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END-LINE STUDY

ON

**PREVENTING AND CONTAINING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN EIGHT REGIONS
IN THE NORTHERN PART OF GHANA**

NOVEMBER, 2024

FOREWORD

Violent Extremism (VE) and terrorism have become global threats, with Africa being particularly vulnerable due to underlying drivers such as porous borders, corruption, weak governance structures, food insecurity, rapid population growth, conflicts and high youth unemployment. Despite various efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism across the continent, these actions have not been fully successful in curbing the spread of extremist ideologies. Ghana's neighboring countries including Burkina Faso and Mali have experienced attacks from extremist groups, underscoring the regional threat.

Ghana has long been recognized as a peaceful nation with no history of extremist attacks. However, developments within the country's neighbours pose serious threat to peace in the country. In February 2023, for instance, media reports highlighted the arrival of approximately 4,000 individuals displaced by Jihadist attacks in Burkina Faso, who sought refuge in Ghana's northern border regions. This influx, coupled with the persistent Bawku conflict, a deeply rooted and longstanding issue, has escalated feelings of insecurity among residents in these areas. While the government remains vigilant and proactive in addressing potential threats, these challenges highlight the fragility of peace in the region and emphasize the need for continued efforts to safeguard national stability.

As part of the country's effort to prevent and contain VE activities, the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET) was developed in 2019. Under this framework, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), was one of the state institutions mandated to implement the framework by fostering peace and security through public education on violent extremism. In furtherance of this call, the Commission

in 2021 implemented the Preventing Electoral Violence and Providing Security to the Northern Border Regions of Ghana (NORPREVSEC) project, from which a risk analysis study highlighted the risk of border communities to extremist activities, and the need for vigilance, education, and proactive community engagement. To strengthen efforts at building resilience of communities located within Ghana's northern border areas, the NCCE in 2023 continued with its prevention education programs on VE by implementing the Preventing and Containing Violent Extremism project (PCVE) to sustain gains made through the NORPREVSEC project. By design, a baseline study was undertaken to assess attitudes and behaviours of communities and institutional response to containing and preventing violent extremism. The Commission subsequently carried out activities that would contribute to shaping and transforming attitudes and behaviours of community members towards radicalisation into violent extremist activities.

Tailored activities were undertaken by the Commission to address vulnerabilities, promote co-existence, and strengthen resilience among communities.

The end-line study examined changes in community knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours regarding violent extremism and other forms of violence. It also examined community tolerance levels towards different religious and linguistic groups and assessed the contributions of both state and non-state actors in combating violent extremism. The result provides empirical basis for gauging the impact of educational activities and interventions undertaken by the NCCE.

The end-line study gathered information in November, 2024 from 1334 Ghanaians (primary respondents) from 58 selected

districts within the eight (8) project regions. Additionally, a total of forty-eight (48) senior/managerial staff from security as well as other relevant state and non-state institutions were contacted. A response rate of 98.6% (1334 out of estimated 1353), recorded for the primary respondents confirms the willingness of community members to participate in the study.

The study identified poverty as one of the main drivers of joining extremist groups. Also, the study indicated a notable decline in violence with a significant increase in citizens' awareness about risks of radicalization, as well as an enhanced tolerance level across the eight project regions over the project period.

In addition to gauging the impact of NCCE's intervention on PCVE, the study provides sector-specific micro-level data on the activities of security agencies, local NGO's, the media and Civil Society Organizations, which are necessary for enhancing their efforts in strengthening security for Ghanaians. The study ultimately, add to the wealth of empirical works produced by the NCCE on improving Ghana's security and democratic governance.

The NCCE expresses its gratitude to all actors who contributed in diverse ways to the success of the end-line study.

The Commission expresses its appreciation to Dr. Festus Aubyn of the West African Network for Peace building (WANEP) for volunteering his expertise in validating the study instruments.

The Commission wishes to express its sincere gratitude to all primary respondents and key informants who enthusiastically participated in this research study and whose responses greatly enriched the study. We also appreciate the dedication and hard work of NCCE's field officers and the administrative support from the Regional Directors, which collectively

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Building on previous surveys, this study leveraged on the Commission's existing electronic platform, Open Data Kit, established with support from the European Union, for seamless data generation and organization.

Under the able leadership of Dr. Henrietta Asante-Sarpong, Director of NCCE's Research Monitoring and Evaluation (RM&E) Department, the study was successfully carried out. The hard work and commitment of the entire RM&E department staff is highly appreciated. The staff who supported with the report production exercise were Mr. Abednego Akutam, Mr. Michael Amponsah, Ms. Flora Mudey, Ms. Victoria Ama Baiden, Ms. Pascaline Diana Shikor, Mrs. Joana Mensah Aidoo, Mr. Edem Kwami Aflakpui, and Mr. Frederick Mawuli Agbenu.

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KATHLEEN ADDY (MS.)

CHAIRMAN, NCCE

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ACRONYMS

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACEO	-	Assistant Civic Education Officer
CSO	-	Civil Society Organization
DISEC	-	District Security Council
EU	-	European Union
GAF	-	Ghana Armed Forces
GBC	-	Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
GIS	-	Ghana Immigration Service
GPrS	-	Ghana Prisons Service
GPS	-	Ghana Police Service
GRA-CD	-	Ghana Revenue Authority- Customs Division
IBM	-	International Business Machines Corporation
MoU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
NABOCADO	-	Navrongo Bolgatanga Diocesan Development Office
NAFPCVET	-	National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
NCCE	-	National Commission for Civic Education
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organization
NIB	-	National Intelligence Bureau
NORPREVSEC Northern	-	Preventing Electoral Violence and Providing Security to the Border Regions of Ghana
NPC	-	National Peace Council
ODK	-	Open Data Kit
PCVE	-	Preventing and Containing Violent Extremism
PDA	-	Personal Digital Assistance
RAs	-	Research Assistants
RMED	-	Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Department



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PREVENTING AND CONTAINING VIOLENT EXTREMISM



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ACRONYMS

SDG	-	Sustainable Development Goal
SPSS	-	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
VE	-	Violent Extremism
VET	-	Violent Extremism and Terrorism
WANEP	-	West Africa Network for Peace Building
WAPSN	-	West Africa Peace and Security Network

KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Anti-Extremist Initiatives

Anti-extremist initiatives are efforts and programs designed to prevent, counter and reduce the spread of extremist ideologies and actions. These initiatives aim to promote tolerance, understanding, and peaceful solutions while addressing the root causes of extremism, such as social, economic, or political grievances.

At-risk groups

At-risk groups are people vulnerable to any form of activities of extremist groups.

Attitude

Attitudes refer to settled ways of thinking or feeling about someone or something, typically reflected in a person's behavior.

Behavior

Behavior is the way people act especially towards other people.

Chieftaincy factions

Chieftaincy factions refer to different groups or parties within a community that support rival candidates or claimants for the position of chief.

Civic Responsibilities

Civic responsibilities are the duties and actions that individuals are expected to perform as members of a community or society to help maintain and improve the well-being of their community. These responsibilities often support democratic values, social order, and the common good

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are non-governmental and non-profit entities that operate independently from the government.

Communal violence

Communal violence refers to violent conflict between groups that share a common identity, often based on ethnicity, religion, or other social ties.

Counter-Terrorism

Counter-terrorism incorporates the practice, military tactics, techniques and strategy that government, military enforcement, business, and intelligence agencies use to combat or prevent terrorism.

Election related conflicts

Election-related conflicts are disputes and violence that occur during or after elections, often due to disagreements over the results or the unfairness of the election process.

Ethnic conflicts

Ethnic conflict refers to the tension, hostility and violence that arise from differences in ethnicity.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is the quality or fact of belonging to a population, group or subgroup made up of people who share a common cultural background or descent.

Extremist

An extremist is a person who holds an uncompromising political or religious views and may advocate for radical actions in furtherance of their views.

Inter communal clashes

Inter-communal clashes refers to conflicts that occur between different communities, often over resources, political power, or cultural differences.

Knowledge

Knowledge is information, understanding, and skills acquired through experience or education. It encompasses facts, information, and skills learned through education or experience

Linguistic Groups

Linguistic Groups are groups of related languages that have descended from a common ancestor which is called the proto-language of the family.

Multidimensional poverty

Multidimensional poverty means being poor in more ways than just not having enough money. It includes lacking things like good health, education, clean water, or a safe place to live. It looks at all the different ways a person or family might struggle, not just their income.

Non-state actors

Non-State Actors are individuals and organizations that are not affiliated with, directed by, or funded through any sovereign government, and often exercise significant political influence and territorial control.

Political polarization

Political polarization is the process by which public opinion divides and goes to the extremes. This often results in a significant division between political parties or groups.

Radicalization

Radicalization is the process by which someone is indoctrinated to support/partake in terrorism and/or extremist activities.

Religious intolerance

Religious intolerance refers to the inability of individuals or groups to tolerate and respect the beliefs and practices of others.

State Actors

State Actors are persons who act on behalf of a governmental body and are therefore subjected to limitations imposed on them by the government.

Terrorism

The UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines terrorism as “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, or taking hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act”

Violent Extremism

Violent Extremism refers to the justification, support and use of violence to achieve a goal, normally political, social, religious or ideological.

Vulnerable Groups

Vulnerable groups refer to segments of the population that are more susceptible to experiencing harm, discrimination, or disadvantage.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Global reports highlight the resurgence of extremist groups in recent years exploiting socio-economic inequalities, political grievances, and gaps in governance structures in the radicalization and recruitment of marginalized youth. Further, these extremist groups leverage on the power of social media and other digitalized platforms to promote their ideologies. The activities of this group have the potential for violent extremism to destabilize communities, cause disruption of livelihoods, and hinder a country's development trajectory. This reinforces the urgency of countries such as Ghana to adopt effective preventive measures.

Ghana known for its stability in democratic governance and relative peace in the West African region, has faced rising concerns over the threat of violent extremism (VE). The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) with support from the European Union (EU) have implemented the project on preventing and containing violent extremism (PCVE) in eight (8) regions in the northern part of Ghana. This was to address the VE menace and promote peaceful and inclusive governance to ensure resilience and security in Ghana. The PCVE project activities included a Baseline study, implementation of key interventions and programmes as well as an End-line study in these selected regions. The key interventions and programmes implemented focused on preventing, preempting and protecting communities from the threats of violent extremism as well as other forms of violence in the country.

This report highlights findings from the End-line study to measure and monitor the progress made post-Baseline study and the implementation of the key interventions and programmes to identify the successes, challenges and lessons learnt. This provides the leverage needed for policy adjustments and the platform for scaling up initiatives in similar vulnerable areas in the country.

Methodology

Similar to the Baseline study, the design for the End-line study was a cross-sectional mixed method undertaken in two phases, namely; quantitative (survey) and qualitative (key informant interviews) research methodologies. The project originally had an eighteen (18) months duration with the Baseline in February 2023, followed by the intervention and programme phase and then, the End-line study in November 2024. The End-line study data collection was carried out in 58 districts across the eight (8) selected regions relative to the Baseline study in 59 districts in the eight (8) regions.

The End-line study quantitative phase participants were persons aged 15 years and above (referred to as primary participants) who resided in these selected districts and regions. This was similar to the Baseline study. The sample size calculation, sampling techniques and procedure for the End-line study was the same as the Baseline study. The Day's Code method was employed in addition to systematic and simple random sampling techniques in the selection and identification of structures, households and individuals. The sample size for the End-line study was 1,353 similar to the Baseline study. However, a total of 1,343 individuals were finally engaged in the quantitative phase resulting in a response rate of 98.6, a 1.2% lower than that of the Baseline study (99.8%). The data collection method employed was survey using a structured questionnaire embedded in an electronic device. Data collection was carried out by trained Research Assistants. Data collection was conducted in major local languages across the eight (8) project regions. Similar to the Baseline study, data were managed in MS Excel and exported into IBM SPSS (version 26.0) for analysis.

Participants for the End-line study qualitative phase (referred to as secondary participants) were informants from key state and non-state institutions from the eight (8) project regions as was during the Baseline study. Forty-eight (48) participants were purposively selected compared to the sixty-seven (67) participants during the Baseline study. The average interviews carried out in each region was six (6) using interview guides compared to eight (8) interviews per region during the Baseline study. Data were generally audio-taped with permission from participants. Similar to the Baseline study, the main medium of language for the interviews was English. The average interview duration was 38.6 minutes relative to 45 minutes for the Baseline study. Interviews were carried out generally in the offices of study participants. The audio-taped interviews were transcribed into text-based formats for analysis using themes. Data were managed with the Atlas-ti application (version 7.9), although the version 7.5.7 was used during the Baseline study.

The preparation towards the End-line study focused on the pretesting and validation of the data collection tools to guarantee data accuracy and completeness. Monitoring and supervision were carried out during the fieldwork. This was to ensure accurate, timely and quality data production. The End-line data collection was not without adherence to the principles of ethics in research similar to that of the Baseline study. The confidentiality, privacy and autonomy of all study participants were observed.

Findings

The demographic characteristics of the survey participants for the End-line study showed that male participants (49.0%) were slightly lower than females (51.0%).

However, the Baseline study showed 0.2% higher males than females. Regional variation by sex showed more male and female recruited in the Northern Region respectively for the End-line. However, the Bono East and Bono Regions had the highest male and female recruits in the Baseline study respectively. The average age of the participants was 37.0 years, similar to that of the Baseline study. Same as the Baseline study, the age group 20-29 years formed the highest proportion in the End-line study, but with a 0.6% higher than in the Baseline study. More (61.0%) of the End-line study participants were in marital unions (married or living together) and about one-third had never been married. This was similar to the Baseline study results. However, the proportion of those married during the End-line study was 3.7% lower than that of the Baseline study. More than half of the participants were affiliated to the Islamic religion and two in five reported to be affiliated to the Christian religion, and this was similar to the Baseline findings. For ethnicity, Dagombas formed the highest proportion of participants (24.8%) while Mossi (0.9%) were the least. This was not different from the findings at the Baseline Study.

The End-line study found that about 24.0% had never attained any level of formal education; this was higher during the Baseline study (28.7%). A quarter (25.4%) of the participants had attained secondary education and 12.1% had completed tertiary education; these were almost the same in the Baseline study respectively. About one-third (36.1%) of the participants were self-employed (with/without employees), and 14.1% were unemployed (looking for a job/not looking for a job). These findings were slightly lower than that of the Baseline study. Herdsmen formed 3.9% of the study participants for the End-line study, and a 0.4% higher than in the Baseline study.

In the qualitative phase of the End-line study, interviews were conducted among forty-eight (48) key informants compared to sixty-seven (67) in the Baseline study. These key informants included state and non-state actors for the two studies. Further, each study constituted security institutions, traditional authorities, religious institutions, civil society organisations (CSOs) and the media respectively. In the End-line study, state actors interviewed were thirty-seven (37), that of the non-state actors were eleven (11) while that of the Baseline study comprised of twenty-nine (29) state actors and thirty-eight (38) non-state actors. The demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the key informants in the End-line study showed that 3/48 were females, and 47/48 had attained tertiary education. But, at Baseline, all participants were males and 65/68 had received tertiary education.

Changes in communities knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors toward VE

The study highlights indicators on communities' knowledge, attitudes and behaviours towards violent extremism (VE) and other forms of violence among both primary and secondary participants. Additionally, a brief comparative analysis of these indicators at the Baseline and End-line studies were examined. On knowledge towards VE, 78.1% of primary participants affirmed the correct statement explaining VE during the End-line study relative to 67.0% at Baseline. This showed an increase of 11.1%. For Key Informants (KIs), these secondary participants

better understood the concept of VE compared to primary participants for both studies. The study revealed that politicians were the group most likely to give support to extremist groups across both studies. On the knowledge of individuals being recruited by extremists groups, while 23 primary participants reported to be privy to such an exercise at Baseline, the End-line study recorded only eight (8) with such knowledge. A 35.5% of the survey participants for the End-line study perceived that Ghana may experience an extremist attack in the near future. One of the key reasons associated with this perception among participants was the current economic hardships faced in the country (45.4%). For at-risk groups targeted by extremists, the youth and women emerged from both the Baseline and End-line studies respectively. Other emerged at-risk groups targeted by extremists from the End-line study included internet users and strangers. From the perspective of the KIs, some asserted that there exists some potential that could spur the activities of violent extremists in the country. In sharp contrast, secondary participants also averred that the country was safe, expressing positive feedback on the state of security in the country. On participants involvements in violence across the eight project regions, 1.7% reported to have ever engaged in violence at End-line compared to 3.4% at Baseline.

Communities' resilience and tolerance towards diverse groups.

The study explored participants' perspectives on communities' level of tolerance towards different social groups, experiences of discrimination or harassment, and perceived conflicts. The End-line study showed a marginal decline in community tolerance towards neighbours from diverse religious, ethnic and political backgrounds. For instance, while 77.8% of participants were willing to accept people with different religious backgrounds at Baseline, this declined to 77.6% at End-line. Additionally, a slight decline in attitudes towards neighbours with different political affiliations from 81.0% at Baseline to 79.6% at End-line was observed. While there was a slight improvement on ethnic discrimination (7.6% at Baseline and 5.9% at End-line), discrimination against persons with disabilities (in relation to accessing essential services) worsened (14.3% at Baseline to 20.0% at End-line) significantly. On participants' perceived level of conflict within their communities, this decreased drastically. For example, while reports of violent political polarization fell from 17.6% (Baseline survey) to 8.9% (End-line survey), instances of violent religious intolerance dropped from 3.9% (Baseline survey) to 0.9% (End-line survey). Also, reports of ethnic conflict and violence-related to land disputes declined from 22.3% (Baseline survey) to 13.0% (End-line survey). Generally, the findings from the End-line study compared to the Baseline study showed enhanced community harmony despite some areas of concern, such as discrimination against PWDs with respect to accessing essential services. The overall tolerance level across the eight (8) project regions exhibited a modest improvement score from 82.6% (Baseline study) to 84.3% (End-line study).

Contribution of state and non-state actors towards the fight against Violent Extremism

This study demonstrated that both state and non-state institutions have critical roles in combating violent extremism. These institutions have engaged in varied activities such as intelligence gathering, establishing specialized units for countering violent extremism, and fostering collaborations with other security agencies. Of particular, state institutions have initiated regular capacity-building practices and the creation of information centers, contributing to their efforts in the fight against extremism. In addition, non-state institutions such as CSOs have initiated various activities which focus around community awareness programmes, youth empowerment initiatives, provision of support for at-risk individuals, and promoting peacebuilding activities.

Highlighting on the participants' assessments of these state and non-state institutions, while a state institution such as the Ghana Police Service and Ghana Armed Forces were rated as "Somehow prompt" in their service delivery respectively, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) received higher ratings for both promptness and proactiveness in addressing extremism. Moreover, NCCE was highly regarded for its public sensitization and capacity-building efforts on violent extremism. On institutional collaboration, the study revealed the strong engagements among some agencies such as the Ghana Police Service and National Intelligence Bureau with other stakeholders, as well as the NCCE's community-based collaborations.

Gender Dynamics of Violent Extremism

The study explored the roles and effects of violent extremism association with gender dynamics. Women have been perceived to be victims of violent extremism. However, corroborating existing findings, study participants revealed the involvements of women in aiding, sustaining, and in preventing violent extremism. For instance, both the Baseline and End-line studies indicated the frequent smuggling of firearms by women. In contrast, women have served as educators, role models and peace-makers in the prevention of violence. The effects of violent extremism on women showed long-term social and psychological consequences like loss of property and livelihoods.

Outcomes and impact of NCCE's public education on PCVE

The End-line study assessed the activities of NCCE under the PCVE project. Findings showed that 43.2% of participants partook in the Commission's activities in-person while averagely, 56.6% were involved in different forms of media engagements. Participation was highest

among the youthful population (60.1%), and in the North East region (70.2%) respectively. The most effective mechanism for channeling out the PCVE intervention project were the radio (79.5%) and posters (76.8%) in the project areas. Additionally,, the use of Community Information Centres was found to be the effective channel in regions like Bono (88.7%) and Oti (85.9%). The PCVE intervention reached out to close to 50.0% of its population in the project areas. Furthermore,, T-shirts used in disseminating PCVE messages increased the visibility of the project. The EU-funded PCVE project was perceived to be effective in reducing the risk of radicalization and engagement in criminal activities within communities especially among unemployed youth and other minority groups.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Generally, the PCVE project has underscored the role of institutional collaborations, community-based education, sensitization and empowerment in the fight against violent extremism. This study has not only contributed to advancing knowledge in addressing violent extremism, it has also provided the platform to adapt best practices on the mechanisms in community engagements, education, sensitization and empowerment. Further, promoting gender mainstreaming infusion accompanied with economic opportunities and citizen participation is crucial in VE prevention. Strengthening existing institutions including the NCCE visibility to meet their respective mandates as stipulated in the current National violent extremism policy documents is crucial in violent extremism prevention. Recommendations based on these findings will not only sustain the gains made with the PCVE project but will make Ghana a safe hub as the country meets its national, regional and global commitments in the fight against violent extremism.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 PCVE Project Background and Study Context

In 2019, the Government of Ghana, through the Ministry of National Security, launched the National Framework for the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET). This was part of efforts to contain the threat of violent extremism and in response to the internal and external dimensions of violent extremism and terrorism on the peace and stability of the Country. The Framework's approach centered on building resilience at the community level, promoting awareness, and strengthening the capacities of both local and national institutions to respond proactively to extremism.

To operationalize this, institutions were assigned roles under the Framework of which the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) was part. Under the framework, the NCCE was to carry out public education, dissemination of information, and civic engagement activities to inculcate in the population security consciousness, and situational awareness. This was in line with the NCCE's mandate specified in Article 2 (d) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana “to formulate, implement and oversee programs intended to inculcate in the citizens of Ghana awareness of their civic responsibilities and an appreciation of their rights and obligations as free people”.

In December 2022, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), with funding from the European Union, launched an 18-month project titled “Preventing and Containing Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Eight Border Regions in Northern Ghana”. To kick start the PCVE project, the Commission explored the knowledge, attitudes and behaviors of communities and at-risk groups to violent extremism and other forms of violence in the project regions. It also examined communities' tolerance level towards different religious and linguistic groups, identified and assessed the contributions of state and non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism.

The PCVE project stems from a collaboration between the NCCE and the European Union (EU) rapid response facility under a grant contract to sustain peace and prevent pre-and post-electoral violence in the Northern border regions of Ghana. The project goal aligns with the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development through the promotion of good and inclusive governance and contributes directly to resilience and security in Ghana.

The country, known for its stable democratic governance and relative peace in the West African region, has faced rising concerns over the threat of violent extremism. Regional dynamics, including the proximity to conflict-prone areas like the Sahel and increasing incidents of extremist activities in neighboring countries, highlight Ghana's vulnerability to spillover effects (Aubyn, 2021). Violent extremism, often driven by a mix of political, economic, and social factors, poses a significant threat to peace, stability, and development (United Nations Development Programme, 2016).

Contextually, Ghana's growing youth population, coupled with high unemployment rates and limited socio-economic opportunities in some regions, makes certain groups susceptible to extremist narratives (National Commission for Civic Education, 2021). Additionally, the presence of porous borders and limited surveillance in certain parts of the country increases the risk of infiltration by extremist groups operating within the West African region. Recent developments in Burkina Faso revealed the southward spread of terrorist activities, posing a high risk to coastal states such as Ghana, Benin and Togo. The proximity of the northern parts of the country and other border areas to these insurgent activities, coupled with the numerous unapproved entry points into the country, justify the need for building community resilience against violent extremist or terrorist activities.

In recent years, extremist groups have exploited socio-economic inequalities, political grievances, and gaps in governance structures to radicalize and recruit marginalized youth, leveraging the power of social media and other digital platforms to spread their ideologies (Campbell, 2020; World Report, 2022). The potential for violent extremism to destabilize communities, disrupt livelihoods, and hinder Ghana's development trajectory underpins the urgency of adopting effective preventive measures (National Commission for Civic Education, 2021).

Based on these concerns, the Commission, with the support of the European Union (EU) and through its Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Department obtained baseline data on preventing and containing violent extremism in eight (8) regions in the Northern part of Ghana. Subsequently, the Commission with support from the European Union (EU), implemented key interventions and programs in these regions. The intervention program sought to prevent, preempt and protect communities from the threats of violent extremism and other forms of violence in the country.

Against this background, this end-line study sought to gauge and monitor the progress made in terms of identifying successes, challenges, and lessons learned, and to provide insights for policy adjustments and a basis for scaling up initiatives in other vulnerable areas.

1.2 Purpose/Justification of the Study

In 2023, NCCE conducted a baseline study on preventing and containing violent extremism in eight regions in the Northern part of Ghana. The findings were intended to inform and shape the Commission's nationwide education on violent extremism and to build community resilience against the threats of violent extremism and other forms of violence. The baseline data also provided the platform to assess the contribution of state and non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism in Ghana.

This end-line study focuses on assessing the effectiveness of ongoing efforts to prevent and contain violent extremism across eight project regions in Ghana. It aims to evaluate the outcomes of interventions and programs targeted at awareness creation, youth empowerment, and the promotion of social cohesion, peace and tolerance among communities.

Also, this study is in fulfilment of the terms of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the EU and the NCCE which requires the latter to conduct studies that identify signs of radicalization and to assess the country's preparedness in implementing the preventive pillar on addressing governance gaps and safeguarding the Ghanaian society including vulnerable groups, from violent extremism and terrorism. This study highlights these facets to make results comparable with the findings from the baseline study.

Previous studies have highlighted the effectiveness of grassroots mobilization, community policing, and awareness programs in countering extremism (Gill et al., 2014; Mesok, 2022). However, there is limited data specifically evaluating the impact of these interventions in Ghanaian communities. This study aims to fill that gap by providing empirical evidence on the effectiveness of anti-extremism initiatives, thereby guiding future efforts to secure peace and stability.

Additionally, violent extremism is a pressing concern in West Africa, with neighboring countries experiencing increasing attacks that destabilize communities and economies. Ghana, though relatively peaceful, is not immune to the risks of cross-border extremism, as demonstrated by recent incidents near its borders.

Further, while the country has implemented various preventive measures and intervention programs, there is no rigorous assessment of these initiatives and how they have positively achieved the objectives of the NAFPCVET framework. Therefore, implementation research evidence-based policy recommendations are essential to maximize the impact of current and future programs aimed at reducing the risk of extremism. The current end-line study aimed to provide data-driven insights into which interventions are most effective, to enable stakeholders allocate resources efficiently.

Also, the high rates of youth unemployment and socio-economic disparities across the regions increase the susceptibility of young people to radicalization. In many cases, extremist groups often exploit these vulnerabilities by promising financial incentives and a sense of belonging to those who feel marginalized. Therefore, end-line assessment will help to gauge and evaluate the effectiveness of youth-focused programs within the study regions and to shed light on areas that require additional support and suggest targeted approaches to foster youth resilience against extremist ideologies.

Building resilience at both the community and institutional levels is pivotal to countering violent extremism. Strong communities with inclusive governance, social cohesion, and proactive security measures are more resistant to extremist influence. This survey will explore the extent to which these elements are present in the project regions and identify gaps in community resilience that need to be addressed to prevent violent extremism effectively.

Ghana's commitment to regional stability aligns with both its national security goals and the broader objectives of international frameworks such as the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. This study will support these objectives by providing actionable insights that can inform policy frameworks and contribute to achieving sustainable peace and security in the region. The findings from this survey will serve as a valuable resource for policymakers, security agencies, non-governmental organizations, and community leaders.

1.3 Study Objectives

The study broadly assesses changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of communities and at-risk groups towards violent extremism, evaluates the outcomes of NCCE's programs targeted at awareness creation and the contributions of state and non-state actors in the fight against VE.

The specific objectives of this study were to:

- i. Evaluate changes in community knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors toward VE.
- ii. Examine community resilience and tolerance towards diverse groups.
- iii. Assess the extent to which state and non-state actors have contributed towards the fight against VE.
- iv. Assess outcomes and impact of NCCE's public education on PCVE

1.4 Organisation of the Report

The study is organized into nine chapters. The first chapter which is the introductory chapter covers the background of the study, study justification, objectives of the study and an outline of how the report has been organized. Chapter two covers the detailed methodology employed for the study. It outlines the study design, scope and sampling approaches as well as data generation, analysis and reporting techniques employed. The third chapter highlights the socio-demographic and background characteristics of both primary and secondary participants of the study.

In chapter four, the report highlights feedback received on issues related to the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of communities and at-risk groups to VE and other forms of violence in the study areas. In addition to general knowledge of the menace, motivations for joining violent extremist groups and factors influencing the support of VE groups are captured in this chapter.

Chapter five provides an assessment of communities' level of tolerance towards people of different backgrounds in Ghana, while chapter six highlights the contribution of state and non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism. The chapter also presents results on challenges faced by institutions in responding to the risk and threat of violent extremism in Ghana, and the recommendations proffered for strengthening their efforts in the fight.

In chapter seven, the report presents the gender dynamics of violent extremism and other forms of violence in Ghana. The eighth chapter presents feedback on the impact of NCCE's awareness-raising interventions on violent extremism, social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. Lastly, Chapter nine provides a summary of the key findings from the study and presents key policy and program-related recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

STUDY METHODOLOGY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines in detail the procedural techniques used to achieve the objectives of this End-line study. This section covers the study design and area, the sample size estimation, and the sampling procedure adopted. Additionally, it provides a thorough description of the data collection methods, data management and analysis techniques, as well as the ethical issues used in the study. Also, this chapter is presented in two phases guided by the research methodology employed.

2.2 Study Design

Similar to the design employed during the Baseline study, this End-line study utilised a cross-sectional mixed-methods design with both quantitative and qualitative methods. This was to evaluate the changes in knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of communities on violent extremism (VE) and the contribution of state and non-state actors in the fight against VE. The use of the same study design for the end-line stage provided an opportunity to make comparisons with the Baseline study findings.

2.3 Scope and Sampling

The study was undertaken in the eight (8) project regions of Ghana. This is also consistent with the Baseline study. These eight regions included Upper East, Upper West, North East, Northern, Savannah, Bono, Oti and Bono East. The first six (6) regions (Upper West, North East, Northern, Savannah, Bono, and Oti) were selected based on sharing borders with Ghana's neighbouring countries where some forms of violent extremism acts have been experienced. Furthermore, these may serve as entry points for violent extremist groups into the country. Bono and Bono East regions on the other hand serves as an intermediate region linking the border regions to the middle and coastal regions of the country, which may create a means of exposure to the threats of violent extremism to these regions.

Same as the Baseline study, fifty-nine (59) out of the seventy (70) districts in these eight (8) project regions were the study sites. The selection of these 59 districts was guided by two criteria (Box 1).

Box 1: Selection criteria for districts as study sites

- ❖ Districts that share a border with neighbouring countries;
 - ❖ Districts that have a population of 75,000 or more.
-

Districts that share a border with neighbouring countries are the first possible entry points for extremist groups into the country. Districts with a population of 75,000 or more that have attained municipal and metropolitan statuses generally have a more youthful population who form part of the primary target group for radicalization into violent extremist activities (NCCE, 2021). The selected districts and regions are captured in Appendix III. Nevertheless, fifty-eight (58) districts were finally involved in the data collection exercise. Participation in the data collection exercise was made impossible in the Garu district in the Upper East region due to an on-going conflict in Bawku in the region at the time of the study. This affected the work of the field team prior to the data collection.

2.4 Phases of the study

2.4.1 Quantitative phase of the study

2.4.1.1 Study population

The study population for the quantitative phase during the End-line study was residents aged 15 years and above in the localities within the 58 districts across the eight regions, one (1) district less than that of the Baseline study.

2.4.1.2 Sample size, distribution and procedure

Following that of the Baseline study, the Krejcie and Morgan formula was used to calculate the sample size for the quantitative phase of the End-line study. The calculated sample size for the End-line study was the same as the Baseline study of 1,353. However, the overall End-line study had 1,334 individuals out of the 1,353 who responded to the data collection tool, resulting in a response rate of 98.6. This was 1.2% lower than the Baseline study response rate of 99.8.

Not to divert from the Baseline study sample size distribution across the selected districts and regions, the End-line study used the proportionate share of a region's population to the national population. For the district samples, a district-specific sample was derived based on the district share of the population in the region. For each locality sample, equal samples for males and females, with a higher female proportion for odd-number samples were selected. Further, for each male-female sample, close to half were administered to the youth (15-35 years). Overall, in metropolitan/municipal/district with sample sizes of 20 and above, one (1) herdsman was purposively selected as an at-risk group category. The sample distribution is captured in Appendix III.

Additionally, the sampling techniques used were not different from what were applied during the Baseline study. These included purposive, systematic and simple random sampling techniques in the selection of primary participants, households and structures leveraging on the Lottery method and the Day' Code technique. Further details on the sampling techniques can be found in the Baseline Study report (NCCE Baseline Study on PCVE in the Northern part of Ghana, 2023).

2.4.1.3 Data collection tool and method

A structured questionnaire was used for the quantitative phase of the End-line study similar to the Baseline study. The structured questionnaire covered information on demographic and socio-economic characteristics, changes in knowledge, attitudes and behaviours towards violent extremism. Further, communities' level of tolerance towards different ethnic groups as well as the extent of contributions of state and non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism.

The data collection method employed was the survey. This was carried out by trained Research Assistants (RAs) utilising a face-to-face approach with the survey tool embedded in an electronic device (Android phones) through the Open Data Kit (ODK) software application. Data collection was conducted between 11th November 2024 and 16th November 2024 whereas the Baseline study was undertaken in February 2023. Same as that of the Baseline study, the End-line study was also carried out in the major local languages (Kasem, Sissala, Dagaare, Mamprulu, Waale, Gonja, Twi, Frafra and Ewe) in the selected districts across the eight (8) regions.

2.4.1.4 Data management and analysis

Data collected were synchronized into an existing database hosted at the Head Office of the NCCE. Hosted data were downloaded into MS Excel, cleaned and exported into IBM SPSS (version 26.0) to ensure consistencies and non-blanks prior to analysis. Statistical techniques utilised were frequency count, percentage and proportion distribution. Furthermore, like the Baseline study, the Partial Credit scoring technique was used to assess the tolerance level of participants towards different ethnic, religious, linguistic and political groups. In addition, the Data Wrapper software (version 1.19.0) was used to examine the spatial distribution of selected issues related to violent extremism at both the district and regional levels.

2.4.2 Qualitative phase of the study

2.4.2.1 Study population

Same as the Baseline study, participants for the qualitative phase of the End-line study included state and non-state actors like the security institutions, traditional authorities, religious institutions, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the media within the eight (8) regions. The security institutions included the Ghana Police Service (GPS), Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), Ghana Prisons Service and the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA). Whereas state actors interviewed were thirty-seven (37), that of the non-state actors were eleven (11).

2.4.2.2 Sample size, distribution and procedure

Relative to the Baseline study of sixty-seven (67) interviews, the End-line study had forty-

eight (48) key informant interviews due to the unavailability of some participants as well as the limited representation of some of the selected institutions across every region for the research project. The average number of interviews per the selected region was six (6). Participants were purposively selected, and were mostly senior officers of these selected institutions [Appendix IV].

2.4.2.3 Data collection tool and method

Similar to the Baseline study, an in-depth interview guide was utilised to elicit information on violent extremism, and the contribution of these institutions (state and non-state actors) in the fight against violent extremism. Trained officers from the Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Department (RMED) [formerly the Research, Gender and Equality Department], of the NCCE carried out the data collection in-person from 1st November 2024 to 10th November 2024. Generally, the main language for the interviews was English. In a few instances, interviews were carried out in the local language while interpreters were also used. The average interview duration was 38.6 minutes. Interviews were conducted mostly in the offices of participants. Data were audio-taped using android phones.

2.4.2.4 Data management and analysis

Audio-taped interviews with key informants were transcribed into text-based format for easy analysis. The text-based documents were imported into the Atlas-ti software (version 9) for data management and analysis. Using a rigorous process of familiarization, data coding and theme development, patterns of meanings addressing the study's objectives were identified.

2.5 Preparatory activities for field data collection

2.5.1 Pre-testing of instrument/interview guide

As it was done during the Baseline study, both data collection tools were pre-tested by two (2) officers from the Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Department in two (2) selected municipalities in the Greater Accra region, that is, Madina and Ashaiman respectively. Further, the interview guide for the key informants was also reviewed and validated by an expert from the West African Network for Peace-building (WANEP). Prior to the review, validation and finalization of the data collection tools, a desk review of relevant reports, studies and articles on violent extremism in Ghana and West Africa as well as findings from the Baseline study, information from these sources informed the development of the data collection tools for the entire End-line study exercise.

2.5.2 Training for data collection

For the End-line study, a two (2) day in-person training session was organized for sixty-one (61) selected Research Assistants (RAs) drawn from the Commission's workforce across the selected project districts. Eligibility of RAs was based on the staff rank of Civic Education Officer (CEO) and above, with a minimum qualification of a Higher National Diploma or Bachelor's degree.

The training was organized in Tamale in the Northern region from the 7th November 2024 to 8th November 2024. Resource persons for the training comprised the Lead/Principal Researcher (Director of RMED, NCCE) with support from the technical staff of the Department, NCCE. The training was also graced with representatives from the European Union Project Office and NCCE's executive body who performed both the opening and closing sessions during the two respective ceremonies.

Whereas the Baseline study training was a mixed approach (virtual and in-person), that of the End-line was in-person only to allow trainees to engage directly with the facilitators, ask questions, seek clarity and receive detailed explanations on the various aspects of the study. The sessions helped to reinforce the study methodology and distribution of study materials and logistics for the take-off of the entire data collection exercise.

2.5.3 Monitoring and supervision

Similar to the Baseline study, the monitoring and supervision exercise was carried out by staff of the RMED, regional heads of the study regions, in addition to some senior-level and management staff at the Head Office of NCCE during the data collection period. The monitoring and supervision exercise was undertaken to ensure the data is collected accurately and timely, as well as ascertain the right application of the methodology in the field. The exercise comprised of spot checks, focus on participants selection and the conduct processes of the interviews. The Director of RMED was in charge of the overall coordination, monitoring and supervision of the data collection exercise.

2.6 Ethical considerations

Not to depart from the Baseline study approaches, institutional, community and household entries were carried out for the End-line study. These included institutional permissions at the national level for proposed key informant interviews to be carried out in their respective regional offices. Additionally, formal letters were also presented to the offices of selected NGOs/CSOs and media organisations at the regional levels. Furthermore, Research Assistants also had official letters from the Commission about the study and the data collection exercise to ensure smooth community and household entry processes. While permission was sought from the heads of households, verbal consent was obtained from participants to ensure privacy, confidentiality and autonomy. Additionally, while verbal consents were sought from parents/guardians of participants aged 15 to 17 years, assents were obtained from this category of participants.

2.7 Reporting

Similar to the Baseline study, an eleven (11) member team made up of nine (9) from the Research, Monitoring, and Evaluation Department (RMED) and two (2) from the University of Ghana, Legon undertook the data management and the reporting on this study.

Findings from the quantitative phase of the study are presented mainly as descriptive in the form of tables, charts, graphs and mean scores with brief narrations. Additionally, themes and quotations from the output of the qualitative analysis were used to support the quantitative findings where necessary and appropriate.

CHAPTER THREE

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents details of the background characteristics of the End-line study participants. As in the Baseline study, two categories of participants were interviewed for the study. These were, primary participants comprising persons 15 years and above for the quantitative aspect of the study, and Key Informants (KIs) who were senior officers and heads/management staff of selected state and non-state institutions for the qualitative phase.

The main background information presented includes sex, age, educational level, employment status, marital status, religious affiliation and ethnicity of the study participants. These characteristics are highlighted to provide perspectives for further analysis, establishing linkages between these characteristics and other key outcomes of the study. The chapter also compares certain characteristics of the study participants from both the Baseline and End-line studies.

3.2 Background Characteristics of Primary Participants

3.2.1 Sex distribution of participants by study period


It is observed in Figure 3.1 that, more females participated in the End-line study compared to the Baseline (NCCE Baseline study, 2023). While 49.9% of participants in the Baseline study were female, the proportion was 51.0% in the End-line study. There was a slight decrease in male participant population, from 50.1% in the Baseline to 49.0% in the End-line study. The results from the End-line study, however, reflect the national male-female population distribution, with females constituting 51 percent and males 49 percent.

From the End-line data, of the 1334 participants interviewed, the Northern region recorded the highest proportions of male (16.4%) and female (16.5%) participants, respectively. This was followed by the Upper East region, with 8.9% male and 8.0% female participants, respectively. The Oti region recorded the lowest proportion of female participants (2.8%), while the North East region had the least proportion of male participants (3.1%) in the End-line study.

3.2.2 Age distribution of respondents by study period

The mean age recorded at the end-line stage was similar to that of the Baseline. The mean age from the End-line study was 36.5 (SD±13.684) compared to 37.0 (SD±15.026) years in the Baseline study. Figure 3.1 presents the percentage distribution of participants across different age groups at the End-line study. More than a quarter (28.6%) of the participants were in the age bracket of 20-29 years. This was followed by 26.5% of the participants in the age group 30–39 years.

Figure 3.1: Age distribution of participants at End-line




Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

The least proportion of participants were in the age group 60 years and above (7.6%). By sex dis-aggregation, there were more female participants in the age groups 15-19 (50.5%) and 20-29 (57.1%) years respectively. The age groups 30-39, 40 -49, 50-59 and above 60 years had more male participants than female participants respectively

3.2.3 Marital status

The study explored the marital status of the participants at the End-line study. Figure 3.2 shows that 58.9% of the participants were married. Approximately a third (29.8%) were single, and 5.7% were widowed. A 2.1% were cohabiting/living together, 1.0% were divorced and 2.5% separated.

Figure 3.2: Percentage distribution of participants by marital status at the End-line study




Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

3.2.4 Religious affiliation at Baseline and End-line Study

The religious affiliation of people plays a role in shaping their worldview and behaviour (Elsayed, K. G., Lestari, A. A., Brougham, F. A., 2023). The study, therefore, explored the religious affiliations of participants (Figure 3.3). The majority of the participants were affiliated to the Islam religion (54.9%), followed by Christianity (39.5%), and traditionalists constituted 4.0%. Additionally, 1.6% of the participants were not affiliated to any religion. The Baseline data shows a similar pattern, as highlighted in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: Religious affiliation of participants



Source: PCVE Baseline and End-line Study Data, November, 2024

3.2.5 Ethnic composition of participants by study period

Table 3.1 presents the ethnic composition of the study participants from both the Baseline and End-line studies. As was the case in the Baseline survey, the ethnic group with the highest proportion of participants was the Dagomba (24.8%), followed by the Akan group (10.7%), and then the Konkomba group (6.8%).

Table 3.1 Distribution of Ethnicity of participants

Ethnic group	Baseline%	End-line%
Akan	8.4	10.7
Ewe	2.5	2.7
Guan	3.1	4.6
Wala	5.5	5.1
Dagomba	23.1	24.8
Grusi	2.2	1.9
Kusaal	7.1	5.2
Mamprusi	2.9	2.9
Sissala	3.7	4.0
Fulbe	2.7	2.8
Gruni	7.5	5.6
Bimoba	2.6	2.5
Dagaaba	6.2	6.7
Konkomba	7.7	6.8
Other	5.1	3.0
Bassare	2	1.9
Gonja	3.6	1.6
Kotokoli	1.1	0.8
Nanumba	1.6	1.9
Nafana	1.4	0.7
Mossi	1	0.9
Kassena	2.2	1.7
Frafra	0.0	1.2
Total	100	100


Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

The Mossi had the least proportion (1.0%) in the Baseline study, the Kotokoli was the ethnic group with the least proportion of the participants (0.8%) in the End-line study. Study participants classified under the ‘other’ category included French and Hausa.

3.2.6 Educational level of participants at Baseline and End-line periods

Peoples' views on issues of security and preventing violent extremism may be closely related to their educational background, and therefore, requires consideration. Compared to the Baseline study, the End-line study recorded a 5.1% decrease in the proportion of participants who have never had any form of education, from 28.7% to 23.6% of the participants (Figure 3.4). The End-line study showed that a quarter (25.4%) of participants had attained secondary education, followed by 20.2% who had attained Middle/Junior High school education, and 12.1% who had completed tertiary education. By sex disaggregation, it was observed that more female participants had little or no education, while more male participants had attained middle/JHS, secondary and tertiary education.

Figure 3.4 Educational level at End-line study



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

3.2.7 Employment status

Employment status provides an insight into the economic situation of individuals, which can significantly influence their priorities, and may therefore be significant for further analysis (Burchell, B., Deakin, S., & Honey, S. 1999). The employment status of the participants for the End-line study was classified under 13 broad themes i.e. Employee (Public sector), Employee (Private sector), Self-employed without employee(s), Self-employed with employee(s), Casual worker, Apprentice, Domestic employee, Unemployed (looking for job), Unemployed (not looking for job), Housewife, Retired/pensioner, Student, and Agriculture (Farming/herdsman). In Table 3.2, majority of participants (76.8%) were employed in some form. The highest proportion were self-employed (without employees) (29.8%), followed by public sector employees (11%), and self-employed with employee (6.3%). Retired/pensioners (2.0%) and agriculture workers (1.4%) had the lowest proportion of participants respectively.

Table 3.2: Employment Status of Participants


Employment status	Frequency	Percent %
Employee (Public sector)	147	11.0
Employee (Private sector)	54	4.0
Self-employed without employee(s)	398	29.8
Self-employed with employee(s)	84	6.3
Casual worker	45	3.4
Apprentice	116	8.7
Domestic employee	59	4.4
Unemployed (looking for job)	134	10.0
Unemployed (not looking for job)	55	4.1
Housewife	75	5.6
Retired/pensioner	27	2.0
Student	121	9.1
Agriculture (Farming/herdsman)	19	1.4
Total	1334	100.0

Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

3.2.8 Regional distribution of study participants

Of the 1,334 primary participants reached, the Northern region had the highest proportion of participants interviewed 32.9%, followed by the Upper East (16.4%), and the Upper West regions (13%) (Figure 3.5). The Savannah and Bono regions had the least proportions with 6.3% each.

Figure 3.5: Regional distribution of participants (%)



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024


3.2.9 Disability status of study participants

Persons who are living with disability constituted 5.2% of the total sample for the End-line study, although the national proportion of persons living with disability is 8.0% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2021). It was further realized that there were more male (54.3%) than female (45.7%) among participants living with disabilities.

3.2.10 Herdsman-ship status of primary participants at Baseline and End-line Study

The End-line study, like the Baseline targeted and interviewed herdsmen to gather their perspectives on the subject matter. As shown in Figure 3.6, of the 1334 people interviewed, 52 (3.9%) were herdsmen, which is similar to the Baseline study where 3.5% of the participants were herdsmen.


Figure 3.6: Herdsman-ship of participants



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

An inquiry into the ethnicity of the herdsmen showed that the majority (67.3%) were Fulbes, followed by Dagbani (5.8%). There were relatively fewer number of herdsmen in the Gruni (1.9%), Bimoba (1.9%) Kokumba (1.9%) and Basari (1.9%) ethnic groups (Figure 3.7).

Figure 3.7 Ethnicity of herdsmen



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

3.3 Characteristics of Secondary Participants

The background information of key informants (KIs) interviewed is essential for the interpretation of results. This section outlines the background characteristics of secondary participants in the End-line study, specifically their sex, age, educational level, and institutional affiliations.

3.3.1 Sex and age of secondary participants

A total of, forty-eight (48) key informant interviews were conducted across the eight project regions for the study. The End-line study recorded interviews with three (3) female key informants whereas the Baseline study involved male informants only. This gap was identified during the Baseline study, and conscious efforts were made at the End-line study to bridge the gap. On age, majority (77%) of the secondary participants were in the age bracket of 36-60 years, 12.5% were below the age of 36 and 10.0% were above 60 years.

3.3.2 Level of Education of secondary participants

Education impacts various aspects of life, such as increasing societal awareness, eliminating superstitions, improving health outcomes, fostering income stability, and promoting a positive attitude. It also enhances knowledge about local events. Therefore, understanding the educational background of study participants was crucial. In this study, nearly all participants (47) had attained tertiary level education, while one participant had received Quranic education.

3.3.3 Institutional Affiliation of secondary participants by region

The study initially aimed to interview fifty-three (53) participants from both state and non-state institutions. However, 48 key informant interviews were successfully conducted across the eight project regions. State institutions are those created by statutory instruments and have their salaries and expenses charged on the consolidated fund. Non-state institutions on the other hand include non-governmental organisations whose salaries and expenses are privately funded.

In total, 37 key informant interviews were conducted with representatives from state institutions across the 8 project regions (Table 3.3). The Upper East region, recorded the highest number of participants (7), followed by the Upper West (6) and North East regions (5). The region with the least number of participants from state institutions was the Oti region with only one (1) participant.

Regarding the specific institutions where interviews were conducted, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) recorded the highest number of participants with seven (7) key informants interviewed respectively. This was followed by the Ghana Prisons Service (6), the Ghana Police Service (5) and the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority (4) in that order. The Ghana Armed Forces and the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation had the least number of participants with only one (1) key informant interview each.

Table 3.3: Distribution of State Institutions contacted by Region

Region	NIB	Ghana Army	GIS	Customs (GRA)	GPS	GPrS	House of Chiefs	NPC	GBC	Total
Northern	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	4
Savannah	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	4
Upper West	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	6
Upper East	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	7
Oti	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
North East	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	5
Bono	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	5
Bono East	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	4
Total	7	1	7	4	5	6	4	2	1	37

Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

Table 3.4 presents the distribution of the secondary participants from non-state institutions across

the study regions. A total of eleven (11) interviews were conducted with non-state institutions across the eight (8) project regions. The Oti region recorded the highest participation of key informant interviews, followed by the Northern region as highlighted in Table 3.4.

Table 3.4: Distribution of Non-State Actors by region

Region	Private Media	CSO/ NGO	Christian Council	Office of the Chief Imam	Total
Northern	1	1	0	0	2
Savannah	0	0	0	1	1
Upper West	0	1	0	0	1
Upper East	0	1	0	0	1
Oti	1	1	1	0	3
North East	1	0	0	0	1
Bono	0	1	0	0	1
Bono East	1	0	0	0	1
Total	4	5	1	1	11

Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

Across the institutions, Civil Society Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations recorded the highest number (5), of key informant interviews, followed by the private media (4), the Christian Council (1), and the Office of the Regional Chief Imam (1).

CHAPTER FOUR

KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOURS OF COMMUNITIES AND AT-RISK GROUPS TOWARDS VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE

4.1 Introduction

Examining the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of communities in preventing Violent Extremism (VE) are core indicators of a community's vulnerability or resilience assessment. It is a crucial benchmark for assessing the success or failure of any intervention which seeks to prevent and contain violent extremism (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), (2022) & Weine et al, (2015).

In line with this, at the project inception stage, one theory of change was for communities to demonstrate desirable attitudes and behaviours which would make them more likely to prevent and contain violent extremism. This could ultimately reduce communities' level of susceptibility usually capitalized on by violent extremist groups to destabilize a community or country.


To test the realization of this theory, the chapter presents a comparative analysis of communities' knowledge, attitudes and behaviours towards violent extremism and other forms of violence from the perspective of both primary and secondary participants. Data from the Baseline and the present End-line study were used for this assessment.

On knowledge, changes in understanding the concept of VE and knowledge of violent extremist groups are presented. Secondly, changes in attitudes and behaviours of communities and at-risk groups towards VE with respect to motivation to join extremist groups, factors influencing support of extremist groups and attitudes towards the fight against VE are assessed. Lastly, knowledge on the existence of other forms of violence, at-risk groups to VE and behaviours of communities towards other forms of violence are investigated.

4.2 Knowledge of the Concept of Violent Extremism

In both the End-line and Baseline studies, an assessment of study participants' knowledge of the concept of VE was explored. Four (4) statements were used to assess the primary participants' knowledge of the concept of VE, of which only one was a correct statement. The correct statement explaining VE is "An act of justification, support and use of violence to achieve a goal, normally political, social, religious or ideological". In comparison to the Baseline, the End-line showed an increase of 11.1% in the knowledge of the concept of VE as indicated in Figure 4.1 with 78.1% at the End-line compared to 67.0% at Baseline.

Figure 4.1: Comparison of Baseline and End-line Results on Correct Statement Explaining VE (%)



Source: Baseline and End-line, PCVE Study Data, February 2023 & November 2024

On the other hand, the study participants who expressed disagreement with the correct scenarios were 15.7% compared to 26.8% at the Baseline stage.

Among the age groups of primary respondents, the End-line and Baseline both found more youth affirming the correct statement in defining VE, the Baseline recorded 65.8% while End-line recorded 78.4% proportions of participants between the age brackets 15-35 years. This indicates an increase in knowledge of 12.6% among the youth across the two study periods. On gender, more males (80.6%) than females (75.8%) affirmed the correct statement at the End-line study.

Regarding persons living with disabilities (PWDs), the study found a similar trend across both studies, where more non-PWDs (78.5% at End-line) than PWDs (70.0% at End-line) knew what constitutes VE. This is far higher than the proportions recorded at the Baseline study (non-PWDs – 67.9%, PWD – 53.6%). Again, there was an increase in knowledge among herdsmen from the Baseline figure of 61.7% to the End-line figure of 63.5%. Overall, knowledge of the concept of VE has increased across various background characteristics.

The key informants (KIs) well understood what constituted VE as they all emphasized the non-existence of violent extremism activity in the region/district. Some of them had this to say:


“For extremism, Bono is a quiet place. I’ve not heard of any extremist activities here. I’ve been here for 14 to 15 years. Yes, I work at all the borders, virtually

all the borders I've never experienced that...". – (KI, Security Agency, Bono region – End-line study).

"In this region, it's fine, it's calm. Although, we are just on the lookout for anything of that sort. Nothing of that sort has been recorded over the period. Our activities and operations cover the whole region, making sure that we detect those kinds of things and sort them out. So, for the security situation now, it's fine. ...". – (KI, Security Agency, Upper West region – End-line study).

Regionally, the Baseline study recorded three regions with less than 70.0% of primary participants affirming the correct statement. The regions were Northern, Bono East and Bono regions. However, in the End-line study, two of these regions Bono and Northern recorded over 80.0% of primary participants who affirmed the right statement. At the End-line study, the Bono region recorded 92.9% and the Northern region 86.3% as depicted in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Regional Comparison of Baseline and End-line Study on Knowledge of the Concept of VE



Source: Baseline and End-line, PCVE Study Data, February 2023 & November 2024

4.2.1 Knowledge of Violent Extremist Groups

Although Ghana has never witnessed any violent extremist attack, it was necessary to find out from study participants whether they were aware of any potential violent extremist groups in their district or community. A one in every forty (2.5% (34)) participants had heard about violent extremist groups in their district. In contrast, a one in every eight, that is, a high proportion of 12.1% was mentioned during the Baseline study.

Out of the 34 primary participants who were aware of potential violent extremist groups in their district, 22 were males, 2 were herdsmen, 25 were adults and 19 of them were from the Northern region.

4.2.1.1 Support to Extremist Groups

From both studies, a high proportion of primary participants mentioned politicians as the group most likely to give support to extremist groups (Figure 4.3). The next groups mentioned were terrorist organizations, foreign nationals and foreign governments respectively. Among the 'Others' mentioned at the End-line study were the Fulbes and the rich in society whereas those for the Baseline study were traditional leaders, armed robbers and ghetto youth.

Figure 4.3: Persons/ Groups Likely to Assist Extremist Groups by Study Period (%)

Baseline	Persons/ Groups likely to assist extremist groups	End-line
38.3	Politicians	33.3
28.1	Terrorist organization	32.8
6.4	Foreign nationals	8.3
7.6	Foreign governments	7.2
8.2	Security Personnel	6.2
3.5	Religious leaders	5.6
4.5	Government representatives	4.0
1.6	Multinational companies/businesses	1.8
1.8	Others	0.8

Source: Baseline and End-line, PCVE Study Data, February 2023 & November 2024

4.2.1.2 Knowledge of Individuals Recruited by an Extremist Group

Similar to the Baseline, the End-line study sought to find out from the primary participants whether they knew of any person(s) or individual(s) in their district or community who had been recruited by an extremist group to perpetrate violence. In contrast to the 23 primary participants who knew of such individual(s) at the Baseline study, the End-line recorded only 8 primary participants.

Across the study regions, the Northern region again recorded the highest number of 5 primary participants with such knowledge, followed by 2 in the Upper West and 1 in the Upper East regions. The districts where primary participants knew of an individual(s) recruited into an extremist group were Gushiegu Municipal, Karaga, Kpandai, Saboba and Savelugu, all from the Northern region. The rest were Wa West and Wa Municipal from the Upper West region and Kassena Nankana Municipal from the Upper East region. At the Baseline study, two districts, that is, Gushiegu municipal and Karaga district were cited by participants.

4.2.1.3 Knowledge of the Existence of Violent Extremist Activities


The primary participants at the End-line study were asked if they had witnessed any violent extremist acts in their districts or communities over the past 12 months. It was interesting to note that some of the participants still considered some acts as violent extremism as 108 (8.1%) of them affirmed this. They further indicated how prevalent the act occurred using Likert scales of very often, sometimes and seldom (Figure 4.4). Majority of them (75.0%) indicated that the act occurred occasionally, 15.7% indicated very often and 9.3% of them said the acts seldom happen.

The key informants (KIs) however, emphasized the non-existence of violent extremism activity in the region/district as emphasized by KIs in the security agencies.

“... For extremism, Bono is a quiet place. I've not heard of any extremist activities here. I've been here collectively for 14 to 15 years. Yes, I work at all the borders, virtually all the borders I've never experienced that.” – (KI, Security Agency, Bono region – End-line study)

Although, Ghana continues to enjoy relative peace and has received global and regional recognition. Ghana's global peace index keeps reducing from 40th in 2022 to 51st in 2023 and now ranks 55th globally (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2024). There exist several internal and external factors accounting for the decline in ranking and in the view of 474 (35.5%) primary participants, there will come a time when Ghana will experience an extremist attack. From Figure 4.4 however, a large proportion of 45.9% of primary participants were not sure if Ghana would ever experience an extremist attack.

Figure 4.4: Is Ghana likely to Experience an Extremist Attack?



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November 2024

Key among the growing concerns by the primary participants who asserted this, was the economic hardships faced in the country (45.4%). Another reason was the weaknesses observed in the national security operations and intelligence gathering, especially along the country's porous borders (23.2%), and the social unrest or existing political instability (13.1%) in the country. A few mentioned the rise of extremist ideologies in the region (11.2%) and the increased recruitment efforts by extremist groups (4.6%). Other responses mentioned by 2.5% of primary participants were the increase in drugs and substance abuse among the youth and the advancement in technology.

Additionally, some KIs believed that there exists some potential that can spur the activities of violent extremists in the country as indicated by one key informant in a security agency in the Northern region.

"... When we talk about violent extremism, in the Northern region I will say no but there are some indicators. The indicators are there just that it has not escalated and has not gotten there yet but the indicators are there..." – (KI, Security Agency, Northern region – End-line study)

4.2.1.4 Security from Extremist Attacks

KIs further gave their opinions on what the state of security is in terms of the safety of persons and their protection from extremist attacks in their respective regions/districts or localities. While some KIs indicated that the state of security was safe, others said it was unsafe.

KIs who expressed positive feedback on the safety of persons and their protection from extremist attacks averred:

"... we are safe, just that a lot needs to be done. If not for the interventions of the security agencies (police, soldiers), Damango would have been a very

different place to talk about but because of their swiftness in response, we are still enjoying the peace we have today...” - (KI, Religious Authority, Savannah region – End-line study).

“The security unlike before we are doing very well. ... We educate and we do sensitization for the public. Apart from stow way and rural-urban migration, we also educate them on VE by meeting the churches, chiefs, communities, and schools. We sensitize them to know that war is never an option. It takes two to tango and always the two can settle any differences ...” - (KI, Security Agency, Northern region – End-line study)

In contrast, some KIs highlighted the issue of insecurity with respect to the safety of persons and their protection from extremist attacks citing the issue of porous borders, and the smuggling of cocoa, arms and fuel across the border. One participant revealed:

“... in some part of the district, there are instances of smuggling of cocoa across the border and there were some clashes between the national security and the community where the smuggling was ongoing. So, I will say our borders are very porous for smuggling of arms. These small arms are some of the basic weapons these extremists will use. Even though there is no VE in the district, but the porous nature of the borders. We have a situation where people will buy fuel in gallons to cross the border. Also, people sell fuel in bottles which needs to be controlled. I heard in the news that none of the fire tenders are working in our region and should the extremists buy fuel from these guys to carry out attacks how would we contain the situation? The security should begin to question such activities because we see motorbikes carrying fuel in ‘Kuffour gallons’ to cross the border ...” - (KI, CSO, Oti region – End-line study)


4.3 Attitudes and Behaviours of Community Members and At-Risk Groups towards Violent Extremism

In this sub-section, the motivation to join extremist groups, factors influencing support of violent extremist groups, and the general attitudes of community members towards the fight against violent extremism were assessed using the Baseline study as a benchmark.

4.3.1 Motivation to Join Extremist Groups

For primary participants, the first three factors that could motivate people to join extremist groups were unemployment (40.0%), financial gain (29.3%), and political and socioeconomic marginalization (6.0%). This is similar to findings obtained from the Baseline study as shown in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5: Motivation to Join Extremist Groups by Study Period (%)



Source: Baseline and End-line, PCVE Study Data, February 2023 & November 2024

From both studies, peer influence was cited as part of other motivational factors. Also, while addiction to hard drugs was mentioned during the Baseline study, intimidation emerged from the End-line study.

Consistent with the Baseline study, poverty emerged as a push factor from the End-line study as reported by some KIs.

“I think number one is poverty. The level of poverty in the region sometimes may result in people's willingness to engage in violent extremism.” – (KI, Religious Authority, Oti region – End-line study)

“... a young man says he's willing to collect money from the terrorists and join them. Even if he dies, his family is going to be better off. So there is that pull factor.” – (KI, CSO, Northern region – End-line study)

Other motivational factors mentioned by the secondary participants were marginalization, community needs, youthful exuberance, unemployment and ideological reasons. On marginalization, some KIs revealed:

“We have those who maybe for certain psychological reasons may either be misfits or they feel isolated from society. And somebody comes along and shows them love, shows them that they have value and they become important. So people like this will swallow the narrative of the violent extremists.” – (KI, CSO, Northern region – End-line study)

Regarding community needs, a key informant in the Savannah region cited that:

“There is also a lack of basic amenities. If you go to a community that doesn't have basic amenities such as potable drinking water, food and medical facility, anybody who comes and offers them these amenities can convince them with their offers.” – (KI, Security Agency, Savannah region – End-line study)

4.3.2 Factors Influencing the Support of Violent Extremist Groups

From the End-line study results, the main factors that could lead some groups or persons to support violent extremist groups include the desire for personal enrichment, poor performance of government to meet the needs of the people, and corruption. Table 4.1 presents further results.

Table 4.1: Factors Influencing Support for Violent Extremist Groups

Factors	Frequency	Percent (%)
Personal Enrichment	551	41.3
Poor performance of government to meet the needs of people	263	19.7
Corruption	201	15.1
Government mistreatment or injustices experienced	113	8.5
Religious beliefs	103	7.7
Coercion/fear of extremist groups	12	0.9
Don't know	84	6.3
Other (Political power, protection and fame)	7	0.5
Total	1,334	100.0

Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November 2024

Some of the responses among the ‘other’ category were to seek ‘political power’ and ‘protection and fame’. In comparison to the Baseline study, similar responses were recorded with the first three factors being personal enrichment, corruption and poor performance of government to meet the needs of the people.

4.3.3 Attitude of Community Members towards the Fight against Violent Extremism

The attitude of community members towards the fight against VE was measured using two indicators. The first was to assess from the primary respondents whether they were willing or not to encourage others to join extremist groups. When asked, what they would do if they happened to know that a family member or close friend desired to join an extremist group, eight out of every ten (81.0%) of them said they would advise him/her to desist from joining. This is a 4.1% increase from the Baseline figure of 77.1% as presented in table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Action to Take when a Relative or Friend Expresses Interest to Join Extremist Group by Study Period

Action to Take	Baseline		End-line	
	Frequency	Percent (%)	Frequency	Percent (%)
Encourage him/her to join	11	0.8	12	0.9
Advise him/her to desist from joining	1041	77.1	1080	81.0
Report to the security agency	264	19.5	224	16.8
Do nothing	25	1.9	12	0.9
Other	10	0.7	6	0.4
Total	1334	100.0	1334	100.0

Source: Baseline and End-line, PCVE Study Data, February 2023 & November 2024

There is a percentage decrease in the proportion of primary participants who said they would do nothing about the issue. On the contrary, a handful of participants were ready to encourage the individual to join the extremist group. Of the 12 who affirmed this position, 8 were within the youthful bracket and 4 were adults. One person was aged 15 years, a male student with JHS as his highest level of education. Across gender, more males (58.3%) than females (41.7%) affirmed this.

Regionally, seven (7) of the participants were from the Bono East region, four (4) from the Northern region and one (1) in the Savannah region. Districts that recorded such responses were the Kintampo South (1 participants) and Pru East (6 participants), all in the Bono East region. Others included the Karaga (1), Sagnarigu (2) and Tamale Central (1) in the Northern region, and East Gonja (1) in the Savannah region.

A comparison with the Baseline study indicated that districts in the two Upper regions that initially reported this response did not replicate it at the End-line study. This can be attributed to the National Commission for Civic Education's (NCCE) constant education, engagements and sensitization programmes. However, the Pru East district with no participant affirming this position at the Baseline study recorded six (6) participants from the End-line study. Other external factors may have led to this notion. A look at the multidimensional poverty fact sheet for Pru East released by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) in 2023 showed that 30.3% of

the population live in multidimensional poverty. Again, 9 out of the 13 indicators measuring poverty in the Pru East district recorded a higher deprivation than the national averages (GSS, 2023). Poverty can therefore serve as a factor for such an assertion made by participants in the district. Also, studies have shown that poverty is one of the main drivers or motivations to join extremist groups (NCCE, 2023).

The second attitudinal indicator, was premised on the statement” *In the context of insecurity in Ghana, imagine that you are approached and offered an interesting financial proposal by someone that seems suspicious or is part of a suspicious group in exchange for your help. Indicate whether it is very likely, likely, unlikely or very unlikely that you would personally do the following in this situation*”. Six situational indicators were presented with five being positive. The positive indicators used were:” *try to avoid contact with that person*,” *consult a friend or family member*,” *try to learn more about the offer*,” *contact the official authorities*” and *consult a community leader*”. The negative indicator was” *will access the money and offer the help*”. Table 4.3 presents the primary participants’ views on the indicators given.

Table 4.3: Attitude towards Suspicious Financial Offers

Attitudinal Indicators	Responses (%)			
	Very Likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very Unlikely
Try to avoid contact with that person	35.5	47.5	10.3	6.7
Consult a friend or family member	29.7	56.1	11.2	3.0
Try to learn more about the offer	18.5	36.7	30.5	14.3
Contact the official authorities (e.g., the security forces)	38.9	48.4	9.6	3.1
Consult a community leader	27.4	60.0	9.5	3.1
Access the money and offer the help	3.0	10.6	26.8	59.6

Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November 2024

From the table, majority of the primary participants aligned with the positive indicators rather than the negative indicator.

4.4 Knowledge of Other Forms of Violence

Within the past 12 months preceding the study in November 2024, 21.1% of primary participants had witnessed acts of violence in their district. This represents an increase from the Baseline study figure of 20.9%. Although this departs from the target of a reduction from the Baseline value, it could indicate that communities now have a good appreciation of behaviours and happenings that suggest violence due to the various sensitization and engagements on the need to be vigilant using especially the National Security campaign message on ‘See Something Say Something’.

Further, the wide circulation of the security numbers “999” and “13555” had helped to give tip-offs to the police on suspicious characters and situations. On the 29th of November 2024, based on a tip-off, the police were able to intercept a bus which was carrying 1,800 pieces of ammunition in Binduri in the Upper East region (Dabang, 2024). Also, based on a tip-off, there has been an arrest of a Metro Mass bus carrying 160 individuals suspected to be thugs in Wiawso in the Western region (Acquah, 2024).

An analysis of the sex of primary participants revealed that more males than females had ever witnessed other forms of violence apart from violent extremism in the past 12 months preceding the End-line study (Table 4.4).

Table 4.4: Primary Participants Who Witnessed Other Violent Acts (%)

Variable	Ever witnessed other forms of violence in the district over the past 12 months	
	Yes	No
Sex of Primary Participants		
Male	59.2	46.2
Female	40.8	53.8
Age Group		
15-35 years	51.4	55.4
36-59 years	39.4	37.4
60 and above	9.2	7.2
Region		
Bono	9.2	5.5
Bono East	8.5	12.0
North East	9.9	5.3
Northern	31.6	33.3
Oti	1.1	7.8
Savannah	16.3	5.0
Upper East	13.8	17.1
Upper West	9.6	14.0


Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November 2024

Across the age groups of participants, more youth had ever witnessed acts of violence compared to the adult and aged groups respectively.

Regionally, the Northern region had the highest proportion of participants who had ever witnessed other forms of violence. Again, as observed from the Baseline study, the Oti region had the least primary participants affirming this position.

The primary participants who had ever witnessed some violent acts within the last 12 months further indicated the type of violent acts they witnessed. Figure 4.6 shows that chieftaincy disputes was the most common form of violence witnessed. This was followed by ethnic conflicts and land disputes.

Figure 4.6: Violence Witnessed in the Past 12 months (%)



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November 2024

The least form of violence witnessed was religious conflicts. Among the other forms of violence mentioned were farmer-herder-related violence and interpersonal conflict. Regionally, chieftaincy disputes were much witnessed in the North East (78.6%), Bono (76.9%) and Upper East (64.1%) regions.

Primary participants went further to indicate how prevalent the act occurred in their district, and a little over half of them said the act occurred occasionally (50.7%). Another 19.9% said the act occurred very often whilst 27.0% said it seldomly occurred.

From the perspective of KIs, they witnessed some violent acts within the last 12 months. Aside ethnic conflicts and chieftaincy factions which were recorded in the Baseline study, other violent acts were also witnessed. These were highway robbery, kidnapping, murder and vigilantism. Some KIs averred:

“The highway on the Central Gonja district between Buipe and Tamale, Sawla towards the Upper West region recorded incidence of highway robbery and we want to link their motivation to monetary...” – (KI, Security Agency, Savannah region – End-line study)

“Kidnappings also happened mostly by the Fulani. The Fulanis identify people linked with wealthy Fulani people, their own tribe and kidnap them. There was an instance where they demanded a GHC100,000 ransom and the family paid and got their relative back. They used the victim’s phone to call their family.


Most times, the family do not report to the police due to instructions by the kidnappers...” – (KI, Security Agency, Savannah region - End-line study)

“Yes, recently we saw some vigilante groups come back, saying the youth are engaged in hard drugs like tramadol. They wanted to stop the sale of these drugs themselves. People said it was the police's job, so the police tried to stop them. They ended up in court, causing commotion, and the case was discharged due to lack of evidence. Yes, the people were arrested and put before a court, but now they are still in town and haven't been arrested by the police again ...”
– (KI, Security Agency, Northern region – End-line study)

4.4.1 Knowledge of Groups that Incite/Promote Attributes of Violence

To curtail any violence in the district and region, the primary participants were asked if they knew of any group within or outside their locality that promotes objectives such as hatred and discrimination against other groups or persons, violence against other groups and/or reward people for perpetuating violence against other groups or persons (Figure 4.7).

Figure 4.7: Existence of Groups which Incite or Promote Attributes of Violence (%)



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November 2024

From Figure 4.7, 8.2% of primary participants knew of a group that rewards people to perpetrate violence. This proportion increased by 2.3% from the Baseline figure of 5.9%.

Also, some KIs validated this finding by indicating some groups:

*“Yes, what I said earlier about political vigilante groups. These groups, even though they are proscribed by law, still exist. For example, the popular group here is the **Kandahar Boys**, named after Kandahar in Afghanistan. This group came into authority during the US invasion of Afghanistan and is associated with the ruling party. They don't operate by law but work underground.” – (KI, Security Agency, Northern region – End-line study).*

*“If you look at it on a political level, even though vigilantism is banned, I just heard yesterday, I don't know how true it is, that **Azorka Boys** was launched in Kumasi. If it is true, they are going against the Vigilante Act. But especially in this political dispensation, political vigilante youth stand a higher chance of picking up arms ...” – (KI, CSO, Northern region – End-line study).*

4.4.1.1 Awareness of Groups or Persons Recruiting People to Perpetrate Violence

Almost two percent (1.6%, 21) of primary participants were aware of groups or persons recruiting people to perpetrate violence. Comparatively, this proportion is less than the Baseline figure of 4.2%.

Regionally, six out of eight regions had primary participants who were aware of the existence of groups or persons recruiting people to perpetrate violence. The regions were Bono, Bono East, Northern, Savannah, Upper East and Upper West regions.

Primary participants further elaborated on how the groups lured people to recruit them. Almost eight out of every ten (76.2%) participants said people were enticed when provided with monetary gains. Another two participants indicated that they were lured when provided with expensive gifts like cars and phones. One participant each mentioned the provision of ‘social services and infrastructure such as boreholes and schools’ and ‘assurance of security and protection’ respectively.

4.4.2 At-Risk Groups

According to the primary participants, the at-risk groups that are targeted the most are the youth (12, 57.1%), women (7, 33.3%), ardent internet users (1, 4.8%) and strangers (4.8%) respectively.

Additionally, some KIs mentioned the youth as quoted.

“A lot of unemployed youth in the region. The youth are vulnerable to be used by these extremists. The unemployed youth in the region is very high ...” – (KI, Security Agency, Bono East region - End-line study).

“The youth, unemployed youth. There is this philosopher who said that if there are discrepancies between your goal and the means to achieve it you will experience some setbacks and violence is the way to go. If I have been to school and acquired all the knowledge and now waiting for the government to provide you with work and if there are no such opportunities you will go the other way, the radical way. This is when you will see stealing and snatching of phones...” (KI, Security Agency, Oti region - End-line study).

Similarly, some KIs at the Baseline study also mentioned the youth and women especially women with sound education and economic status. A KI from one of the Civil Society Organizations had this to say:

“... There are instances in which women, high profile women who have gone far in education... even from France with a North African background were radicalized... So we can't leave out any group... We can all be radicalized because if they come and give you some huge amount of money you will be happy to add it to what you already have ...” - (KI, CSO, Upper East Region - End-line study)

4.4.3 Behaviours of Community Members towards Other Forms of Violence

Generally, the behaviours of community members were established from whether or not they had ever engaged in violence. Across the eight project regions, only 23 participants (1.7%) had ever engaged in violence. This is a great measure of progress compared to the Baseline figure of 3.4%. Table 4.5 further presents selected background characteristics of participants who had ever engaged in violence. The data shows that more males than females had ever engaged in violence.

Table 4.5: Primary Participants Who Had Ever Engaged in Violence

Variable	Ever Engaged in Violence	
	Yes	No
Sex of Primary Respondents		
Male	14 (60.9%)	639 (48.7%)
Female	9 (39.1%)	672 (51.3%)
Age Group		
15-35 years	11 (47.8%)	717 (54.7%)
36-59 years	10 (43.5%)	494 (37.7%)
60 and above	2 (8.7%)	100 (7.6%)
Region		
Bono	2 (8.7%)	82 (6.3%)
Bono East	2 (8.7%)	148 (11.3%)
North East	3 (13.1%)	81 (6.2%)
Northern	7 (30.4%)	432 (32.9%)
Oti	0 (0.0%)	85 (6.5%)
Savannah	0 (0.0%)	99 (7.5%)
Upper East	2 (8.7%)	217 (16.6%)
Upper West	7 (30.4%)	167 (12.7%)
Total	23 (1.7%)	1,311 (98.3%)

Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November 2024

Among the age groups, the younger population tend to engage in acts of violence compared to the older population (Table 4.5). Regionally, both the Northern and Upper West regions had the highest proportion of participants who had ever engaged in acts of violence.

Additionally, primary participants indicated the form of violent acts they had ever engaged in. Out of the 23 participants who engaged in violent acts, eight (34.8%) of them engaged in land disputes, six (26.1%) in election-related violence, and two participants each in chieftaincy disputes and ethnic conflicts respectively. One person engaged in inter-communal clashes. Subsequently, participants cited reasons for their engagement in the violent acts mentioned. Among them were to demand their rights, fight for better living conditions, for their voices to be heard, and to put fear in other people.

CHAPTER FIVE

COMMUNITIES' RESILIENCE AND LEVEL OF TOLERANCE TOWARDS DIVERSE GROUPS

5.1 Introduction

Communities that are resilient and tolerant play a critical role in fostering inclusive development, peaceful coexistence, and social cohesion. In diverse societies like Ghana, where people of different ethnicities, religions, political affiliations, and genders coexist, understanding the dynamics of tolerance and discrimination is essential in the fight against violent extremism.


This chapter presents study respondents and participants' views on communities' level of tolerance towards different groups with specific emphasis on three broad themes namely attitudes towards different social groups, experiences of discrimination or harassment and perception of conflicts in communities by comparing baseline and end-line results across various indicators. Additionally, the chapter presents a measurement of the overall scores of communities' level of tolerance towards diverse groups.

5.2 Attitude towards Different Social Groups

The study explored community attitudes toward having neighbours from diverse backgrounds, including differences in religion, ethnicity, and political affiliation. The findings showed a marginal decline in willingness to have neighbours of different religions, from 77.8% at baseline to 77.6% at end-line, while those expressing dislike increased from 5.8% to 6.4%. Similarly, willingness to accept neighbours of different ethnicities decreased slightly from 80.2% to 80%, with those expressing dislike rising from 4.3% to 5.4%.

It was further observed that, acceptance of neighbours with differing political affiliations, fell from 81% at baseline to 79.6% at end-line, while those who dislike neighbours with different political affiliations increased from 3.7% to 5.6%. Although overall tolerance remains relatively high, these downward trends, particularly concerning political affiliations, point to emerging challenges that warrant some attention.

Figure 5.1: Respondents' responses on attitude towards different social groups by study periods



Source: Baseline and End-line PCVE Survey Data, March 2023 & November 2024

5.3. Experiences of discrimination or harassment


The study also assessed participants' experiences of discrimination or harassment, focusing on three key themes: the prevalence of discrimination and harassment, denial of access to public facilities, and incidents of unfair treatment witnessed by respondents in the community.

5.3.1 Prevalence of discrimination and harassment

The survey assessed respondents' personal experiences of discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, disability status, and gender. The findings indicate a slight improvement in ethnic discrimination, with the proportion of respondents who had never experienced it increasing from 86.3% at baseline to 87.6% at end-line, while repeated occurrences dropped from 7.6% to 5.9%. Religious discrimination remained largely unchanged, with 91.9% of respondents at baseline and 90.5% at end-line reporting no incidents.

In contrast, discrimination against persons with disabilities (with respect to access to essential services) worsened significantly. The proportion of respondents who reported never experiencing such discrimination declined from 76.2% at baseline to 65.7% in the end-line study, while repeated incidents rose from 14.3% to 20%. Additionally, gender-based discrimination also increased slightly, with repeated incidents rising from 4.4% at baseline to 6.5% at end-line.

Figure 5.2: Respondent's feedback on prevalence of discrimination and harassment by study periods



Source: Baseline and End-line PCVE Survey Data, March 2023 & November 2024

Key informant interviews reinforced these findings, particularly concerning gender-based discrimination. Fourteen out of the 48 key informants acknowledged the presence of gender-based discrimination in their communities. A security officer from the Northern region explained:

Yes, because here everything is dominated by men. Women don't own land; it's the men who do. So, the men are more empowered, and the women are less empowered"(KI, NIB Northern Region).

Another based his reason on low female representation in parliament


"Yes. In the northern region, we have only two female parliamentary aspirants, from Sagnerigu and Savulugu. Instead of focusing on what they can do, people sometimes criticize their personalities, which is not good" (KI, Media, Northern region)

5.3.2 Denial of Access to Public Facilities

The survey examined instances where study participants observed others being denied access to public facilities in their communities based on ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, disability status, gender, or nationality. From the findings, denial of access to public facilities based on ethnicity remained consistently low, with 93.8% of respondents at baseline and 93.9% at end-line reporting witnessing no such incidents. Similarly, denial related to religious affiliation showed little change, with 95.4% of respondents at baseline and 95.3% at end-line reporting no discrimination.

In contrast, denial of access to public facilities due to disability increased significantly, with reported cases rising from 11.9% at baseline to 22.9% at end-line. These findings highlight a worrying concern of discrimination against persons with disabilities, emphasizing the need for some measures to promote equal access to public facilities. Figure 5.3 provides further details.

Figure 5.3: Comparing baseline and end-line results on respondents' feedback on witnessing incidents of denial of access to public facilities




Source: Baseline and End-line PCVE Study Data, March 2023 & November 2024

5.4 Perception on community beliefs and exposure to violence

The survey further examined study participants' perceptions of how some community beliefs and happenings could expose individuals to violence or otherwise. The issues considered were political polarization, religious intolerance, ethnic conflicts, chieftaincy disputes, and land disputes. Figure 5.4 outlines the details of the result

Figure 5.4: Perceived level of existence of violence or otherwise in relation to community beliefs and practices



Source: Baseline and End-line PCVE Survey Data, March 2023 & November 2024

The findings revealed significant progress in some areas. For instance, perceptions of political polarization associated with violence decreased substantially, from 17.6% at baseline to 8.9% at end-line. Religious intolerance and ethnic conflicts with violence also observed appreciable declines at the end-line stage.

However, chieftaincy factions and land disputes remain persistent issues even though there were some improvements. Reports on violent chieftaincy conflicts dropped from 22.4% at baseline to 20.1% at end-line, while violent land disputes saw a significant reduction from 22.3% to 13%. These findings highlight progress in mitigating conflicts, although long-standing disputes over leadership and land continue to challenge community harmony.

Out of the 48 key informants interviewed, fourteen confirmed that land disputes within their jurisdiction is devoid of violence. One factor that has contributed to this according to one key informant, is the fact that parties resort to legal processes for amicable resolution of their dispute. It was presented as follows:

“It exists without violence. The most beautiful part is that when such issues happen, they decide to go to court to resolve their issues. They don’t use violence to solve the problem”-(KI, Religious leader, Oti region)

5.5 Overall level of Tolerance

This section evaluates the overall tolerance levels of primary participants in the eight project regions, focusing on the following criteria, co-existence with different groups, non-existence of violence, and non-discrimination based on socio-political backgrounds.

Generally, study participants in the end-line recorded a marginal increase in overall level of tolerance compared to the baseline. Overall tolerance score improved from 82.6% at baseline to 84.3% at the end-line. The detailed result is presented in table 5.1

Table 5.1: Comparing Baseline and End-line results on overall score on tolerance level

Criteria	Average Score (%)	
	Baseline	End-line
Co-existence with different groups of people	87.6	86.7
Non-Existence of violence	68.6	74.6
Non-discrimination based on socio-political background	91.8	91.5
Overall score of tolerance level	82.6	84.3

Source: Baseline and End-line PCVE Survey Data, March 2023 & November 2024

5.6 Assessment of tolerance levels by region

Regionally, Bono region recorded the highest overall tolerance score at 95.1%, followed by Bono East at 90.2%. In contrast, the Savannah region reported the lowest score, declining from 82.8% at baseline to 76.9% at end-line. Bono's overall tolerance score showed significant growth, increasing from 85.2% at baseline to 95.1% at end-line.

In terms of the individual indicators for the end-line study, Bono region recorded the highest proportion of participants demonstrating a high tolerance for non-discrimination based on socio-political background (98.5%) and non-existence of violence (93.7%). In contrast, the North East region recorded the lowest scores for the indicator “co-existence with different groups”.

Table 5.2: Average level of tolerance by region (%)

Region	Co-existence with different groups of people	Non-Existence of violence	Non-discrimination based on socio-political background	Overall average score
BONO EAST	93.4	82.0	95.3	90.2
BONO	93.1	93.7	98.5	95.1
NORTH EAST	75.3	66.1	91.2	77.5
NORTHERN	90.8	68.2	92.8	83.9
OTI	84.6	83.8	89.0	85.8

SAVANNAH	80.0	68.8	82.0	76.9
UPPER EAST	77.2	77.1	90.2	81.5
UPPER WEST	89.7	74.9	90.4	85.0

Source: End-line PCVE Survey Data, November 2024

An additional analysis was conducted on respondents' tolerance levels toward different religious and linguistic groups, using the same indicators applied in the general tolerance assessment. The findings show an increase in overall tolerance along religious and ethnic lines, rising from 86.2% at baseline to 90.4% at end-line. This improvement also reflects growing acceptance of people of diverse religious and linguistic backgrounds. Further details on the overall levels of tolerance, including regional distributions, is presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4

Table 5.3: Comparing baseline and end-line result on overall level of tolerance towards different religious and linguistic groups

Criteria	Average Score (%)	
	Baseline	End-line
Co-existence with different religious and ethnic groups	86.4	92.4
Non-Existence of religious intolerance and ethnic conflict	79.8	83.5
Non-discrimination along ethnic and religious lines	92.5	92.4
Overall score of tolerance level	86.2	89.4

Source: Baseline and End-line PCVE Survey Data, March 2023 & November 2024

Table 5.4: Level of tolerance towards different religious and linguistics groups by regions (%)

Region	Co-existence with different religious and ethnic groups	Non-Existence of religious intolerance and ethnic conflict	Non-discrimination along ethnic and religious lines	Overall average score
BONO EAST	94.6	98.4	98.0	97.0
BONO	98.0	99.7	94.6	97.4
NORTH EAST	94.7	68.3	94.7	85.9
NORTHERN	94.6	77.9	94.6	89.0
OTI	90.4	89.5	90.4	90.1
SAVANNAH	83.2	75.6	83.2	80.7
UPPER EAST	90.8	83.7	90.7	88.4
UPPER WEST	89.3	85.7	89.3	88.1

Source: End-line PCVE Study Data, November 2024

CHAPTER SIX

CONTRIBUTION OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN COMBATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the contributions of both state and non-state institutions in combating violent extremism in Ghana, as outlined in the National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism. It explores the roles of key state institutions, including the Ghana Police Service, Ghana Immigration Service, Ghana Armed Forces, the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority, the National Intelligence Bureau, and the Media, along with non-state actors such as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs). The chapter compares baseline data with End-line data to assess the evolving contributions of these state institutions in the fight against violent extremism. Feedback from key informants regarding the impact of these institutions is presented, complemented by the perspectives of primary respondents. The chapter concludes with recommendations from key informants on effective strategies to address the challenge of violent extremism.

6.2 Nationally determined roles of State and Non-State institutions in fighting Violent Extremism in Ghana

The National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAFPCVET) outlines the roles of key state and non-state institutions in addressing violent extremism in Ghana. These responsibilities aim to foster a coordinated approach in addressing the root causes, preventing extremist activities, and responding to threats. The roles are detailed below:

Table 6.1: Nationally Determined Roles of State and Non-State Institutions in Fighting Violent Extremism in Ghana

No.	State Institution	Role
1	Ghana Police Service (GPS)	The GPS serves as the lead agency for maintaining law and order, preventing crime, and being the first responder in the four pillars of the NAFPCVET. In collaboration with agencies like NIB, RD, GIS, and others, it updates the crime registry digitally and prevents illegal importation of firearms. It also partners with the Ministries of Communications, Finance, and Defense to combat cybercrime.

2	Ghana Armed Forces (GAF)	The GAF coordinates Counter-Terrorism (CT) efforts and supplements civil response during terrorist incidents. It gathers military intelligence locally and internationally through Defense Advisers and complements intelligence operations led by NIB, GIS, and MOD. The GAF also collaborates to preempt terror activities.
3	National Intelligence Bureau (NIB)	The NIB is tasked with intelligence gathering on internal security threats, preventing violent extremism, and countering terror-related crimes. It revives the crime registry and works with the Ministry of Information and NCTC to develop public awareness campaigns.
4	Ghana Immigration Service (GIS)	The GIS monitors immigration at entry and exit points, patrols borders, and registers foreign workers. It also oversees refugees and refugee camps, contributing to the overall internal security framework.
5	Ghana Revenue Authority – Customs Division (GRA-CD)	The GRA-CD collaborates to curb the illegal importation of weapons, drugs, and hazardous substances. It provides intelligence on import-export trends, helping address terrorist threats at ports and borders.
6	National Communications Authority (NCA)	The NCA ensures secure telecommunications infrastructure by detecting and disrupting unauthorized use of radio frequencies. It secures the National Digital Terrestrial Television Transmission Network, expands national call centers, and enforces communication regulations.
Non-State Institutions and Their Roles		
7	Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)	CSOs engage communities in addressing the root causes of violent extremism. They promote dialogue, tolerance, and policy advocacy. Additionally, they educate the public on emergency security response and mobilize resources to support awareness campaigns.
8	Chieftaincy and Faith-Based Institutions	These institutions run community outreach programs to educate members on the consequences of violent extremism. They work to prevent youth radicalization by collaborating with relevant organizations and promoting peace within communities, churches, and mosques.

Source: Ministry of National Security, Ghana (2019).

6.3 State Institutions Performance in Relation to Mandate

This section evaluates how state and non-state actors have implemented their assigned roles in the fight against violent extremism. It highlights practical contributions of these institutions and compares the contributions of those institutions during the baseline study conducted by the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) with feedback received at the End-line, providing insights into progress and areas that require further attention.


6.3.1 Contribution of State Actors in the Fight Against Violent Extremism.

The contributions of state actors in the fight against violent extremism were examined at both Baseline and End-line. These state actors include the Ghana Prisons Service (GPS), Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), Ghana Revenue Authority- Customs Divisions (GRA-CD), Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), National Investigative Bureau (NIB)

At baseline, three major contributions were identified by study participants. These include intelligence gathering, collaborations, and the establishment of institutional structures to deal with the risk and threat of violent extremism in the regions.

However, at the Endline, five major themes were identified. These include intelligence gathering, the establishment of specialized units to address violent extremism, the creation of information centers, collaboration with other institutions, and the implementation of regular capacity-building initiatives as depicted in figure 6.1

Figure 6.1 Contribution of State Actors in the Fight against Violent Extremism



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

Intelligence Gathering: Both the baseline and end-line findings emphasized the critical role of disseminating intelligence to relevant authorities. However, the end-line data revealed marked improvements in inter-agency collaboration which enhanced the efficiency of intelligence gathering and response.

The baseline findings revealed reactive measures, with intelligence gathering focused on identifying threats and issuing warnings to prevent the escalation of violence.

In contrast, the end-line findings highlighted a more proactive stance. Specifically, extended operations to community-level intelligence collection, enabling early identification and countering of extremist threats before they materialized.

This was evident by a Key Informant as

“The NIB response is very high. We work in all the communities; we collect information on activities of individuals and agencies that pose a threat to the nation. The NIB has been very proactive. The strategy utilized is early threat identification.” (KI Security Agency, Bono East Region, End-line).

“The only unit we have, for which I am the chairperson, is the security and intelligence unit within the prisons. We pick intelligence from the inmates themselves in relation to escape, whether somebody is arranging to bring external aggressors to attack the prisons.” (KII Security Agency, Oti Region, End-line).

Established Institutions to Deal with Violent Extremism: On this both Baseline and End-line assessments reveal progress in strengthening these structures.

In the baseline, security agencies highlighted the existence of specific units and regiments dedicated to handling insecurity and extremist activities. These structures were often paired with the regular deployment of officers to strategic locations to detect and mitigate threats.

The end-line results demonstrate improved capacity and more organized efforts to counter violent extremist threats. Institutions have strengthened operations, especially in border towns, and broadened their focus to include regular simulation exercises for better preparedness and faster response. As expressed by Key Informants as;

“The NIB also builds capacity and carries out security measures. There has been a lot of security deployment to the Upper West region with mechanized Infantry Units, some in Bawku and Builsa areas, all as part of efforts to deal with VE. Deployment and simulation exercises are being carried out routinely to be prepared so that nothing takes us by surprise.” (KII Security Agency, Northern Region, End-line).

So we the “10 Mechanized Battalions” are primarily established here because of the threat of violent extremism and we have troops deployed along the border towns to monitor the situation up there and basically to affect such situations. The operation that we conduct is in conjunction with the other security agencies, immigration and customs, and the police.” (KII, Security Agency, Upper West Region, End-line).

Capacity Building: This was identified at the End-line level as central to combating violent extremism. Security agencies have made significant progress in equipping personnel with the skills and tools to tackle emerging threats through training programs and improved resource allocation.

For instance, the Customs Division highlighted recent efforts to train officers in identifying explosives and improvised explosive devices. According to a representative:

“There was training to sensitize and also educate our officers on how to identify explosives and improvised bombs... Recently, they’ve given us some gadgets where you can check cars and detect metals.” (KI Security Agencies, Bono Region, End-line)

Collaborations: Collaboration between security agencies and stakeholders was crucial at both the Baseline and End-line stages in addressing violent extremism.

At baseline, participants indicated that security agencies collaborated to provide protection at borders and prevent violent extremism through joint deployments and coordination with the National Security Agency.

In comparison, the End-line participants indicated that security agencies expanded collaboration to include localized, issue-specific partnerships, such as the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) working with the District Security Committee (DISEC) to address community-level conflicts.

A key informant from Bono Region remarked:

“Normally, we work with DISEC, the District Security Committee. We invite both parties to the meeting and try to resolve the issue through DISEC.” (KI Security Agencies, Bono Region End-line).

Creation of Information Centers: The establishment of information centers was mentioned by study participants only at the End-line. These centers were created to enhance public awareness and strengthen collaboration between security agencies and communities.

This was expressed by a Key Informant as;

“Now Ghana Immigration Service is having a baby or a branch that we call the migration information center. We educate, and we do sensitization for the public.” (KI Security Agencies, Northern Region End-line).

6.3.2 Contribution of Non-State Actors in the fight against Violent Extremism


This section highlights the contributions of non-state actors, specifically traditional and religious authorities, CSOs and the media, in addressing the risks and threats of violent extremism. The contributions of these institutions were assessed at both baseline and End-line surveys.

6.3.2.1 Traditional/Religious Authorities' Roles

At the Baseline study, religious and traditional authorities were found to focus on promoting peace through teaching, counseling, and dispute resolution. Religious leaders emphasized using sermons and teachings to promote unity and peaceful coexistence and played a significant role in calming tensions and settling grievances.

In the End-line, study participants revealed a broader and more structured role of non-state actors in combating violent extremism. These included collaborations with other institutions in their sensitization efforts to augment the preaching for peace as observed during the baseline, depicted in Figure 6.2

Figure 6.2: Role of Traditional/Religious Authorities in the fight against Violent Extremism



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

Collaboration with other Institutions:

“I remember one project called the Soko project which engaged my institution to go around, talk about peace, and enlighten them on violent issues around us from other countries.” (KI Religious Authority, Oti Region, End-line)

Similarly, some religious leaders emphasized organizing church programs in collaboration with agencies like the NCCE to educate their congregants. As one respondent noted,

“We organize programs for our churches and even bring in the experts and NCCE to educate our members.” (KI Religious Authority, Bono Region, End-line)


Preaching of Peace:

“What I focus on, along with those who support me, is incorporating messages of peace into my sermons and teachings. My goal is to emphasize the importance of peace and encourage everyone to strive for it. This is a significant part of what I do.” (KI, Religious Authority, Oti Region, End-line)

6.3.2.2 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were found to play a pivotal role in addressing the risks and threats of violent extremism by engaging communities through public sensitization and fostering collaborations with other institutions as depicted in Figure 6.3

Figure 6.3: CSOs in the Fight against Violent Extremism



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

Public Sensitization: One of the core contributions of CSO’s found in both baseline and End-line studies was raising awareness about violent extremism and promoting civic education. These efforts include training, workshops, and community-focused activities designed to empower citizens with knowledge and skills to counter the menace. As highlighted by an informant,

“We are part of a CDD project. This border security...a good number of my staff were well trained in the skills and all that. So, after that project, we still leverage the skills we have learned and the experience from the implementation of the project. So what Citizens Watch is actually doing in most of the communities is civic education.” (KI CSO Bono Region, End-line)

CSOs also utilize diverse platforms to amplify their sensitization campaigns. These include hosting workshops for opinion leaders, organizing community fora, and participating in radio discussions to reach a broader audience. A key informant emphasized,

“We are intensifying civic education. We are doing workshops for opinion leaders. We have community fora; we do radio discussions.” (KI, CSO Upper West, End-line)

Collaborations with Other Institutions: CSOs also contribute significantly by partnering with various stakeholders to promote peace and unity. These collaborations include working closely with institutions such as the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) and STAR Ghana as highlighted by a Key informant as

“I move with NCCE, I move with STAR Ghana. And then, because of that, we try to foster community relationships. In most of the communities that we go, this is exactly what we try to do to ensure people live together in peace.” (KI CSO, Oti Region, End-line)

6.4 Contribution of Security Agencies to Peaceful Coexistence in Communities

This section highlights the role of State and Non-State actors in ensuring peaceful coexistence within communities.

6.4.1 State Actors’ Contribution to Peaceful Coexistence in Communities

The End-line participants mentioned the role of the security agencies to include intelligence gathering, identifying sources of disunity and collaborating on public sensitization initiatives.

This was evident in the following quotations

Intelligence Gathering to detect issues of Disunity

“We pick intelligence on incidences of marginalization and attacks on indigenous groups. We discuss information at regional council meetings and invite their leadership for discourse if we are not able to deal with it at the DISEC level. We invite the Peace Council to deal with it. We also make sure nobody is violating their right to existence.” (KII Security Agencies, Northern Region, End-line)

“The NIB is in the various districts and towns. We identify things that will pose major threats to the state. We give early warning signals to the government.” (KI Security Agencies, Bono Region, End-line)

Collaborations for Public Sensitization

“When the opportunity comes for us to get invitations to some of these civil activities, most of the time the invitations are coming in here, so we make sure to partake in these programs that the civil society organizes. When they bring the invitations, we try our best to attend and speak to them in the sense of ensuring that there is peace, that coexistence is peaceful so that we are all peaceful together.” (KI Security Agencies, Upper West, End-line)

6.4.2 Non-State Actors' Contribution to Peaceful Coexistence in Communities

Trained Chiefs as Arbitrators: The training of traditional leaders, particularly chiefs, to act as arbitrators, was found only in the End-line as significant initiative in contributing to peaceful coexistence within communities.

A Civil Society Organization (CSO) operating in the Northern Region emphasized the transformative impact of training chiefs in arbitration. One informant explained,

“Imagine that you’ve built the capacity of the chiefs to be mini-judges, to do arbitration in the palaces professionally. What do you need anyway? It will reduce a lot of grievances as people get their issues addressed.” (KI CSO Northern Region, End-line)

Furthermore, structured training programs have been implemented to enhance the capabilities of traditional leaders. Another informant noted,

“In the first component, we trained the paramount chiefs on the Chieftaincy Act, on alternative dispute resolutions, and on the New Land Management Act.” (KI CSO Upper West Region, End-line).

This comprehensive training provides chiefs with a strong understanding of legal frameworks and alternative dispute resolution techniques, enabling them to adjudicate disputes professionally while aligning with national governance structures.

Public sensitization: Public sensitization initiatives were found in both baseline and End-line studies to be promoting peaceful coexistence. Media organizations in the Northern Region are at the forefront of such efforts, leveraging their platforms to ensure dialogue and build mutual understanding.

A media representative from the Northern Region highlighted the station’s role in advocating for peace, stating:

So we have a program called Editorial where we have dedicated about 10 to 15 minutes on our morning shows, every morning, to sensitize the general public on the need to have peaceful coexistence or live peacefully. Especially we coming from the Islamic sect, we have a lot of people who come here, so

we try as much as possible to create that conducive environment for everyone to come here. So, we set the pace so that when they leave here, I mean our resource persons, they would have a good testament to whatever we are doing here.”(KI Media, Bono East, End-line).

6.5: Non-State Institutional Capacities to Respond to the Threat of Violent Extremism

Institutions involved in countering violent extremism exhibit notable strengths that enhance their capacity to address violent extremism challenge effectively.

Adequate Financial Resources: One significant strength highlighted by study participants at the End-line is a robust financial base. Certain institutions, such as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the Northern Region, benefit from substantial funding that enables them to implement their programs without financial constraints. As one respondent humorously remarked,

“As far as resources are concerned, our biggest problem is whether we'll be able to finish the money, which is a good problem to have. I'm sure NCCE will be excited to have this kind of problem. Sorry. But you'll get it.” (KI CSO Northern Region End-line)

Inadequate Training and Capacity Building: In spite of the financial capacity of some non-state agencies they often lack adequate training and capacity to effectively contribute to countering violent extremism. Some key informants highlighted gaps in training and preparedness across these sectors.

“Well equipped? No, because we are not well-vested in the issues. I have yet to see the DISEC doing public education and building our capacities to counter violence. The District Assembly should organize such a forum to build our capacity” (KI CSO Northern Region, End line).

“I think we are not equipped much, and as a religious body, we need more training to be able to educate our people” (KI Religious Authority, Oti Region, End-line,).


“So, I think we are equipped, but not fully equipped. A lot of staff still need to understand it better and use our platforms to advocate for peaceful coexistence or raise awareness about the dangers associated with extremist activities. We definitely need more training at least 5 out of every 10 staff members need it” (KI Media, Northern Region, End-line)

6.6 Citizens' Knowledge of Key State Institutions Combating Violent Extremism

On citizens' knowledge of the key state institutions combating violent extremism in Ghana, the Ghana Police Service (GPS) (36.2%) was the most recognized institution respondents acknowledged as combating violent extremism. Following closely is the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) (27.5%) and The Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) (13.8%).

The least known institutions were the Ghana Prisons Service (0.1%) and the CD of GRA (0.1%) little above a tenth (10.5%) were unaware of any institution involved in combating violent extremism highlighting a gap in public knowledge.

Figure 6.4 Knowledge of Key State Institutions Combating Violent Extremism



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.7 Citizens' Assessment of Institutional Performance in Public Relations and Awareness Creation

Figure 6.5 presents citizens' perceptions on the effectiveness of various institutions in terms of public relations, public education, and awareness creation to address the risk of violent extremism.

The Ghana Police Service received an average rating from 32.7% of respondents, with 30.8% rating their performance as being high and 10.4% rating it as very high. However, 21.7% of respondents rated their efforts as low or very low.

The Ghana Armed Forces were rated positively in awareness creation, with 31.0% of respondents rating their performance as high and 31.5% assigning them an average. However, 22.3% of respondents rated their efforts as low or very low.


The National Intelligence Bureau also received positive ratings, with 25.0% of respondents rating their efforts as “high” and 27.1% as “very high”. However, 6.3% of respondents rated the NIB as “Low”, suggesting possible gaps in accessibility or visibility.

The Ghana Immigration Service received positive ratings, with 39.7% of respondents rating its performance as “High” and another 39.7% as “Average”. Negative ratings were “low”, with only 3.9% of respondents rating its efforts as “low” or “very low”, making the GIS one of the most trusted institutions.

The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) was the highest-rated institution in this assessment. 44.4% of respondents rated its performance as “High”, while 34.3% rated it as “Very High”. These ratings reflect the NCCE's effectiveness in public education on peaceful coexistence and the risks of violent extremism. Negative ratings were minimal, with only 0.3% assessing its efforts as “Very Low”, highlighting the NCCE's central role in public sensitization.

The National Peace Council (NPC) also demonstrated a strong contribution to public sensitization, with 44.8% of respondents rating their efforts as “High” and 27.6% as “Average”. These ratings reflect the public's acknowledgment of the NPC's mandate to foster peace and build awareness in communities. However, 24.1% of respondents rated their performance as “Low”, suggesting some gaps in their outreach and effectiveness.

Figure 6.5 Public relations/public education, sensitization/awareness creation



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.8 Citizens' Assessment of Institutions in the Fight against Violent Extremism

This section analyzes citizens' perceptions of how effectively key state institutions are fighting extremist activities. The assessment is based on the following indicators: promptness in service delivery, proactiveness in addressing terrorism and violent extremism, collaborate with stakeholders and communities and Prosecution of Cases of Violent Extremism or Communal Violence.

6.8.1 Promptness in Service Delivery

The GPS received moderate ratings regarding promptness in service delivery. A little above a third of respondents (33.3%) rated the GPS as “Prompt”, while 28.6% indicated they are “Somehow Prompt”. The least 6.2% rated their promptness as “Very Prompt”, suggesting room for improvement in delivering timely services.

The Ghana Armed Forces also received a moderate rating in terms of promptness, with 38.0% of respondents perceiving them as “Prompt” and 21.7% as “Somehow Prompt”. The least 8.2% rated their service delivery as “Very Prompt”, indicating that while generally effective, there are opportunities to enhance their responsiveness further.

The National Intelligence Bureau received high ratings for promptness. Close to third of respondents (31.3%) rated the NIB as “Prompt”, with an additional 10.4% assigning a rating of “Very Prompt”. The largest proportion of respondents (41.7%) indicated that the NIB is “Somehow Prompt”, reflecting a perception of steady, if not always immediate, responsiveness. Only 12.5% of respondents rated them as “Not Prompt” or “Not Very Prompt”, indicating relatively high public confidence in their ability to act swiftly.


The Ghana Immigration Service received one of the most favorable ratings for promptness. A greater proportion of respondents (43.6%) rated the GIS as “Prompt”, while 33.3% considered them “Somehow Prompt”. Negative ratings were minimal, with only 16.6% indicating the GIS was “Not Prompt” or “Not Very Prompt”. However, just 3.8% of respondents rated them as “Very Prompt”, suggesting that while they are effective, they may not consistently deliver the highest level of timeliness.

The National Commission for Civic Education received the highest ratings for promptness in service delivery. Nearly half of respondents (48.8%) rated the NCCE as “Prompt”, and about a fifth (19.9%) rated them as “Very Prompt”, the highest among all institutions. Negative ratings were negligible, with only 4.3% combined indicating “Not Prompt” or “Not Very Prompt”. These results reflect strong public confidence in the NCCE's ability to deliver timely services, especially in public education and awareness creation.

The National Peace Council (NPC) demonstrated moderate promptness in service delivery. 31.0% of respondents rated the NPC as “Prompt”, and 13.8% as “Very Prompt”. However, a

relatively high proportion (24.1%) rated them as “Not Prompt” or “Not Very Prompt”, indicating challenges in consistently meeting expectations. A further 27.6% rated them as “Somehow Prompt”, suggesting their responsiveness varies across regions or situations.

Figure 6.6 Promptness in Service Delivery



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.8.2 Proactiveness in Addressing Terrorism and Violent Extremism

The Ghana Police Service (GPS) received mixed ratings regarding proactiveness. A plurality of respondents (32.9%) considered the GPS to be “Proactive”, while 27.5% rated it as “Somehow Proactive”. However, a combined percentage of 23.6% of respondents rated the GPS as either “Not Proactive” or “Not Very Proactive”, suggesting concerns about the institution’s ability to proactively address issues related to violent extremism. Only 4.8% rated them as “Very Proactive”, indicating limited recognition of exceptional proactivity.

The Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) received moderate ratings, with 31.5% of respondents perceiving them as “Proactive” and 25.0% as “Somehow Proactive”. However, a combined percentage of 23.9% respondents, rated the GAF as either “Not Proactive” or “Not Very Proactive”, and 3.3% viewed their efforts as “Very Proactive”. These ratings suggest that while the GAF is seen as responsive, it may not always take sufficient preventive measures to address violent extremism.


The National Intelligence Bureau emerged as the institution most frequently rated as Somehow Proactive, with 58.3% of respondents assigning this rating. A smaller proportion (18.8%) rated the NIB as “Proactive”, while only 2.1% viewed it as “Very Proactive”. Negative ratings were relatively low, with a combined 16.6% of respondents rating the NIB as either “Not Proactive” or “Not Very Proactive”. These results suggest that while the NIB is seen as capable of taking preventive actions though, it may lack widespread recognition for high levels of proactiveness.

The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) received relatively positive ratings. A majority of respondents (38.5%) rated the GIS as “Proactive”, with 30.8% rating it as “Somehow Proactive”. Negative ratings were comparatively low, with 22.8% indicating the GIS is “Not Proactive” or “Not Very Proactive”. However, only 2.6% rated the GIS as Very Proactive, indicating that their efforts are seen as adequate but not exceptional.

The National Commission for Civic Education was the most highly rated institution for proactiveness, with 44.1% of respondents perceiving it as “Proactive” and an additional 15.0% rating it as “Very Proactive”. Negative ratings were minimal, with a total of 8.2% respondents assigning “Not Proactive” or “Not Very Proactive”. These findings indicate strong public confidence in the NCCE’s ability to anticipate and address issues related to violent extremism through education and awareness creation.

The NPC received mixed ratings. A proportion of respondents (41.4%) rated the NPC as “Proactive”, while 17.2% considered it “Somehow Proactive”. Negative ratings, however, were relatively high, with 24.1% combined rating it as either “Not Proactive” or “Not Very Proactive”. Additionally, only 6.9% of respondents rated the NPC as “Very Proactive”, suggesting perceptions of moderate proactivity in its efforts to address violent extremism.

Figure 6.7 Pro-activeness in identifying and responding to cases of terrorism /Violent Extremism



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.8.3 Collaboration with Stakeholders and Communities

The Ghana Police Service received mixed ratings regarding collaboration. While 41.6% of respondents rated the GPS's collaboration efforts as "Well", only 16.4% considered them to be "Very Well". Notably, 16.8% rated the GPS as "Poor", and 8.3% rated it as "Very Poor", indicating significant room for improvement. Additionally, 17.0% of respondents indicated "Don't Know", suggesting limited awareness of the GPS's collaborative efforts among some citizens.

The GAF performed slightly better than the GPS in terms of collaboration, with 54.3% of respondents rating it as collaborating 'Well'. However, only 2.7% rated their efforts as "Very Well", which may indicate a perception of adequate but not exceptional collaboration. On the negative side, 16.8% rated their collaboration as "Poor", and 8.2% as "Very Poor". The relatively high "Don't Know" response of 17.9% suggests a lack of visibility of the GAF's engagement with stakeholders and communities.

The NIB received favorable ratings for collaboration, with the majority of respondents (56.3%) rating their efforts as "Well" and 18.8% rating them as "Very Well". Negative ratings were minimal, with only 14.6% combined rating the NIB's collaboration as "Poor" or "Very Poor". This indicates strong public recognition of the NIB's collaborative initiatives. The lower "Don't Know" response (8.3%) compared to the GPS and GAF suggests greater public familiarity with the NIB's efforts.


The GIS received one of the highest positive ratings for collaboration, with 59.0% of respondents rating their efforts as "Well" and 9.0% as "Very Well". However, 15.4% rated their collaboration as "Poor", and 9.0% rated it as "Very Poor", suggesting that while the GIS performs well overall, there are gaps in their engagement strategies. The relatively low "Don't Know" response (7.7%) reflects strong public awareness of their collaborative efforts.

The Ghana Prisons Service received the least favorable ratings. Half of the respondents (50.0%) selected "Don't Know", reflecting significant public unawareness of their collaborative efforts. The remaining half rated the Prisons Service's collaboration as "Poor", with no respondents rating it as "Well" or "Very Well". This indicates an urgent need for the institution to enhance its visibility and collaborative initiatives in addressing violent extremism.

The NCCE was one of the highest-rated institutions for collaboration. A majority of respondents (50.1%) rated their collaboration efforts as Well, and 34.9% rated them as "Very Well". Negative ratings were extremely low, with only 4.9% and 1.6% rating their efforts as "Poor" or "Very Poor", respectively. The relatively low "Don't Know" response (8.4%) underscores the NCCE's strong visibility and effectiveness in working with stakeholders and communities.

The NPC also received high ratings for collaboration, with 37.9% rating their efforts as "Well" and 34.5% as "Very Well". Negative ratings were minimal, with only a combined total of 6.9% respondents rating their efforts as "Poor" or "Very Poor". However, 17.2% of respondents indicated "Don't Know", suggesting that while the NPC is generally well-regarded, there is room to increase public awareness of its collaborative initiatives.

Figure 6.8 Collaboration with Stakeholders and Communities




Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.8.4 Citizens Assessment of The Ghana Police Service in Prosecution of Cases of Violent Extremism or Communal Violence/Terrorism

The figures show that the Ghana Police Service (GPS) is perceived as moderately effective in prosecuting cases related to violent extremism, with 43.1% of respondents rating their efforts as "Well". A smaller portion, 5.8%, considers the GPS's prosecution efforts to be "Very Well." However, there is significant dissatisfaction, with 26.1% rating the prosecution efforts of the GPS as "Poor" and 9.9% as "Very Poor". Additionally, 15.1% of respondents were unsure or unaware of the GPS's actions in this area, indicating a potential communication or engagement gap.

Figure 6.9 Citizens Assessment of the Ghana Police Service in Prosecution of Cases of Violent Extremism or Communal Violence/Terrorism




Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.9 Knowledge of Civil Society Organizations Implementing Protection Activities and Combating Radicalization in Your Locality

Figure 6.10 indicate that a majority of respondents, 89.1%, were unaware of any Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) implementing protection activities or combating radicalization in their localities. Conversely, only 10.9% of respondents reported awareness of such organizations.

Figure 6.10 Knowledge of any Civil Society Organization(s)/NGOs Implementing Protection Activities and Combating Radicalization in your locality

Knowledge of any Civil Society Organization(s)/NGOs Implementing Protection Activities and Combating Radicalization in your locality




Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.10 Civil Society Organization(s)/NGOs implementing protection activities and combating radicalization in your locality

Figure 6.13 shows the levels of recognition of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) involved in protection activities and combating radicalization. COGINTA is the most recognized, with 25.2% of respondents acknowledging its efforts, followed by the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) at 20.4%, and the Belim Wusa Development Agency (BEWDA) at 12.9%. Youth Empowerment for Life (10.9%) and NABOCARDO (6.8%) were also mentioned by respondents.

Organizations such as CDA-Ghana, FOSDA, and the Savannah Women's Empowerment Group are recognized by smaller proportions (4.1%, 4.1%, and 4.8%), while NORSAAC, GDCA, and the Northern Ghana Interfaith Group are identified by 2.7% each. An additional 2.7% mentioned "Other organizations," indicating smaller or less prominent groups.

Figure 6.11 Civil Society Organization(s)/NGOs implementing protection activities and combating radicalization in your locality



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.11 Specific Duties of CSO implementing protection activities and combating radicalization in your locality

The table 6.2 highlights the specific roles of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in implementing protection activities and combating radicalization. Of the 212 responses recorded (15.9% of surveyed participants), the most frequently cited duty was conducting community awareness programs on violent extremism (63 responses, 4.7%), emphasizing the importance of public education as a preventive measure. Similarly, respondents stated that educating the public on violent extremism and its risks (52 responses, 3.9%) with the activities of CSOs within their communities which reinforces the focus on awareness creation.

Youth empowerment initiatives aimed at reducing vulnerability to radicalization was highlighted by 36 respondents (2.7%), while 22 respondents (1.6%) emphasized collaboration with local authorities to strengthen community resilience. Providing support services for at-risk individuals (12 responses, 0.9%) and promoting peacebuilding and interfaith dialogue (11 responses, 0.8%) were less common but significant roles. Vocational training and employment programs for youth (5 responses, 0.4%) and engaging local leaders in conflict resolution (8 responses, 0.6%) were the least mentioned duties.

These findings indicate that CSOs prioritize awareness creation and public education as key strategies while roles such as youth empowerment and collaboration with authorities, though less prevalent, highlight important complementary efforts. Expanding these activities could enhance the scope and impact of CSOs in combating radicalization.

Table 6.2 Specific Duties of CSO implementing protection activities and combating radicalization in your locality


	Frequency	Percent
Conducting community awareness programs on violent extremism	63	4.7
Organizing youth empowerment initiatives to reduce vulnerability to radicalization	36	2.7
Providing support services for at-risk individuals	12	0.9
Collaborating with local authorities to strengthen community resilience	22	1.6
Educating the public on violent extremism and its risks	52	3.9
Offering vocational training and employment programs for youth	5	0.4
Promoting peacebuilding and interfaith dialogue	11	0.8
Engaging local leaders and community stakeholders in conflict resolution	8	0.6
Other	3	0.2
Total	212	15.9

Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.12 Citizens' Participation in Forums Organized by CSOs on Preventing Violent Extremism

Figure 6.12 shows that 12.9% of respondents have attended forums or engagements on preventing violent extremism organized by NGOs or CSOs, while 87.1% have not. This indicates a significant gap in the outreach and impact of such initiatives

Figure 6.12 ever attended a forum or an engagement on preventing violent extremism organized by any NGO/CSO?



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.13 Participation in Forums organized by CSO's


Figure 6.14 presents responses regarding NGOs/CSOs with which citizens have engaged in forums or activities focused on preventing violent extremism. COGINTA is the most recognized organization, accounting for 29.9% of mentions, reflecting its strong presence and community engagement in counter-radicalization efforts.

The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) follows with 16.8%, followed by Youth Empowerment for Life ranking third with 11.2%, indicating its contributions to empowering young people and reducing vulnerability to radicalization. NABOCARDO and the Belim Wusa Development Agency (BEWDA) each received 10.3%, highlighting their active involvement in community-oriented programs.

Smaller organizations also play important roles, though with lower recognition levels. The Savannah Women's Empowerment Group accounts for 5.6%, underscoring its focus on women's empowerment as a strategy to counter radicalization. NORSAAC and the Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA) were each recognized by 4.7% of respondents, while the Community Development Alliance (CDA-Ghana) and the Ghana Developing Communities Association (GDCA) received 3.7% and 2.8%, respectively.

The data highlights disparities in recognition, with a few organizations, such as COGINTA and WANEP, leading in visibility and impact. This suggests an opportunity for smaller organizations towards enhance their outreach and collaboration efforts to improve their contributions to combating violent extremism and fostering community resilience.

Figure 6.13 Participation in Forums organized by CSO's



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.14 Effectiveness of Government's Efforts to Combat Violent Extremism

This section evaluates the impact of government initiatives aimed at preventing and addressing violent extremism in the project regions. It provides an analysis of community perspectives on district-level efforts, the role of key institutions, the availability of focal persons, and the perceived gaps and strategies for addressing violent extremism. The findings are compared with baseline data to track changes over time.


6.14.1 Community Perspectives on District-Level Efforts

Comparing current data with the baseline, there is a noticeable shift in community awareness and involvement in district-level efforts to combat violent extremism. In many districts, respondents acknowledged improvements in collaboration between communities and local authorities.

At baseline, less than 70% of the respondents from five out of the eight study regions, including the Bono (65.5 percent), Northern (64.8 percent), North East (42.2 percent), Oti (64.7 percent) and Savannah (58.6 percent), indicated that their districts have been effective in addressing violent acts. Three regions (Bono East Region, Upper East Region and Upper West Region) had more than 70% of the respondents who indicated that their districts have been effective in addressing violent acts.


At the end-line, however, more than 70% of the respondents in all eight regions indicated that their districts have been effective in addressing violent acts, with the North having the highest proportion of the respondents in the Region indicating that their districts have been effective in addressing violent acts.

Figure 6.14: Baseline Respondents' Perceptions on the Effectiveness of Districts in Addressing Violent Extremism



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

Figure 6.15: End-line Respondents' Perceptions on the Effectiveness of Districts in Addressing Violent Extremism




Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November 2024

At the district level, the perceptions of respondents regarding the effectiveness of Districts in addressing violent extremism varies significantly between baseline and end-line as shown in Figure 6.6. At baseline, only four districts (Dormaa West, Nkoranza South, Kpandai and Binduri) had more than half (50%) of their respondents indicating that their districts have been very effective in addressing violent acts. Eighteen (18) out of the 59 study districts had no respondent indicating that their districts have been very effective in addressing violent acts.

At the end-line, however, sixteen (16) districts had more than half (50%) of their respondents indicating that their districts have been very effective in addressing violent acts. Six (6) districts (Lambussie, Nanumba South, Karaga, East Mamprusi, Talensi, Atebubu-Amantin) had more than half (50%) of their respondents indicating that their districts have been very effective in addressing violent acts. Only seven districts (Wa West, Sissala East, Lawra, Binduri, Bawku West, Bawku, Jaman South) had no respondent indicating that their districts have been very effective in addressing violent acts as compared to 18 districts at baseline.

Figure 6.16: Baseline and End-line Respondents' Perceptions on the Effectiveness of Districts in Addressing Violent Extremism




Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.14.2 Community Awareness of Measures by Government to Prevent Violent Extremism in Ghana

Generally, communities' perspectives on government efforts to prevent violent extremism in Ghana have improved between baseline and end-line. On the community awareness of measures put by the government to prevent violent extremism in Ghana, there was an increased community awareness of government efforts, from 27.5 percent at the baseline to 55.6 percent at the end-line.

Figure 6.17: Baseline and Endline Respondents' Level of Awareness of measures put by the Government to prevent violent extremism in Ghana




Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

Regarding the district and the awareness of measures put in by the Government to prevent violent extremism in Ghana, there is a significant improvement in community awareness between baseline and end-line (shown in Figure).

At the baseline, the number of districts with respondents who indicated awareness of any measures put in by the Government to prevent violent extremism in the Country was lower as compared to the end-line Three districts (Lambussie, Karaga , and Sene East) had more than 70% of the respondents who indicated awareness of such measures. Out of the fifty-nine (59) project districts, twenty-four (24) of them had less than 20% of the baseline respondents indicated awareness of any measures put in by the Government to prevent violent extremism.

At the end-line, however, only 7 districts (Banda, Dormaa West, Nkwanta North, Jirapa, Guan, Bawku West and Yendi) out of the 59 had less than 20% of the respondents indicated awareness. Twenty-one (21) districts had more than 70% of the respondents indicating they were aware of the Government's measures to prevent violent extremism. Awareness level was highest among respondents from Talensi, Bunkpurugu Nakpaduri and Atebubu-Amantin districts. Two districts (Banda and Dormaa West) had zero percent of the respondents being aware of any measures put by the Government to prevent violent extremism.

Figure 6.18: Baseline and End-line Respondents' Level of Awareness of measures put by the Government to prevent violent extremism in Ghana



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

Of those who mentioned that they are aware of measures put in place by the Government to prevent violent extremism in their districts, more than one-third (36.1%) of the baseline indicated that they have heard of the See Something, Say Something initiative by the government. Twenty-five (25) percent of them indicated that they are aware of the constant patrol of security personnel at the borders of their regions. The measures are highlighted in Table 6.3

Table 6.3 Baseline Respondents' Perceptions of Measures by Government to Prevent Violent Extremism

Measures by Government to Prevent Violent Extremism	Frequency	Percent
The government's "See something, say something" initiative create awareness on violent extremist activities.	134	36.1
There has been constant patrol of security personnel at our borders.	93	25.0
The establishment of military base in the various regions	28	7.5
There has been continuous sensitization by NCCE in the district on the need to be vigilant	24	6.5
Government has recruited more security personnel, almost every village has a police security post	19	5.1
The government has resourced the security agencies	15	4.0
The establishment of DISEC in the regions	14	3.8
Government is supporting institutions like NCCE to educate the general public on the effects of violent extremism groups	12	3.2
Government has organized and deployed security personnel to the various districts	9	2.4
There has been education on the importance of peaceful co-existence in the region.	7	1.9
Don't remember	4	1.1
Other	13	3.5
Total	372	100.0

Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023

At the end-line, however, almost 70% of the respondents indicated that creating job avenues through youth employment programs was one of the government's measures to prevent violent extremism while 11.1% of them mentioned the establishment to District Security Committee (DISEC) and Municipal security task Force to handle security issues on the district.

Table 6.4 End-line Respondents' Perceptions on Measures by Government to Prevent Violent Extremism

Measures by Government to Prevent Violent Extremism	Frequency	Percent
Creating job avenues through youth employment programs to prevent the youth from falling prey to extremism groups	514	69.3
The establishment of DISEC and Municipal Security Task Force to handle security issues in the district	82	11.1
Persistent security patrol in and along the borders of the district	61	8.2
Increase in the number of police stations and posts in the district	59	8.0
Other	26	3.5
Total	742	100.0

Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.15 Institutions/Persons to Report Suspicious Acts of Violence in District

Generally, there are significant changes in the perceptions of respondents regarding the Institutions or Persons to report suspicious acts of violence in the districts between baseline and end-line. At baseline, 45% of respondents interviewed indicated that they will report to security agencies followed by 23.1% who mentioned the assemblyman/woman while the least proportion of them indicated that they will call the police helpline 999 for help.

At the end-line, the proportion of the respondents who mentioned the security agencies as Institutions/Persons to report suspicious acts of violence has increased to 52.9%. This is presented in Table 6.5

Table 6.5: Baseline and End-line Respondents' Perceptions of Institutions/Persons to Report Suspicious Violent Activities in District


Institutions/Persons	Baseline		End-line	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Security Service (Police, Immigration, Army)	608	45.0	706	52.9
Assemblyman/woman	312	23.1	318	23.8
Chief	164	12.1	153	11.5
Family elder	121	9.0	63	4.7
Friend/family member	60	4.4	41	3.1
Landlord	58	4.3	34	2.5
Religious leader	11	0.8	16	1.2
Call the 999-help line	8	0.6	-	-
Other	9	0.7	3	0.2
Total	1351	100	1334	100.0

Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023 and November 2024

6.16 Communities' Perspectives on Government Efforts

Communities widely recognise the Government's "See Something, Say Something" Campaign initiative as a significant step toward raising awareness. The majority (74.3%) of the endline respondents indicated that they have heard about the campaign, which encourages citizens to be vigilant against violent extremist activities.


Figure 6.19 Awareness of the Government's "See something, Say something campaign



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

More than half (53.7%) of the end-line respondents indicated that the Government is somewhat effective in addressing the problem of violence in this country.

Figure 6.20: Effectiveness of Government's Effort in Addressing the Issue of Violence.



Source: PCVE Endline-Survey Data, December 202

6.17 Focal Persons Spearheading Activities Related to Violent Extremism

At baseline, we explored the presence of focal persons at both state and non-state institutions to spearhead activities that are related to the fight against violent extremism. The feedback received from key informants showed that there were no focal persons within the five (5) security agencies visited across the study areas to spearhead activities related to violent extremism. However, institutional structures and units exist to deal with issues related to violent extremism and terrorism.

In comparison with the baseline, the end-line results showed that there has been a modest increase in the availability of focal persons designated at some state institutions to address violent extremism at the district level. Some participants indicated that a special unit has recently been created with a focal person to provide a rapid response force to deal with violence. According to some key informants, however, there are no focal persons in their institutions to spearhead activities that are related to the fight against violent extremism.

Baseline Key Informants Perspectives on the Presence of Focal Persons at State Institutions	End-line Key informants Perspectives on the Presence of Focal Persons at State Institutions
<p><i>“We don’t have a focal person who is in charge of violent extremist-related issues instead we work together as a team to get the job done”. (KII, Security Agency, Savannah)</i></p> <p><i>“As I said earlier, the entire institution of the Ghana Police Service has the mandate of fighting crime. But we do have desks or units for special cases like domestic violence, gender violence etc. So, we have a counter-terrorist unit within the Police Service whose duty is to investigate and lead intelligence on terrorist activities. They also design strategies to combat extremist activities”. (KI, Security Agency Upper West Region)</i></p> <p><i>“No, there isn’t any focal person assigned to spearhead activities related to violent extremism”. (KII, Media, Bono Region)</i></p> <p><i>“Not really, we don’t have, maybe we might have but not officially as a position. Over here, we have teams (Entertainment, Social and Political Presenters) who handle social and political programmes whose duties are to speak about those issues”. (KII, Media, OTI Region).</i></p>	<p><i>“There’s a counter terrorism unit in NIB at the national level.” (KII, National Intelligence Bureau, Bono East Region)</i></p> <p><i>“In the region, there's a recently created unit in the northern sector. It's a rapid response force to deal with violence. They would be the first to respond. BNI, so you have a rapid response force.” (KII, National Intelligence Bureau, Northern Region).</i></p> <p><i>“No but we have the district child protection committee where all these organizations including the police are representatives.” (KII, NGO, Oti Region)</i></p> <p><i>“Our set-up doesn’t have a specific person assigned to this, but because we consider the issue very important, we treat it with the seriousness it deserves. Whenever our attention is drawn to it, we make it a priority.” (KII, Media, Northern Region)</i></p>

Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

6.18 Perceived Gaps and Ways to Address Violent Extremism

At baseline, we obtained from key informants information regarding the challenges of state and non-state actors in the fight against violent extremist activities in Ghana. At the end-line, we obtained data to gauge the challenges state and non-state actors face in the efforts to address violent extremism in the Country. Generally, key challenges include inadequate resources, lack of training, and inconsistent coordination across sectors persist. These issues remain largely consistent with baseline findings, though some districts reported minor improvements in resource allocation. Also, non-governmental actors highlighted persistent difficulties, such as limited funding, insufficient community involvement, and lack of collaboration with state institutions.

6.19 Challenges of State Actors

Both baseline and end-line studies highlight critical challenges faced by state institutions in the fight against violent extremism activities in the Country. At baseline, two major challenges were mentioned including logistical and coordination. On logistical challenges, the baseline participants mentioned lack of equipment weapons, vehicles and other protective wear), accommodation, telecommunication and other operational challenges they faced in their fight against violent extremism. On challenges with coordination, the participants at baseline indicated they most often find it difficult to access adequate and timely information from sister institutions to provide effective coordination and collaboration in the fight against violent extremism.

In the end-line, participants mentioned logistical challenges, financial challenges and low staff strength as major hindrances to the fight against violent extremist activities in the Country. This was evident in the following voices;

Logistical Challenges

“We lack logistics. in the northern region, there are structures we are seven. We have the Tamale regional command, Yendi Sector, Tatale sector, Bimbilla, Zabzugu, Saboba, and Kpandai and Wulensi. These sectors are very far apart but immigration has only one pick-up (Car) for the command. Tamale can boast of only a motorbike”. (KI, Ghana Immigration Service, Northern Region).

Financial challenges

“Financially, we need resources to recruit more resources, but that is not forthcoming”. (National Intelligence Bureau, Northern Region)

Low Staff Strength

“The staff strength can be improved with requisite skills and proper training.

They must have certain basic attributes and traits such as honesty”. (KII, National Intelligence Bureau, Savannah Region)

“Staff strength has improved a little bit, but skills development is very low.” (KII, National Intelligence Bureau, Northern Region)

Challenges of Non-State Actors

At the baseline, non-state actors including religious and traditional authorities, NGOs, CSOs and media practitioners mentioned financial and inadequate resources as the major challenges confronting them in the fight against violent extremism. Similarly, in the end-line, participants mentioned that they lacked the capacity required to address issues related to violent extremism. This was evident in the following quotations;

Low Capacity

“So, I think we are equipped, but not fully equipped. A lot of staff still need to understand it better and use our platforms to advocate for peaceful coexistence or raise awareness about the dangers associated with extremist activities. We need more training—at least 5 out of every 10 staff members need it.” (KI, Media, Northern Region)


“Well equipped no. because we are not well vested in the issues. I am yet to see the DISEC doing public education and building our capacities to counter violence. The district assembly should organise such a forum to build our capacity”. (KI, NGO, Oti Region)

“I think we are not equipped much and as a religious body we need more training to be able to educate our people”. (KI, Religious Leader, Oti Region)

6.20 Ways to Prevent Violence and Violent Extremism in Study Areas

At baseline, the key informants expressed their opinions on the best ways to prevent violent extremism in Ghana. From their perspectives, the best ways included education and sensitization, employment creation, strengthening border security, resourcing institutions, eliminating political vigilantism, enhancing community and security vigilance and tolerating community members irrespective of ethnic, religious and political affiliation.


Figure 6.21 Ways to Prevent Violence and Violent Extremism in Study Areas



Source: PCVE Survey Data, February 2023

With regards to communities' perspectives on what can be done to prevent violence at the district level, about 40% of endline primary respondents indicated that the NCCE and the Information Services Department(ISD) should be better resourced to sensitize the public on the need for peaceful co-existence. Other recommendations mentioned by the primary respondents are presented in Table 6.4.


Figure 6.22: Communities' perspectives on what can be done to prevent violence at the district level



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

On the best way for the government to address the country's potential threat to violent extremist activities, the endline primary respondents mentioned strengthening the military response or military capabilities, improving the economy, creating more jobs and intensifying public education on the negative effective of violent extremism as the best strategies.


Figure 6.23: Communities’ perspectives on best way for the government to address the country’s potential threat to violent extremist activities



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

The feedback from key informant interviews with security agencies and media practitioners in the eight project regions revealed six thematic areas regarding the best ways to prevent acts of violent extremism and other forms of violence in the Country (as shown figure).

Figure 6.24: Endline Key Informants perspectives on best way for the government to address the country's potential threat to violent extremist activities



Source: PCVE End-line Study Data, November, 2024

CHAPTER SEVEN

GENDER DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM

7.1 Introduction


Exploring knowledge of how extremist ideologies take advantage of and uphold established gender norms remains important in efforts at addressing violent extremism. This requires an understanding of the gender dynamics of violent extremism. Violent extremism affects men and women differently. Women are characteristically shown as victims, while males are frequently singled out as violent perpetrators. Therefore, recent calls highlight the importance of integrating gender perspectives into counter-violent extremism strategies and examining gender-specific drivers of radicalization.

Against this background, this chapter presents comprehensively, the possible roles of men and women play in perpetrating violent extremism and other forms of violence. Also it highlights the effects of their activities as well as their contributions to conflict resolution and fighting extremists' activities. The results identified in the End-line study are compared with the Baseline findings where necessary.

7.2 Role of Women and Men in Perpetrating Violence

The findings from the Baseline and End-line studies reveal nuanced roles played by women and men in violent extremism. The proportion of males who indicated that they had participated in any violent act have decreased from 69.6%, at Baseline, to 60.9% at the End-line. In contrast, the proportion of female participants who had ever committed any violent act has increased from 30.4% at Baseline to 39.1% at the End-line. Generally, both genders had engaged in acts of violence associated with land disputes, election-related violence, chieftaincy disputes, ethnic conflicts, and inter-communal clashes.

Figure 7.1: Comparing Baseline and End-line survey results on the percentage distribution of primary participants ever engaged in any form of violent



Source: Baseline and End-line PCVE Survey data, February 2023 and November 2024

Finding from both the Baseline and End-line studies for the key informants' interviews revealed that women play various roles in acts of violence and extremism. Some women often act as conduits for weapon supply, share information and influence their spouses' involvement. Both studies identified women leveraging societal perceptions of vulnerability to smuggle contraband goods. Examples include carrying weapons disguised as firewood or under maternity clothing. Some key informants expressed this as follows:

“When the extremists’ are able to work through women it makes it easier because, people in general think they are vulnerable and are not likely to engage in these violent extremist acts. They can carry bombs in their firewood and will not be searched by any security personnel. Women can pretend to be pregnant but will be carrying weapons on them”- (KI, CSO, North East-Baseline study).


“They hardly get noticed as being the perpetrators and can be used in the smuggling of stuff such as contrabands. If a woman is carrying firewood with AK47 hidden inside the firewood, you cannot suspect it.” (KI, Security Agency, Savannah Region-End-line study)

7.3 Effects of Violent Extremism on Men and Women

This section presents the opinions of survey respondents on the gender likely to be affected by violent extremist activities as depicted by the Baseline and End-line studies.

Figure 7.2 presents an overview of the percentage distribution of individuals likely to be affected by violent extremism categorized by gender. From the End-line, 73.2% of participants mentioned that women are more likely to suffer violent extremism than men, similar to the observation at the baseline period(72.6%).

Figure 7.2: Comparing Baseline and End-line survey results on the percentage distribution of Gender type more likely to suffer from VE activities



Source: Baseline and end-line PCVE Survey data, February 2023 and December 2024

The effect of violent extremism has far-reaching implications that extend beyond immediate security threats but also impact the social structure and the vulnerable in society.

Men are generally the target for recruitment into these extremist groups and mostly suffer the consequences of joining the groups as highlighted by some key informants as follows:

“Men die during conflicts because they are at the forefront to defend their communities - (KI, Security Agency”, Savannah Region-Baseline study).

“Men are deployed into rebel or terrorist groups against their wishes, and those who resist these forced enlistments are killed” - (KI, Security Agency, Upper West Region-Baseline).

From the End-line study, some primary participants highlighted the effects of violent extremism on presented in Box 1:

Box 2: Effects of violent extremism on men

- Men are often killed during wars and violent attacks
- Men are vulnerable to robbery, kidnapping and violent assault
- Men face increased poverty during violent attacks as they struggle to provide for their families
- Men are often forced to fight because they are perceived as strong and courageous
- Men are frequently targeted for recruitment or involvement in violent attacks
- Men may become unemployed and unable to support their families due to the disruption caused by violence
- Men risk losing their properties during violent conflicts
- Men sometimes resort to substance abuse to cope with the psychological trauma they experience
- Men may lose their sense of dignity and self-worth during violent attacks

The key informants also highlighted some negative consequences of conflicts and violent extremism on women. It was observed that, women could experience psychological problems as they become homeless, widows, poor, and may have their properties and livelihoods lost. The following voices are some perspectives shared by some key informants.

“There are also psychological effects of conflicts.

We have evidence to show that in some places, women were sexually abused due to conflicts. For example, houses are burnt in an area and you move to a different community. After a while, the man of that household begins to harass the woman sexually. Some of them are traumatized and even have mental disorders” - (KI, CSO, Upper East-Baseline)

“Women end up becoming single mothers and they lose their source of economic power because when the husband is around, he helps with taking care of the family but if he is not around, the woman has to take up all the economic burdens. Their voices are reduced and limited because of conflicts” - (KI, CSO, Upper East-Baseline)

The End-line findings were not different from the Baseline. End-line participants indicated that, men are stronger and hence able to move out when threatened by violent activities than their women counterparts. On the other hand, women may take over the burden and responsibilities of men as breadwinners in the absence of men as a result of violence. This was evident in the following quotations from secondary participants at the End-line study:

“Women are weaker. Men are stronger and they will run and leave the women. Women will lose their breadwinners which are the men when there is violence. Children and women will suffer more because they are vulnerable.” (KI, CSO Oti Region-End-line)

“.....As we have been saying it hasn't changed, it's women because if there is violence and a pregnant woman is involved, she will suffer more than a man. Even if the man is 50 years old, he can run, but a pregnant woman cannot run”. (KI, CSO Bono Region-End-line)

7.4 Role of Women in Preventing Violent Extremism

This section highlights the viewpoints of key informants on the roles and support women provide in preventing violent extremism in their regions. The secondary participants in the Baseline study outlined the roles of women as: acting as role models to their spouses and children who may have plans to engage in violent extremism. Women can serve as agents of peace and can also serve as mediators.

Women As Agents of Peace: Women serve as mediators to feuding factions and provide counseling that leads to peace between these factions. The following are the few quotations from the key informants:

“Women are good peacemakers. They bring about peace quickly if they put their abilities into action, by advising, counseling, and being mediators because their presence alone can make a difference” (KI, Religious Authority, Bono Region-Baseline)

Educational support: Women provide education to their spouses and children on negative effect of violent extremism and the importance of preventing the occurrence of extremist activities. It was also stated that, women can also advise their spouses and children to desist from participating in acts of violence. Some key informants made these assertions:

“Women can help prevent violent extremism through education and taking part in advocating for peace and convincing their husbands to go for peace” (KI, Media Bono East Region-Baseline)

Positive Role Model: Women as wives can offer positive advice to discourage their spouses and children from joining extremist groups. Good parenting also prevents young males and husbands from participating in acts of violence for money or material gains. A key informant put it as follows:

“Women have to start the education from the basic level, they have to educate their children and their husbands talking on tolerance and patience. If people are tolerant there would not be conflicts. Women must take lead in educating their family members, especially the male youth and their husbands” - (KI, Security agency, North East Region-Baseline)

From the End-line study, some secondary participants mentioned the roles played by women in preventing violent extremism include being influencers to their husbands to desist from VE activities and providing good parenting as the case at the baseline stage.

Good parenting; In the Bono region, a key informant emphasized that good parenting can help prevent their children, especially the youth from engaging in violent extremism acts. These are some viewpoints from the key informant:

“.....They are able to convince people passionately. They are the same people who can control their adolescent children more than the fathers. The adolescents are very...They always want to explore the world. If women understand peace, and we are six in the house, they are able to get four people to follow them when it comes to peace. So I think that women play a very good role, if we are able to involve them in dialogue, in civic education and also able to train them with skills to upgrade them, they will help a lot in the fight against extremism.”(KI, CSO Bono Region-End-line)

CHAPTER EIGHT

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF NCCE'S ACTIVITIES ON PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

8.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the outcomes and impact of the PCVE interventions implemented by the NCCE across the eight project regions. These interventions included dialogues, community engagement activities, and media advocacy aimed at fostering awareness and resilience against violent extremism. The chapter explores respondents' perspectives on their participation in these activities, the effectiveness of the interventions, and the mediums through which they received education. It also assesses the extent to which the interventions achieved their objectives, including reaching targeted populations, promoting community awareness, and reducing the risk of radicalization and violent extremism.

8.2 Participation in NCCE's Activities

The participation of study respondents in NCCE's activities was assessed based on two main types of interventions implemented by the Commission to disseminate information related to the PCVE project. These interventions were categorized as either in-person or contact-based activities, which included fora, symposia, and meetings with identifiable groups, or non-contact or virtual activities delivered through various media channels. This distinction allowed for a comprehensive evaluation of the reach and effectiveness of the NCCE's efforts in promoting awareness and education on PCVE.

8.2.1 Participation in NCCE's Fora and Engagements


An assessment of the in-person or contact activities showed that among the 1,334 participants engaged in this study, 576 representing 43.2% had ever attended a forum or an engagement on preventing violent extremism organized by the NCCE. Of the 576 participants who had ever attended activities organized by the NCCE on violent extremism, 52.8% were males.

This observed level of participation shows an improvement compared with similar data from the Baseline study. In the Baseline, the total number of persons who had ever participated in a programme or activity on violent extremism organized by both state and non-institutions constituted 31.5% of the total study population.

In terms of the age distribution of participants, the more youthful population (60.4%) dominated the sessions. This comprised of 26.9% in the age category 30-39 years, 26.2% who are in the age bracket 20 – 29 years and 7.3% who were 15-19 years.

The regional level data showed that two regions recorded more than half of participants participating in PCVE-related activities. The North East region (70.2%) recorded the highest proportion of participants who attended a forum or engagement organized by the NCCE. This was followed by the Northern region (50.6%), and the Bono region (16.7%) recorded the least proportion of participants (Figure 8.1).

Figure 8.1: Regional distribution of attendance to PCVE fora and other engagements




Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

Media Engagement and Receipt of PCVE Education

Various media platforms were also engaged to increase mileage and coverage of messages on violent extremism. At the Baseline study, participants indicated their main source of information on violent extremism. From the results of that assessment, Radio (49.8%), Television (16.9%), the NCCE (13.3%), Community Information Centres (10.8%), social media (5.4%), News Portals (0.3%) and other sources (3.5) were the main sources of information on violent extremism for participants. These media platforms were therefore engaged during the implementation phase of the project for the dissemination of PCVE messages.

This End-line study survey assessed coverage of these platforms by asking participants whether they had heard or seen any advertisement or information on addressing violent extremism via any of the media platforms within the last 12 months. The result is presented in the Figure 8.2.

Figure 8.2: Participants' Source of PCVE Messages within the Past Year



Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

From Figure 8.2, more than half of the study respondents received PCVE education through the radio (79.5%), posters (76.8%), Community information Centres (55.3%) and Television (50.9%). Social media and Cinema Van shows reached the least proportion of participants representing 39.7% and 37.2% respectively.

By region, radio remained the most effective media platform for wider coverage in the Upper East (84.0%), Savannah (83.8%), Upper West (78.2%) and Northern (77.7%) regions. Meanwhile posters were the most effective channel for disseminating PCVE messages in the North East (100.0%) and Bono (77.4%) regions respectively. Community Information Centres reached a much wider populace in the Bono East (88.7%) and Oti (85.9%) regions.

Radio was again the principal means of receiving information on violent extremism among the age groups: 50-59 years (83.2%), 40-49 years (82.7%), 60 years and above (81.4%) and also 30-39 years (79.9%). For the much younger age groups i.e. 15-19 years (79.0%) and those aged 20-29 years (77.5%) received PCVE-related messages via posters.

In all, data on coverage showed that on average of 56.6% received the education through all the media platforms engaged in the awareness creation campaigns.

8.3 Assessment of the Content of NCCE's Engagements

The project was specific in relation to the contents to be delivered during engagements with communities in the implementing districts and regions. The topics earmarked to be discussed during the engagements included: peaceful coexistence and social cohesion; preventing and containing violent extremism – the role of citizens; triggers and effects of violent extremism;

identifying early warning signals of violent extremism; signs of radicalization; threats of violent extremism; and response measure in case of extremist attacks.

Participants who confirmed having heard of PCVE-related messages and adverts on any of the media outlets were asked to recount some of the subjects discussed during the engagements. The Table 8.1 presents the result of this assessment.

On the average, each participant was able to recall three (3) topics out of the seven (7) that were discussed via the various media platforms. The result as presented in table 8.1 enabled the project management team to verify field implementation of the project plan. Project implementing offices were tasked to air messages on the seven (7) topics. The results presented in table 8.1 affirm that all topics assigned were discussed. Participants' ability to recount the topics treated several days after the engagement indicates some measure of retention of the messages aired by the NCCE on violent extremism.

Table 8.1: Topics Treated during Media Engagements

Topics Treated	Frequency	Percent
Peaceful coexistence and social cohesion	1,024	25.1
Role of citizens in preventing and containing violent extremism	674	16.6
Triggers and effects of violent extremism	669	16.4
Identifying early warning signals of VE activities	614	15.1
Signs of radicalization	581	14.3
Threats of violent extremism	345	8.5
Actions to take in the event of an attack	161	4.0
Other	4	0.1
Total	4,072	100.0


Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

8.4 Assessment of Project Impact

The impact of NCCE's activities was assessed across three parameters i.e., knowledge, attitudes and behaviours. Study participants described the impact of NCCE's activities on their knowledge, attitudes and behaviours in respect to violent extremism.

In describing the impact of their engagement with NCCE on their knowledge, approximately three in every five participants (61.6%) stated that the engagement enabled them to gain a deeper understanding of violent extremism and its consequences.


Figure 8.3: Specific impact of NCCE’s campaign on participants’ knowledge



Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

Figure 8.4 highlights the specific impact of NCCE’s educational campaign on the attitudes of participants in the intervention districts and regions. Attitudinal changes as reported by participants included proactiveness in identifying and reporting suspicious persons (37.5%) and improved level of tolerance and respect for the views of others (35.9%).


Figure 8.4: Specific impact of NCCE’s educational campaign on attitudes



Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

In terms of adjustment in behaviour, 47.1% reported that they will actively promote peaceful existence within the community. Some 20.9% also reported that they now have the ability to identify and report suspicious persons whiles 20.1% indicated that they have become more mindful and conscious of strangers (Figure 8.5).

Figure 8.5 Specific impact of NCCE's educational campaign on the behaviour of Respondents



Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

The study also assessed the impact of NCCE's fora and engagements on knowledge of communities and at-risk groups in the project communities and districts towards violent extremism and other forms of violence (Table 8.2).

Table 8.2: Impact of NCCE's Educational Campaign on the knowledge of Community Members

Specific Impact	Frequency	Percent
An increase in community's knowledge on violent extremism, how to detect early signs and prevent violent extremism	129	23.5
Community members are now aware of the triggers and effects of violent extremism	102	18.6
An increase in community's vigilance and security conscious against violence extremism	92	16.8
Community members now live peacefully and tolerate people from different ethnic groups	69	12.6
Community members know where to report suspicious violent acts and relate better with security agencies	67	12.2
The engagement has reduced violent activities and attitude and prefer dialogue	45	8.2
The youth in the community has set up a watchdog committee	25	4.6
Don't know	19	3.5
Total	548	100.0

Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

From table 8.2, it was observed that there was an increase in the community's knowledge on violent extremism (23.5%), and the awareness of the triggers and effect of violent extremism (18.6%). Further, 16.8% of participants indicated an increase in the community's vigilance and security consciousness against violent extremism. Also, more than ten percent of the participants cited community members living peacefully and tolerating people from different ethnic groups (12.6%) as well as having knowledge on where to report suspicious violent acts and relate better with security agencies respectively (12.2%).

Community attitudes was assessed, and from the result, 22.8% of project community members indicated that they now view security agencies favourably, displaying a positive attitude. Another 19.2% reported that they have become more vigilant whiles 15.6% indicated that their ability to embrace divergent opinions has been enhanced (Table 8.3).

Table 8.3: Specific Impact of NCCE's Educational Campaign on the Attitudes of Community Members

Specific Impact	Frequency	Percent
Community members now view security agencies favourably, displaying a positive attitude	82	22.8
Community members have become more vigilant, able to recognize suspicious individuals and activities.	69	19.2
Community member's attitudes towards embracing other people's opinion enhanced	56	15.6
Increased knowledge on the subject has made community members to desist from acts that can lead to violence	53	14.8
Community members are stepping forward to promote peace education and become positive change agents	44	12.3
Community members are now vigilant and conscious about VE	41	11.4
Community members are cautious about gifts from strangers, which can lead to radicalization.	12	3.3
Don't know	1	0.3
Other	1	0.3
Total	359	100.0

Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

Behavioural changes at the community level was also assessed. Participants (39.7%) indicated that relations among community members has improved. Another 28.1% reported that community members are now vigilant in monitoring community safety and avoiding risky behaviours. Some 17.8% also pointed out that community members now support local security groups (Table 8.4).

Table 8.4: Specific Impact of NCCE's Educational Campaign on the Behaviour of Community Members

Specific Impact on Community Behaviour	Frequency	Percent
Improved relationships among community members and they now live peacefully, promoting tolerance	116	39.7
Community members are now vigilant in monitoring community safety and avoiding/abstaining risky behaviours	82	28.1
Community members now support local security groups and are joining community initiatives to support security agencies	52	17.8
Increase willingness among community members to report suspicious behaviours to authorities	25	8.6
Community members have learnt and are teaching the effects of violent extremism	15	5.1
Don't know	2	0.7
Total	292	100.0

Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

8.5 NCCE's Collaboration with other Institutions on the PCVE Project

The NCCE's collaboration with other institutions on the PCVE Project has been instrumental in promoting awareness and peaceful co-existence. Key informants (KIs) confirmed that the NCCE has been collaborating and effectively partnering with organizations such as the Local Council of Churches and the Ghana Immigration Service to carry out educational activities and sensitization to promote peaceful coexistence in the country. Some participants highlighted the areas in which the Commission has collaborated with other institutions on the PCVE Project. These areas included provision of free airtime for public education, demonstrating the commitment of various stakeholders to the PCVE Project. This was evident in the following quotations from some KIs. For instance, on public sensitization, some KIs asserted:

“Yes because, personally I was a facilitator last year at Modern City Hotel. I was the only security officer on the panel. So NCCE and immigration have had a collaboration”- (KI, Security Agency, Northern region – End-line study).

“We have worked with the NCCE on a lot of occasions. Anytime we invite them to talk to our people, they honour our invitation. We are partners as the Local

Council of Churches. Anytime the Council organizes a program that involves peace, we involve the NCCE". - (KI, Religious leader, Oti region – End-line study).

"Our collaboration has been effective, and I believe we've achieved a lot. The audience we reach isn't just in the Northern Region; our programs extend to other regions as well. I'm eager to listen to and watch what we've discussed with the NCCE in the Region, as I'm sure it has played a role in some of the changes happening...." (KI, Media group, Northern region – End-line study).

"Yes. We give free airtime for public education"- (KI, Media group, Oti region – End-line study)

8.6 Visibility of NCCE Branded Materials – T-Shirt

The PCVE related messages were conveyed on printed T-shirts as part of measures to increase visibility and coverage of the project. To this end, three different messages were printed onto different T-shirts [T-shirt one (T1), T-shirt two (T2), and T-shirt three (T3)] (Box 1). The front part of all the T-shirts has the European Union (EU) logo positioned on the right side and the NCCE logo on the left side. Beneath the logo is the project title "PCVE". At the back of the T1, the message reads "Whose business is it to secure Ghana?", "Is it me? Yes you!" The message is designed in a bold, engaging format with a thumbs-up graphic, emphasizing personal responsibility and collective effort in securing the nation. The back of the second t-shirt (T2) displays the message "Make Ghana's Security Your Priority Business!". The back of the Blue T-shirt (T3) as shown in Box 1 displays the message: "Be a citizen vigilante!" accompanied by an "Expose Suspected Characters".

BOX 3: Branded PCVE T-Shirts



Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024


8.6.1 Recognition of NCCE T-Shirts

The study participants were asked if they had ever seen any of these T-shirts worn by NCCE officials. The majority (88.4%) of the study participants confirmed that they had seen NCCE officials wear T2 with the inscription "Make Ghana's Security Your Priority Business!". Another 86.9% of the participants indicated that they had seen NCCE officials wear T1 with the inscription "Whose business is it to secure Ghana?", "Is it me? Yes you!". Also, 76.8% responded in affirmative to having seen the T3 with the inscription "Be a citizen vigilante!" accompanied by an "Expose Suspected Characters".

8.6.1.1 Visibility of PCVE Branded T-Shirts by Region

Across regions, Northern consistently had high proportions of participants who reported seeing posters T1 (100%), T2 (100%), and T3 (97.6%) (Figure 8.6). Savannah also had 100% proportion of participants who affirmed seeing T1, while Upper West (94.3%) affirmed seeing T2 and for T3 Savannah had 84.1% of participants. On the other hand, Oti region had the lowest proportion of participants who reported seeing T1 (69%) and T2 (64.8%) while Bono had an extremely low proportion of participants who reported seeing T3 (22%).

Figure 8.6: Visibility of PCVE Branded T-Shirts Across Regions



Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

8.6.1.2 Visibility of PCVE Posters (Campaign Materials)

As part of efforts to increase visibility and coverage, PCVE-related messages were disseminated through posters. Seven distinct messages were printed on different posters to convey critical information (Box 2). The posters aimed to promote community engagement, security awareness, and counter-violent extremism. The messages on the posters were as follows. Poster 1 (P1)

had the inscription “Join a neighbourhood watch committee. Help secure your community”. Poster 2 (P2) had the inscription “No space for Violent Extremism in our communities, schools, workplace, etc....”. Poster 3 (P3) had the inscription “Report suspicious characters to lawful agencies or your community leaders (with emergency contacts attached)”. Poster 4 (P4) had the inscription “Worship centers, watch out! Be security alert- Promote peaceful co-existence through dialogue”. Poster 5 (P5) had the inscription “Beware of Violent Extremist”. Poster 6 (P6) had the inscription “Whose business is it to secure Ghana, "Is it me? Yes you!". Poster 7 (P7) had the inscription “Report activities of violent extremist to relevant authorities”.

The study sought to assess the visibility of the various PCVE Posters by asking participants to identify the images. Generally, Poster 2 was the commonest among the participants with 78.2% indicating that they had ever seen it. Poster 1 and Poster 3 followed with 78.2% and 78.0% respectively. Conversely, more than half of the study participants (69.5%) had not seen Poster 7.

BOX 4: PCVE Posters



8.6.1.3 PCVE Posters Visibility by Region

The Northern and Savannah regions recorded the highest visibility for posters P1 and P2, with 95.2% and 93.6% of participants respectively (Table 8.5). Similarly, the Northern (86.7%) and Bono East (83.5%) had the highest proportion of participants who reported seeing poster P5. For poster P7, Savannah (85.9%) and Upper West (81.9%) regions had the highest visibility. On the other hand, posters P4 and P7 had lower visibility in some regions. Specifically, Oti (57.4%) and Bono East (54.8%) regions had the lowest proportion of participants who reported seeing poster P4. For P7, Bono (52.4%) and Oti (54.1%) regions had the lowest visibility.

Overall, the results suggested that the poster campaign was effective in large audience across the regions.

Table 8.5: Regional Variations of PCVE Posters

Region	P1 (%)	P2 (%)	P3 (%)	P4 (%)	P5 (%)	P6 (%)	P7 (%)
Bono	73.0	76.2	81.0	73.0	60.3	52.4	52.4
Bono East	76.5	80.9	72.2	54.8	83.5	80.9	73.0
Northern	95.2	95.2	89.2	86.8	86.8	83.1	73.5
North East	72.8	75.3	71.2	75.3	70.9	69.0	65.1
Oti	72.1	67.2	75.4	57.4	60.7	65.6	54.1
Savannah	93.6	89.7	92.3	88.5	74.4	88.5	85.9
Upper East	81.9	80.0	85.7	82.4	71.9	62.9	67.1
Upper West	74.7	82.5	74.7	79.5	80.1	81.9	81.9

Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024


Comparatively, the result indicated that the t-shirts had a broader reach and impact, with a higher proportion of participants reporting visibility than the posters. This could be attributable to the longer lifespan of t-shirts than posters. Again, individuals are more likely to wear t-shirt and move from one location to another thereby making them more likely to be visible than posters. The findings implied that incorporating wearable items like t-shirts into awareness campaigns can be an effective strategy for increasing visibility and reach.

8.6.2 Perceived Effectiveness of the European Union (EU)-Funded Action

The study sought to ascertain the community's perceptions of the PCVE success in reducing risks of radicalization (Figure 8.7). The End-line study showed an improvement in community perceptions regarding the EU-funded action's effectiveness. More than half (55.4%) of the study participants indicated that the program enhanced awareness of violent extremism and its

prevention. The educational campaigns, community engagement activities, and collaborative efforts with local authorities were cited for creating a sense of vigilance and fostering resilience against radicalization. The findings indicated that the EU-funded programme achieved its primary objectives, particularly in promoting public education and encouraging proactive reporting of suspicious activities. However, the results highlighted the need for sustained action to solidify the gains made.

Figure 8.7: Perception of Study Respondents on the Effectiveness of the EU-funded Action



Source: PCVE End-line Survey Data, November 2024

The study explored key informants awareness of any EU-Funded Actions aimed at reducing radicalization risks of community members. It was revealed that most efforts involved collaboration between the EU, NCCE and civil society organizations like the Preventing Electoral Violent and Providing Security to the Northern Border Regions of Ghana (NORPREVSEC) and COGINTA. To support these efforts and collaboration indicated by KIs, four (4) themes emerged highlighting public education, NCCE collaboration with other institutions, dialogues and community engagements, and peacebuilding and violence prevention training. Some KIs asserted:

"I know that your institution which is the NCCE does a lot of public education. Because I work with the NCCE, I know they have received funding from the EU to do public education." (KI, CSO, Oti region - End-line study).

"Recently, there was a NORPREVSEC event with NCCE. They organized some training for the security agencies in the north quite recently."- (KI, NIB, Northern region – End-line study).

I know that there have been dialogues in most of the districts and regions, from Northern to Upper East and Upper West, where security people and media have been engaged." (KI, Media group, Northern region – End-line study).

I think this PCVE study is an example... It involved training on maintaining peace and preventing violence, spearheaded by the Regional Coordinating Council." (KI, Media group, North East region – End-line study).

It was evident that community dialogues, featuring stakeholders like the media, religious leaders, CSOs, local communities and security agencies have been instrumental in promoting awareness and peaceful co-existence.

The End-line study sought to ascertain the effectiveness of the EU-funded action in reducing the risk of radicalization of community members of vulnerable groups such as unemployed youth, herdsmen and ethnic minorities. The results indicated that among herdsmen, 44.2% reported that the EU-funded action has reduced the risk of radicalization of members of their community to a large extent. More than half of the unemployed respondents (54.5%) reported that the EU-funded action has reduced the risk of radicalization to a large extent, with an additional 2.1% said it has reduced the risk of radicalization of members of their community completely. Based on the results, the End-line study participants felt that the EU-funded action has reduced the risk of radicalization and engagement in criminal activities within their community.

CHAPTER NINE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 Introduction

The end-line study on preventing and containing violent extremism in eight Northern regions of Ghana is a follow-up to a baseline study conducted by the NCCE in 2023. The end-line study was conducted in November 2024 to gauge changes in knowledge, attitudes and behaviors of communities and at-risk groups to violent extremism and other forms of violence in the study areas. The role and contribution of state and non-state institutions in fighting the menace were also investigated. This was necessitated by the fact that the Commission with support from the European Union (EU) carried out 18 months key interventions and programs in eight regions to prevent, preempt and protect communities from the threats of violent extremism and other forms of violence. The study regions were the Northern, North East, Upper East, Upper West, Savannah, Oti, Bono and Bono East regions.

A cross-sectional mixed-method study design was employed using both quantitative and qualitative techniques. In selecting the respondents, purposive and simple random sampling techniques were employed. The study interviewed one thousand, three hundred and thirty-four (1,334) primary-level study participants for the quantitative study in fifty-nine (59) districts across the eight (8) project regions. Additionally, a total of forty-eight (48) key informant interviews were also conducted with senior-level officers of selected state and non-state institutions. Data collection was undertaken by trained officers from the district offices and headquarters of NCCE.

The analysis was done to provide a clear understanding of communities level of tolerance towards different religious and linguistic groups in the study areas, examine gender dynamics of violent extremism and identified and assessed the contributions of state and non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism.

9.2 Summary of Findings

9.2.1 Background Characteristics of Respondents

More than half (51.0%) of the respondents were females. Close to thirty percent (28.6%) of the respondents belonged to the 20-29 age category. Approximately one-fourth (25.4%) of the respondents had no education. About thirty percent of the respondents were self-employed with majority (58.9%) married and belonged to the Islam religion (54.9%). Five (5) percent of the respondents were persons with disabilities. A third (33%) of the respondents were from the Northern region. The study participants for the qualitative study were forty-eight (48).

9.2.2 Knowledge, Attitudes and Behaviours of Communities and at-risk groups to VE and other Forms of Violence

The study explored changes in the knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of communities and at-risk groups regarding violent extremism and other forms of violence in the eight project regions. Similar to the baseline, the end-line study utilized four scenarios (three correct and one incorrect) to assess the change in primary respondents' knowledge of the concept of violent extremism.

Generally, the study revealed increased knowledge of the concept of violent extremism (VE) among respondents, with 78.1% correctly identifying VE at the End-line compared to 67.0% at the Baseline. The overall improvement in knowledge was observed across demographic groups, including youth, males, non-PWDs, and herdsmen. Again, similar to the baseline, the knowledge of the concept of violent extremism among the end-line key informants interviewed was almost universal. Respondents in the youthful age bracket were observed to have a significantly increased knowledge of the concept of violent extremism between baseline and end-line (65.8% and 78.4%, respectively).

Regionally, in the end-line, seven (7) out of the eight regions had more than 70% of the respondents identifying the correct statement as compared to five regions at baseline. At the end-line, Bono, Northern, Oti and Upper West regions in that order recorded a higher proportion of the respondents who had knowledge of the concept of violent extremism. On the other side, the Region with the lowest proportion of respondents who knew the concept of violent extremism was the Bono East Region.

On knowledge of the existence of extremist groups, about 3% of the end-line primary respondents knew about these groups as compared to 12% at baseline. It was observed that a higher proportion of the end-line male respondents had knowledge about persons recruited into violent extremist groups compared to females who had such knowledge at the baseline. The Northern region again recorded the highest number of primary respondents with such knowledge, followed by the Upper West and the Upper East regions.

More than one-third (35.5%) of the end-line study participants expressed fear that Ghana could experience an extremist attack in the future due to the increasing economic hardships, weaknesses observed in the national security operations and intelligence gathering, especially along our porous borders and existing political instabilities in the country. Approximately 19% of the primary respondents however held a contrasting view regarding extremist attack on the Country. This was affirmed by the key informant interviews in which participants indicated that adequate security measures have been put in place to ensure the safety of persons.

With regards to how people are recruited by violent extremists, it was reported that such groups usually lure victims with money, employment opportunities, expensive gifts (cars, phones) and education opportunities abroad. Politicians were identified by high proportions of both the baseline and end-line respondents to be the most likely group to sponsor and support the extremist groups. More than half (57.1%) of the primary respondents identified the Youth as the most at-risk groups targeted for recruitment.

Generally, both the baseline and end-line study primary participants demonstrated a positive attitude in the fight against violent extremism. Comparatively, in the baseline, more than seven out of every ten (77.1%) people said they would advise family members or close friends to desist from joining extremist groups. This figure has increased to 81.0% at the end-line. On witnessing violence and other forms of violence, 21 percent of both Baseline and End-line study respondents have ever witnessed or known the existence of other forms of violence apart from violent extremism in the study districts.

9.2.3 Communities resilience and level of tolerance towards diverse groups

Both the baseline and end-line studies examined communities' level of tolerance towards different groups in Ghana with particular emphasis on discrimination against or unfair treatment of persons with different ethnic groups, religious groups, gender and political backgrounds. Additionally, the studies investigated the level of existence of political polarization, religious intolerance, ethnic conflict, and chieftaincy fractions in Ghana.

Results from both Baseline and End-line studies showed that communities had a strong level of tolerance toward people of varied backgrounds and beliefs. In both studies, high proportions of the primary respondents indicated a strong willingness to coexist and interact with people from different backgrounds and political affiliations. There is approximately two (2) percent improvement in the level of tolerance towards people of different backgrounds between the Baseline (82.6%) and the End-line (84.3%).

Regionally, over 70% of the End-line respondents in all the eight regions indicated their willingness to coexist and interact with people from different backgrounds. While there are clusters of violent conflicts and other forms of violence reported to be dotted around some communities in the study regions, the proportions of respondents reporting about the existence of these events has declined from the Baseline and the End-line.

With regard to discrimination, the study assessed the prevalence of discrimination in three main thematic areas; denial of access to a public facility, unfair treatment of persons in the community and harassment. Generally, there was positive feedback regarding acts of discrimination against persons based on their gender, background, political affiliation and belief system. Less than 20% of both the Baseline and End-line respondents indicated that they had witnessed some acts of discrimination against people based on their gender, ethnicity and political affiliations. There is an eleven (11) percent increase in the proportion of respondents who had witnessed discrimination against and harassment of persons with disability between the Baseline (23.8%) and the End-line (34.3%). It was observed that persons with disability were mostly denied access to some public facilities due to lack of disability-friendly facilities in those public places and this has increased from 11.9% at the Baseline to 22.9% at the End-line.

9.2.4 Contribution of State and Non-state actors in the fight against violent extremism

The contribution of state and non-state actors toward the fight against violent extremism was assessed by both the Baseline and End-line studies. Results from both studies showed that state actors including the security agencies are involved in intelligence gathering, collaborating with institutions and putting down structures to prevent and contain violent extremism. Participants also mentioned the role of the media, in providing education and sensitization programmes to create awareness among the general public against violent extremism. Additionally, it was observed that Civil Society Organizations, religious authorities and traditional authorities often engaged community members as well as collaborated with other institutions to educate the public against acts of violence. On the presence of focal persons in security agencies, the end-line results showed that there has been a modest increase in the availability of focal persons designated at institutions to address violent extremism at the regional level. There are also institutional structures and units such as the counter-terrorism unit which exist in institutions such as the NIB, Ghana Immigration Service and the Ghana Armed Forces to provide rapid response force and deal with issues related to violent extremism and terrorism.

Additionally, there is a noticeable shift in community awareness and involvement in district-level efforts to combat violent extremism between the Baseline and the End-line. In many districts, respondents acknowledged improvements in collaboration between communities and local authorities in the fight against violent extremism. Generally, there are significant changes in the perceptions of respondents regarding the Institutions or Persons to report suspicious acts of violence in the districts between baseline (45%) and End-line (52.9%).

With regard to the challenges faced by state and non-state institutions in their response to the risk and threat of violent extremism, both the Baseline and End-line participants mentioned logistical, technical, low staff strength and financial challenges as major hindrances to state institutions particularly security agencies in the fight against violent extremist activities in the Country. Similarly, results from both studies revealed that non-state institutions were under-resourced to be able to provide the right architecture necessary for the fight against violent extremism.

On ways to prevent violence and violent extremism, results from both studies showed that education and sensitization programs are critical to creating awareness among community members on the happenings of violent extremism in neighbouring countries to identify signs of extremist activities in communities. Additionally, it was observed that eschewing tribal politics, political vigilantism and discrimination among political parties is paramount to preventing violent extremism. Similarly, there is a need for the government to adequately resource state institutions, particularly security agencies to fight against violent extremism. The End-line participants mentioned the need for the government to extend development to rural areas and ensure transparency in the justice delivery system in the Country to prevent acts of violence. Again, in both the Baseline and End-line surveys, the issue of unemployment featured prominently among other drivers of radicalization into violent extremist activities.

9.2.5 Gender Dynamics of Violent extremism and other Forms of Violence in Ghana

The role of gender in violent extremism was explored in both the Baseline and End-line studies. Specifically, the role of women as perpetrators and agents in preventing violent extremist activities was assessed in both studies. Also, the studies investigated the effect of violent extremism on men and women and other special interest groups including PWDs.

Generally, the proportion of women who indicated that they have ever engaged or participated in any form of violent acts has increased from 30.4% at the Baseline to 39.1% at the End-line. From the perspective of key informants, women as mothers, caregivers and wives often serve as a conduit for the supply of weapons and source of information for violent extremists. Additionally, it was observed that women often provide moral and logistical support to violent extremist groups.

The study highlights the distinct gendered effects of violent extremism (VE). Women were identified as more vulnerable to the repercussions of VE, with 73.2% of End-line participants noting women as more likely to suffer compared to men. Similarly, the key informants mentioned women and children as well as persons with disabilities as the individuals more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities compared to men. Women face psychological trauma, loss of livelihood, homelessness, and often become single mothers due to violence. Men, on the other hand, are commonly targeted for recruitment, forced to fight, or killed during conflicts. Additionally, men experience increased poverty, loss of property, and psychological issues such as substance abuse due to their perceived role as protectors and providers during violent attacks. These findings underscore the profound social and psychological disruptions VE causes for both genders.

Women play critical roles in preventing VE, acting as agents of peace, mediators, and educators within their families and communities. They influence their spouses and children to avoid extremist activities, advocate for dialogue during conflicts, and support peacebuilding efforts. Empowering women through education and economic stability emerged as essential strategies for preventing their involvement or victimization in VE-related activities. Key informants emphasized that women's participation in dialogue, advocacy, and community leadership significantly contributes to mitigating the risks of violent extremism, highlighting their pivotal role in fostering societal resilience.

9.2.6 Assessment of Impact of NCCE's Activities on Preventing Violent Extremism

The End-line study assessed the impact of NCCE's activities on preventing violent extremism. It was found that, more than 4 in 10 (43.2%) had ever attended a forum or an engagement on PCVE organized by the NCCE. The Commission's activities on preventing violent extremism has reached more Youth (60.4%) than the rest of the population. The North East region (70.2%) recorded the highest proportion of respondents who attended a forum or engagement organized by the NCCE.

PCVE messages delivered through radio and posters had the highest reached with 79.5% and 76.8%, respectively. Comparatively, the result indicates that the Commission's T-shirts had a

broader reach and impact, with a higher proportion of respondents reporting visibility than the posters. More than 6 in 10 (61.6%) of the End-line respondents have indicated their engagement with NCCE education activities helped improved their knowledge and understanding of violent extremism and its consequences. Also, more than half of the study respondents indicated that the program enhanced awareness of violent extremism and its prevention. The educational campaigns, community engagement activities, and collaborative efforts with local authorities were cited for creating a sense of vigilance and fostering resilience against radicalization.

The Commission has met its target of increasing level of tolerance of individuals towards different religious and linguistic groups by close 20% to 82.6% at the Baseline to 99.1% at the End-line. Similarly, the target to reduce the percentage of citizens who have ever engaged in acts of violence by 3% was achieved. Finally, the findings indicated that the EU-funded program achieved its primary objectives, particularly in promoting public education and encouraging proactive reporting of suspicious activities.

9.3 Conclusion

The findings showed that efforts to contain the threat of violent extremism and promote peace and stability in the Country through the NAFPCVET framework are yielding positive results. The Framework's approach to building resilience at the community level, promoting awareness, and strengthening the capacities of both local and national institutions to respond proactively to extremism has resulted in the improvement of community and institutional knowledge of the concept of violent extremism. Both government and EU initiatives demonstrate positive strides in combating violent extremism, however, gaps in resource allocation, community inclusion, and long-term strategy persist.

9.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the following are suggested.

1. The study found a significant improvement in the willingness for peaceful coexistence among participants in the study area. This points to the effectiveness of grassroots mobilization, community education, and awareness programs in promoting peaceful coexistence and countering extremism and other forms of violence. Therefore, it is recommended that NCCE's education program particularly the PCVE approach should be scaled-up and tailored towards encouraging the creation of diverse and inclusive neighbourliness.
2. Successful campaigns like "See Something, Say Something " need to be scaled up to ensure broader reach and inclusivity. The NCCE needs to continue education and sensitisation programs to sustain the gains made in raising community members' awareness of violent extremism in neighbouring countries and detecting signs of extremism in communities.

3. In both Baseline and End-line studies, the issue of unemployment comes up strongly among the key drivers of radicalization into violent extremist activities. There is a need to address structural gaps such as unemployment and poverty, which exacerbate vulnerabilities to radicalization.
4. State and non-state actors are key agents in the fight against violent extremism. However, logistical and financial challenges particularly among security agencies limit their ability to increase and strengthen border security to prevent a potential terrorist attack in the country. Therefore, there is a need to enhance the capacity of state actors through targeted training and resource provision. Additionally, there is a need to foster greater collaboration between state and non-state actors to leverage community insights and resources.
5. The study results show that the awareness creation campaign reached considerable number of Ghanaians. However, it is recommended that the awareness creation campaign be sustained beyond the project implementation areas to reach a much wider population.
6. From the End-line study, Pru East district in the Bono East region which previously did not record any instance where respondents were willing to encourage others to join extremist group now had 6 respondents. To substantiate this, other extreme factors were considered. Consequently, poverty emerged as the leading factor in the district as recorded by the Ghana Statistical Service. It is therefore recommended that project implementers think outside of the conventional exposure factors to violent extremism such as porous borders and conflict prone areas and include other areas with known factors such as poverty. There is therefore the need to scale-up the PCVE project to the other eight non-implementing regions.

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APPENDIX I: STUDY INSTRUMENTS

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CIVIC EDUCATION

“END-LINE STUDY ON PREVENTING AND CONTAINING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN EIGHT NORTHERN REGIONS OF GHANA.”

Q U E S T I O N A I R E

The National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), as part of its mandate, is conducting an end-line study on preventing and containing violent extremism (VE) in the eight northern regions of Ghana. This study aims to assess changes in the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of communities and at-risk groups towards violent extremism and other forms of violence since the baseline research. Additionally, it examines the current levels of tolerance, social cohesion and peace within communities towards different religious and linguistic groups and evaluates the contributions of state and non-state actors in the ongoing fight against VE.

PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT YOUR RESPONSES WILL BE TREATED WITH UTMOST CONFIDENTIALITY.
CONSEQUENTLY, YOU NEED NOT PROVIDE YOUR NAME)

NAME OF INTERVIEWER.....

REGION.....

DISTRICT/MUNICIPAL/METRO.

LOCALITY NAME.

DATE OF INTERVIEW.....

SECTION A: BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS

1. Sex:

- i. Male ☐ ii. Female..... ☐

Disability Status:

- i. PWD..... ☐ ii. Non- PWD..... ☐

2. Age: How old are you in complete years?

..... years

3. Educational background: (highest attainment)

- i. Never Attended..... ☐
 ii. Primary ☐
 iii. Quranic school..... ☐
 iv. Middle/JSS/JHS..... ☐
 v. Secondary/SSS/SHS..... ☐
 vii. Post-Secondary (diploma) ☐
 viii. Tertiary (Bachelor, Cert. Diploma, masters, Ph.D. etc)..... ☐
 ix. Other (specify)

4. What is your employment status?

- i. Employed (Public sector) ☐
 ii. Employed (Private sector)..... ☐
 iii. Self-employed without employee(s)..... ☐
 iv. Self-employed with employee(s)..... ☐
 v. Casual worker..... ☐
 vi. Apprentice..... ☐
 vii. Domestic employee ☐
 viii. Unemployed (looking for a job)..... ☐
 ix. Unemployed (not looking for a job)..... ☐
 x. Housewife..... ☐
 xi. Retired/pensioner ☐
 xii. Student..... ☐
 xiii Other (specify).....

5. Marital status

- i. Single ☐ ii. Separated ☐ iii. Widowed ☐
iv. Married ☐ v. Divorced ☐ vi. Living together ☐
vii. Any Other (specify).....

6. Religious affiliation

- i. No religion..... ☐ ii. Christian ☐
iii. Islam..... ☐ iv. Traditionalist..... ☐
v. Any Other (Please specify)

7. Ethnicity:

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| i. Akan..... <input type="checkbox"/> | vi. Dagbani..... <input type="checkbox"/> | xi. Fulani.... <input type="checkbox"/> |
| ii. Ga/Dangme..... <input type="checkbox"/> | vii. Grusi..... <input type="checkbox"/> | xii. Gruni... <input type="checkbox"/> |
| iii. Ewe..... <input type="checkbox"/> | viii. Kusaal <input type="checkbox"/> | xiii. Kokomba <input type="checkbox"/> |
| iv. Guan <input type="checkbox"/> | ix. Mampruli..... <input type="checkbox"/> | xiv. Bimoba.. <input type="checkbox"/> |
| v. Waala..... <input type="checkbox"/> | x. Sissala..... <input type="checkbox"/> | xv. Dagari... <input type="checkbox"/> |
| xvi. Other | | |

SECTION B: KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR OF COMMUNITIES AND AT-RISK GROUPS TOWARDS VIOLENT EXTREMISM & OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE

8. State whether you agree or disagree that the following statements explain violent extremism

Please indicate if you Strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, Strongly disagree or Disagree.

Statements	Level of Agreement					
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Don't know
a. A serious and prolong disagreement among persons or group of persons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. An act of justification, support and use of violent to achieve a goal normally political, social, religious or ideology.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Deceiving others in order to take advantage of them	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Using one's personal resources to fight injustice.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

9a. In the past 12 months, have you **witnessed** any violent extremist acts in your district/community?

- i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

9b. If yes to 9a, how often does this act (act mentioned) occur in your district/community?

- i. Very Often ☐ ii. Sometimes ☐ iii. Seldom ☐ iv. Never ☐

10. Are you aware of any violent extremist group in your district/community?

- i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

11. Do you know of any group within your locality or outside your locality that incite or promote;

	Yes	No
Hatred and discrimination against other groups and persons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Violence against other groups or persons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Reward people for perpetuating violence against other groups or persons	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

12a. Are you aware of any group or persons recruiting people to perpetuate violence in your locality or district?

- i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

12b. If yes to 12a, how do they lure people to recruit (*Select One*)

- i. By sponsoring their education..... ☐
- ii. Providing them with money..... ☐
- iii. Giving them expensive gifts (cars, houses)..... ☐
- iv. Promising them of a better live abroad ☐
- v. By providing social services and infrastructure (boreholes, schools etc). ☐
- vi. Promising employment opportunities ☐
- vii. Providing assurance of security and protection. ☐
- viii. Don't know ☐
- ix. Other

12c. If Yes to 12a, in your opinion which category of people do they target the most? (*Select one*)

- i. Youth..... ☐
- ii. Unemployed youth..... ☐
- iii. Women ☐
- iv. Children ☐
- v. Opinion leaders..... ☐
- vi. Religious leaders..... ☐
- vii. Traditional leaders..... ☐
- viii. Prison returnees/Ex-convicts ☐
- ix. Ex-military/police officers..... ☐
- x. Ardent Internet users ☐
- xi. Refugees/Asylum seekers ☐
- xii. Irregular Migrants ☐
- xiii. Any other (specify)..... ☐

13. Some people help or support the activities of the extremist groups and violence. In your opinion, which institution /persons or group of people are likely to support or give assistance to extremist groups?" (*Select one*)

- i. Foreign governments..... ☐
- ii. Government representatives..... ☐
- iii. Security Personnel..... ☐
- iv. Religious leaders..... ☐
- v. Foreign nationals..... ☐
- vi. Politicians ☐
- vii. Multinational companies/businesses... ☐
- viii. Terrorist organizations..... ☐
- ix. Don't know..... ☐
- x. Others..... ☐

14. In your opinion what could motivate people to join violent extremist groups? (*select one*)

- i. Political and socioeconomic marginalization..... ☐
- ii. Religious suppression..... ☐
- iii. Adventure..... ☐
- iv. Inequality..... ☐
- v. Unemployment..... ☐
- vi. Financial gain ☐
- vii. Alienation..... ☐
- viii. Lack of tolerance..... ☐
- ix. Injustice..... ☐
- x. Lack of voice..... ☐
- xi. Bad governance ☐
- xii. Corruption ☐
- xiii. Unresolved conflicts ☐
- xiv. Human right violations by the police/Military..... ☐
- xv. Don't know..... ☐

xvi. Others.....

15a. In your opinion, what is the main factor that lead some groups or persons to support violent extremist groups? (*Select One*)

- i. Personal enrichment..... ☐
- ii. Government mistreatment or injustices experienced..... ☐
- iii. Poor performance of government to meet the needs of people.. ☐
- iv. Corruption ☐
- v. Religious beliefs..... ☐
- vi. Coercion/fear of extremist groups..... ☐
- vii. Don't know..... ☐
- viii. Other ☐

15b. Between men and women, which gender is more likely to be affected by violent extremist activities?

i. Men ☐

ii Women ☐

If (i) in 15b, give one reason for your answer?

- i. Men are often killed during wars and violent attacks ☐
- ii. Men are more vulnerable to robbery, kidnapping, and violent assaults ☐
- iii. Men face increased poverty during violent attacks as they struggle to provide for their families ☐
- iv. Men are often forced to fight because they are perceived as strong and courageous ☐
- v. Men are frequently targeted for recruitment or involvement in violent attacks ☐
- vi. Men may become unemployed and unable to support their families due to the disruption caused by violence. ☐
- vii. Men risk losing their properties during violent conflicts. ☐
- viii. Men sometimes resort to substance abuse to cope with the psychological trauma they experience ☐
- ix. Men may lose their sense of dignity and self-worth during violent attacks ☐

If (ii) in 15b, give one reason for your answer?

- i. Women are often considered the most vulnerable group in society ☐
- ii. Women are disproportionately burdened with poverty and caregiving responsibilities ☐
- iii. Women are more likely to become single parents as a result of wars and violent extremist activities ☐
- iv. Women are often lured, kidnapped, raped, or killed during violent extremist activities ☐
- v. Women face loss of economic livelihood due to displacement or conflict ☐
- vi. Women are frequently left vulnerable when their husbands or male protectors are killed ☐
- vii. Women are less likely to have access to knowledge or resources for self-defense ☐
- viii. Women are denied opportunities to participate in decision-making and protection mechanisms. ☐

16. In the context of insecurity in Ghana, imagine that you are approached and offered an interesting financial proposal by someone that seems suspicious or is part of a suspicious group in exchange for your help. Please tell me if it is very likely, likely, unlikely or very unlikely that you would personally do the following in this situation:

	Very likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very unlikely
a. Try to avoid contact with that person.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Consult a friend or family member.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Try to learn more about the offer	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Contact the official authorities (e.g., the security forces)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Consult a community leader	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Will access the money and offer the help	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

17. Do you know of any person or individual in your district/community who has been recruited by an extremist group to perpetuate violence?

- i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

18. If you happen to know that a family member or close friend is expressing interest in joining an extremist group, what would you do? (**Select One**)

- i. Encourage him/her to join ☐
 ii. Advise him/her to desist from joining..... ☐
 iii. Report him/her to security agency..... ☐
 iv. Do nothing..... ☐
 v. Other (Specify)

19a. Do you think there will come a time, Ghana will experience an extremist attack?

- i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐ iii. Not sure ☐

19b. If Yes, briefly provide a reason for your response

- i. The rise of extremist ideologies in the region ☐
 ii. Increased recruitment efforts by extremist groups ☐
 iii. Weaknesses in national security and intelligence ☐
 iv. Economic hardships leading to vulnerability ☐
 v. Social unrest or political instability ☐
 vi. Other (Please specify) ☐

19c. If No, briefly provide a reason for your response:

- i. Ghana's strong community ties and resilience ☐
 ii. Effective measures taken by the government and security forces ☐
 iii. Low presence of extremist groups in the country ☐
 iv. Public awareness and education on extremism ☐
 v. Belief that socio-economic factors protect against extremism ☐
 vi. Other (Please specify) ☐

20a. In the past 12 months, have you **witnessed** any violent acts (apart from violent extremism) in your district?

- i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

20b. If Yes to 20a, what form of violence was that? (*Select One*)

- i. Chieftaincy dispute..... ☐
- ii. Land dispute ☐
- iii. Ethnic conflict ☐
- iv. Inter-communal clashes..... ☐
- v. Religious conflict..... ☐
- vi. Election related violence ☐
- vii. Armed robbery ☐
- viii. Any other

20c. If yes to 20a, how often does this act (act mentioned) occur in your district?

- i. Very Often ☐
- ii. Sometimes ☐
- iii. Seldom ☐
- iv. Never ☐

21a. Have you ever engaged in any form of violent act?

- i. Yes ☐
- ii. No ☐

21b. If Yes, what type/form of violent act did you engage in? (*Select One*)

- i. Election related violence... ☐
- ii. Chieftaincy disputes..... ☐
- iii. Religious conflicts..... ☐
- iv. Armed robbery ☐
- v. Tribal violence ☐
- vi. Inter-communal clashes.. ☐
- vii. Land disputes..... ☐
- viii. Any other (specify).....

21c. Why did you engage in the violent act(s) mentioned? (*Select One*)

- i. For my voice to be heard ☐
- ii. For better living condition ☐
- iii. To demand for my right ☐
- iv. To put fear in people ☐
- v. Other

SECTION C: COMMUNITIES LEVEL OF TOLERANCE TOWARDS DIFFERENT GROUPS

22. For each of the following group of persons, please indicate whether you would like to have people from this group as neighbors by ticking one of the likert scale given; would like, wouldn't care, would dislike

Group of persons	Would Dislike	Wouldn't care	Would like	Don't know
a. People of different religion(s)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. People from another ethnic group	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

c. People belonging to political party other than yours	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
---	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

23. How often, if at all have you personally been discriminated against or harassed based on any of the following:

	Once	Several times	Never	Not Applicable
Your ethnicity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Your religion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Your political affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Disability status	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

24. How would you rate the level of existence of the following in your community:

	Does not exist	Exist but not violent	Exist with violence
a, Political polarization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b, Religious intolerance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c, Ethnic conflict	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d, Chieftaincy factions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e, Land/Boundary disputes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

25. In your district, have you ever witnessed a situation where someone was denied access to public facility (*place of worship, health facility, school, recreational centers etc*) due to;

	Yes	No
a. His/her ethnicity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Religious affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Political affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Disability status	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Nationality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

26. In your district, have you ever witnessed a situation where someone was treated unfairly due to:

	Yes	No
a. His/her ethnicity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Religious affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Political affiliation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Disability status	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

e. Gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Nationality	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

SECTION D: CONTRIBUTION OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST VE.
(NON-STATE ACTORS)

27a. Do you know of any Civil Society Organization(s)/NGOs implementing protection activities and combating radicalization in your locality?

i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

27b. If Yes, mention at least one of such CSOs/NGOs

- i. West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) ☐
- ii. Northern Ghana Interfaith Group ☐
- iii. Savannah Women's Empowerment Group ☐
- iv. Ghana Developing Communities Association (GDCA) ☐
- v. Youth Empowerment for Life ☐
- vi. Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA) ☐
- vii. NABOCARDO ☐
- viii. Community Development Alliance (CDA-Ghana) ☐
- ix. COGINTA ☐
- x. Other (Please specify) ☐

27c. Briefly describe what they do specifically

- i. Conducting community awareness programs on violent extremism ☐
- ii. Organizing youth empowerment initiatives to reduce vulnerability to radicalization ☐
- iii. Providing support services for at-risk individuals ☐
- iv. Collaborating with local authorities to strengthen community resilience ☐
- v. Educating the public on violent extremism and its risks ☐
- vi. Offering vocational training and employment programs for youth ☐
- vii. Supporting victims of violence and radicalization ☐
- viii. Promoting peacebuilding and interfaith dialogue ☐
- ix. Engaging local leaders and community stakeholders in conflict resolution ☐
- x. Other (Please specify) ☐

28a. Have you ever attended a forum or an engagement on preventing violent extremism organized by any NGOs/CSOs?

i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

28b. If Yes, mention the name of the NGO/CSO

- i. West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) ☐
- ii. Northern Ghana Interfaith Group ☐
- iii. Savannah Women's Empowerment Group ☐
- iv. Ghana Developing Communities Association (GDCA) ☐
- v. Youth Empowerment for Life ☐
- vi. Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA) ☐
- vii. NABOCARDO ☐
- viii. COGINTA ☐

- ix. Community Development Alliance (CDA-Ghana) ☐
- x. Other (Please specify)

(STATE ACTORS)

29. Do you know of any state institution(s) established by law to tackle violent extremism and terrorism in Ghana? (Tick one)

- | | | |
|-------|---|--------------------------|
| i. | Ghana Police Service (GPS) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| ii. | Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| iii. | National Investigation Bureau (NIB) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| iv. | Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| v. | Ghana Revenue Authority-Customs Division (GRA-CD) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| vi. | Ghana Prisons Service | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| vii. | National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| viii. | National Peace Council | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| ix. | Any other (specify)..... | |

30. How will you assess the performance of the named anti-violent extremism and terrorism agency in terms of the following?

- i. Public relations/public education, sensitization/awareness creation
[Very High = VH, High = H, Average = A, Low = L and Very Low = VL, Don't know = DK]
VH ☐ H ☐ A ☐ L ☐ VL ☐ DK ☐
- ii. Promptness in service delivery
[Very Prompt = VP, Prompt = P, Somehow Prompt = SP, Not Very Prompt = NVP And Not Prompt = NP, Don't Know = DK]
VP ☐ P ☐ SP ☐ NVP ☐ NP ☐ DK ☐
- iii. Pro-activeness in identifying and responding to cases of terrorism /Violent Extremism
[Very Proactive = VP, Proactive = P, Somehow Proactive = SP, Not Very Proactive = NVP, Not Proactive = NP and Don't Know DK]
VP ☐ P ☐ SP ☐ NVP ☐ NP ☐ DK ☐
- iv. Prosecution of cases of violent extremism or communal violence/terrorism
[Very well = VW, Well = W, Poor = P, Very Poor = VP and Don't Know DK]
VW ☐ W ☐ P ☐ VP ☐ DK ☐
- v. Collaboration with other stakeholders and communities in responding to the threat of Terrorism and Violent Extremism
[Very well = VW, Well = W, Poor = P, Very Poor = VP and Don't Know DK]
VW ☐ W ☐ P ☐ VP ☐ DK ☐

31a. Have you ever attended a forum or an engagement on preventing violent extremism organized by any government entity (institution/ministry or agency)?

i. Yes.. ☐ ii. No.. ☐

31b. If Yes, Mention one of such entity (*Select One*)

- | | | |
|-------|---|--------------------------|
| i. | District/Municipal/Metropolitan Assembly..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| ii. | Ministry of Information..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| iii. | Ministry of National Security | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| iv. | NCCE..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| v. | National Peace Council (NPC) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| vi. | Ministry of Local Government and Rural development..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| vii. | Information Service Department..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| viii. | Don't know..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| ix. | Other | <input type="checkbox"/> |

32. How effective do you think your district has been in addressing violent acts?

- i. Very effective..... ☐
- ii. Somewhat effective ☐
- iii. Not at all effective..... ☐
- iv Don't know ☐

33a. Are you aware of any measures put in place by government to prevent violent extremism and other forms of violent acts in the country?

i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

33b.If Yes, mention one of such measures

- | | | |
|------|---|--------------------------|
| i. | National Counter-Terrorism Strategy | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| ii. | Community policing initiatives | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| iii. | Public education campaigns by NCCE | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| iv. | Border security improvements | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| v. | Collaboration with international organizations (e.g., UN, EU) | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| vi. | Other (Please specify) | |

34. Have you heard about the government's "See something, say something" campaign which encourages citizens to be vigilant against violent extremism activities?

i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐

35. In your opinion whom should one report to when he/she sees any suspicious activities in the community/ district? (*Select one*)

- | | | |
|------|--|--------------------------|
| i. | Family elder..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| ii. | Friend/family member..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| iii. | Land lord..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| iv. | Security Service (Police, Immigration, Army) ... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| v. | Assemblyman/woman..... | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| vi | Chief | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| vii | Religious leader | <input type="checkbox"/> |

viii Other

36. How effective do you think the government has been in its efforts to address the problem of violence in this country?

- i. Very effective.....☐
- ii. Somewhat effective☐
- iii. Not at all effective.....☐
- iv Don't know☐

37. In your opinion, what more can be done to prevent violence in your district?

- i. Government should empower law enforcement institutions to enforce laws on violence in the district.....☐
- ii. Citizens should adhere to the rule of law and ensure peace at all times.....☐
- i. Government should resource the security agencies to strengthen surveillance at the borders.....☐
- ii. Government should provide sustainable jobs/employable skills for the youth....☐
- iii. Parties to conflict should be encouraged to resolve their differences through effective dialogues.....☐
- iv. NCCE and Information Service Department should be better resource to sensitize the public on the need for peaceful co-existence.....☐
- v. Other

38. In your opinion, what do you think is the best way for the government to address the country's potential threat to violent extremist activities.? (*Multiple Response*)

- i. Strengthen the military response or military capabilities.....☐
- ii. Working together with religious leaders to address the issue.....☐
- iii. Working together with traditional leaders to address the issue.....☐
- iv. Cooperate more with our neighboring countries to address the issue.....☐
- v. Improve the economy and create more jobs.....☐
- vi. Intensify public education on the negative effective of violent extremism.....☐
- vi. Improve education standards.....☐
- vii. Increase resources distributed to states and local communities.....☐
- ix. Don't know☐
- x. Other (specify)

CITIZENS' KNOWLEDGE ABOUT NCCE'S ACTIVITIES ON PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

EXPOSURE TO NCCE'S EDUCATION

39a. Have you ever attended a forum or an engagement on preventing violent extremism organized by the NCCE

- i. Yes. ☐ ii. No. ☐

39b. If yes to 39a, please explain how the forum or engagement impacted on your knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors towards violent extremism and other forms of violence in your district/locality?

39c. If yes to 41a, please explain whether the forum or engagement has brought about some changes in the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of communities and at-risk groups in your district and community towards violent extremism and other forms of violence?

40. Have you heard or seen any advertisement, information, or poster on fighting Violent Extremism and other forms of violence by the NCCE within your community or locality within the last year within the last 12 months?

- i. Yes ☐ ii. No ☐ iii. Can't tell. ☐

41a. Within the last 12 months have you heard or seen any advert, messages, information and posters on addressing violent extremism by the NCCE on each of the following media outlets

TV	Radio	Community info Centre	Posters	Website	Social media
Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>
No <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>	No <input type="checkbox"/>

41b. If yes to any media outlet, what message was sent across by your chosen media outlet? (Tick all that apply)


- i. Peaceful coexistence and social cohesion ☐
- ii. Triggers and effects of violent extremism ☐
- ii. Signs of radicalization ☐
- iii. Identifying early warning signals of VE activities..... ☐
- iv. Role of citizens in preventing and containing violent extremism ... ☐
- v. Threats of violent extremism ☐
- vi. Actions to take in the event of an attack ☐
- vii. Any other (specify)

42. The NCCE has designed posters on violent extremism, the posters look like these (show posters to respondents). Do you think you have ever seen these posters at any program within your district or municipality or T shirts worn by officials of NCCE?

(a) T-shirts worn by any official of NCCE



(b) Posters on Violent Extremism



43. To what extent do you feel that the EU-funded Action has reduced the risk of radicalization and engagement in criminal activities within your community, particularly among unemployed youth and ethnic minorities?

- | | | |
|------|----------------------|----------------------|
| i. | Not at all | <input type="text"/> |
| ii. | To a small extent | <input type="text"/> |
| iii. | To a moderate extent | <input type="text"/> |
| iv. | To a large extent | <input type="text"/> |
| v. | Completely | <input type="text"/> |

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME

INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE

A. INTRODUCTION

As part of supporting the Government's efforts to prevent and contain the threat of violent extremism (VE) and other forms of violence in Ghana, the NCCE has implemented a project aimed at preventing and containing violent extremism in the northern parts of the country. This project has contributed significantly to promoting social cohesion, peace, and tolerance among communities while strengthening the roles of state and non-state actors in combating violent extremism.

Following the baseline study and the implementation of the project, we are now conducting an end-line survey to assess the impact of the project. This survey seeks to evaluate changes in community attitudes, behaviors, and institutional responses towards preventing and containing violent extremism in Ghana. The findings will further inform public education efforts and contribute to the national discourse on violent extremism, particularly in northern Ghana.

We invite you to participate in this end-line study by sharing your knowledge and insights on the subject. Please be assured that your participation will remain anonymous, and your responses will be treated with the utmost confidentiality

Name of Interviewer:

Date of Interview:

B. CONSENT GIVEN FOR INTERVIEW Yes ☐ No ☐

C. BACKGROUND/ SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Region	
District	
Locality	
Organization	
Designation/Rank/Position	
Gender	
Educational level	
Age (select an age range)	a) 15 -24 b) 25-35 c) 36-60 d) Above 60

D. KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES, AND BEHAVIOURS OF COMMUNITIES AND AT-RISK GROUPS TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE

1. Are there any violent extremism activity (ies) happening in your region/ district/locality?
2. In your opinion, what is the state of security in terms of safety of persons and protection from extremist attacks in your region/district/locality (Probe: Why?)
3. Can you shed light on known or potential extremist activities that have occurred since 2023 and are present in your jurisdiction?
4. Apart from violent extremism, have you ever witnessed any acts of violence in your district/region/locality over the past 12 months?
5. In your region/district/locality, do you know of any individuals or groups most likely to engage in violent extremist acts?
6. In your opinion what can motivate people to engage in acts of violent extremism in your district/region/locality?

E. COMMUNITIES' LEVEL OF TOLERANCE TOWARDS DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC GROUPS

7. How would you rate the level of existence of the following in your community? (For each of the options indicate whether they exist, exist but not with violence or exist with violence)
 - a) Political polarization
 - b) Religious intolerance
 - c) Ethnic conflict
 - d) Chieftaincy factions
 - e) Land/Boundary disputes
8. Do you know of any situation where some members of your community have been discriminated against based on their; (i) religion (ii) ethnic group or (iii) political affiliation (iv) Gender (v) Nationality?
9. Are people with different national, ethnic, religious, or political backgrounds able to live peacefully in your community? If Yes/No, state why.

F. CONTRIBUTIONS OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM

10. How has your institution responded to the risk or threat of violent extremism in your region/district/locality? (Probe: Strategies, Focal persons/Unit in place, Challenges)
11. How is your institution contributing to peaceful co-existence and national cohesion in your region/district/locality?
12. How have you collaborated with NCCE in responding to the threat of Violent Extremism in your region/district/locality? (Probe: If yes, state the nature of the collaboration)
13. Do you have a focal person whose duty is to spearhead activities related to violent extremism in your institution? (Probe: If yes, State the specific duties)
14. How well are you equipped to respond to the risk of violent extremism in the following areas:
 - **For security agencies** probe: logistics (drones, transport, ammunition), financial support, staff strength, training/skills development, etc.)
 - **For Traditional/ CSO/ Media** probe: training/capacity building, collaborations, community support, etc.
15. Are you aware of any other organization working on preventing and countering violent extremism in your region/district /locality (Probe: CSO's NGOs, Religious Groups, State Institutions)? Briefly describe what they do specifically.
16. Are you aware of any EU-funded Actions that have reduced the risk of radicalisation of members of your community and engagements in activities of criminal groups? (Probe: What was the project about?)

G. ROLE OF WOMEN IN PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

17. Between men and women who are more prone to the adverse effects of violent extremist activities and why.
18. In your opinion, what role do women play in perpetrating violent extremist acts
19. In your opinion, what role can women play in preventing violent extremist acts in the country?

H. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

20. What in your view are the best ways to prevent acts of violent extremism and other forms of violence in your region/district/locality?

APPENDIX II: SAMPLE SIZE DISTRIBUTION BY REGION AND DISTRICT

NO.	REGION	DISTRICT	DISTRICT SAMPLE SIZE	REGIONAL SAMPLE SIZE
1.	BONO	BANDA	6	
2.	“	DORMAA CENTRAL MUNICIPAL	23	
3.	“	DORMAA WEST	9	
4.		JAMAN SOUTH MUNICIPAL	22	
5.		JAMAN NORTH	24	
	BONO TOTAL			84
6.	NORTH EAST	BUNKPURUGU NYANKPANDURI	17	
7.	“	CHEREPONI	18	
8.	“	EAST MAMPRUSI MUNICIPAL	38	
9.	“	YUNYOO NASUAN	11	
	NORTH EAST TOTAL			84
10.	NORTHERN	NANUMBA NORTH MUNICIPAL	38	
11.	“	NANUMBA SOUTH	22	
12.	“	SABOBA	19	
13.	“	SAVELUGU MUNICIPAL	25	
14.	“	TAMALE METROPOLITAN	76	
15.	“	TATALE-SANGULI	15	
16.	“	YENDI MUNICIPAL	31	
17.	“	SAGNARIGU MUNICIPAL	69	
18.	“	GUSHEGU MUNICIPAL	31	
19.	“	KPANDAI	26	
20.	“	TOLON	24	
21.	“	KARAGA	23	
22.	“	KUMBUNGU	22	
23.	“	MION	19	
	NORTHERN TOTAL			440
24.	OTI	KRACHI NCHUMURU	27	
25.	“	KADJEBI	15	
26.	“	GUAN	6	
27.	“	NKWANTA NORTH	25	
28.	“	KRACHI EAST	12	
	OTI TOTAL			85
29.	SAVANNAH	BOLE	23	
30.	“	CENTRAL GONJA	29	
31.	“	EAST GONJA	24	
32.	“	SAWLA TUNA KALBA	23	
	SAVANNAH TOTAL			99

NO.	REGION	DISTRICT	DISTRICT SAMPLE SIZE	REGIONAL SAMPLE SIZE
33.	UPPER EAST	BAWKU MUNICIPAL	24	
34.	“	BAWKU WEST	29	
35.	“	BINDURI	16	
36.	“	BOLGATANGA MUNICIPAL	28	
37.	“	BONGO	24	
38.	“	GARU	15	
39.	“	KASSENA NANKANA MUNICIPAL	20	
40.	“	KASSENA NANKANA WEST	18	
41.	“	NABDAM	11	
42.	“	TALENSI	18	
43.	“	PUSIGA	16	
44.	“	TEMPANE	18	
	UPPER EAST TOTAL			237
45.	UPPER WEST	JIRAPA	18	
46.	“	LAMBUSSIE-KARNI	10	
47.	“	LAWRA	12	
48.	“	NADOWLI-KALEO	16	
49.	“	NANDOM	11	
50.	“	SISSALA EAST	16	
51.	“	SISSALA WEST	13	
52.	“	WA WEST	19	
53.	“	WA MUNICIPAL	41	
54.	“	WA EAST	18	
	UPPER WEST TOTAL			174
55.	BONO EAST	TECHIMAN MUNICIPAL	49	
56.	“	ATEBUBU AMANTIN	29	
57.	“	PRU EAST	28	
58.	“	KINTAMPO SOUTH MUNICIPAL	23	
59.	“	SENE EAST	21	
	BONO EAST TOTAL			150
TOTAL SAMPLE SIZE			1353	1353

APPENDIX III: DISTRIBUTION AND BACKGROUND OF KEY INFORMANTS INTERVIEWED

REGION	NO. OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED	INSTITUTIONS CONTACTED
NORTHERN	7	Ghana Immigration Service
		Ghana Police Service
		National Intelligence Bureau
		Customs Division of GRA
		Ghana Prisons Service
		Media (Zaa Multimedia)
		CSO (CONGINTA)
SAVANNAH	5	Ghana Immigration Service
		Ghana Police Service
		National Intelligence Bureau
		Customs Division of GRA
		Office of the National Chief Imam
NORTH EAST	5	Ghana Police Service
		National Intelligence Bureau
		Ghana Prisons Service
		Ghana Immigration Service
		Media (Nobiya FM)
UPPER EAST	8	Ghana Immigration Service
		Ghana Prisons Service
		Customs Division of GRA
		National Intelligence Bureau
		National Peace Council
		Regional House of Chiefs
		Media (GBC)
UPPER WEST	6	CSO (NABOCADO)
		Ghana Immigration Service
		Ghana Armed Forces
		Ghana Prisons Service
		Customs Division of GRA
		Regional House of Chiefs
BONO	6	National Intelligence Bureau
		Ghana Immigration Service
		Ghana Police Service
		Ghana Prisons Service
		Customs Division of GRA
		Regional House of Chiefs
BONO EAST	5	National Intelligence Bureau
		Citizens watch Ghana
		Ghana Immigration Service

OTI	6	Ghana Police Service
		National Intelligence Bureau
		National Peace Council
		Media (Gaskiya FM)
		Ghana prisons services
		Ghana police service
		Ghana Immigration Service
		Regional House of Chiefs
		NGO (Citizens Care)
		Media (Kano FM)